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Pacific News #29

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Pacific News

Die Pacific News, ISSN 1435-8360, ist das periodisch erscheinende Informationsmedium der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Pazifische Studien e.V. (APSA), welches in Zusammenarbeit mit der Abt. für Humangeographie am Geographischen Institut der Universität Göttingen herausgegeben wird. Durch die interdisziplinäre Vielfalt der Beiträge möchte die Pacific News ihren Lesern die Beschäftigung mit aktuellen Entwicklungen im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum erleichtern; ferner ist es ein Bestreben der APSA, engagierten Nachwuchswissenschaftlern eine seriöse Publikationsplattform anzubieten. Die Pacific News erscheint halbjährlich. Interessierte Autoren können die Redaktion unter den angegebenen Adressen kontaktieren.

EDITORIAL

Rolf Jordan hat sich nach über sieben Jahren Mitarbeit an der Zeitschrift Pacific News aus der Redaktion zurückgezogen. Insgesamt hat er an über 15 Ausgaben mitgewirkt und ganz wesentlich dazu beigetragen, dass sich die Zeitschrift zu einem angesehenen, auch visuell ansprechendem Publikationsmedium entwickelt hat. Durch seine kritisch-hinterfragende Art, seinen scharfen Intellekt, seine Bescheidenheit und hohe Verlässlichkeit hat sich Rolf Jordan eine sehr große Wertschätzung erworben. Für die sehr gute Zusammenarbeit möchten wir ihm überaus herzlich danken.

Dr. Michael Waibel

Julia Albrecht

Seine Nachfolgerin ist Julia Albrecht, die seit Januar 2003 Mitglied der APSA ist und bereits mehrere Beiträge für die Pacific News verfasst hat. Die Geographin promoviert derzeit am Department of Tourism der University of Otago, Dunedin, Neuseeland als Stipendiatin der Hochschule zu einem tourismusgeographischen Thema.

Wie Sie sicher festgestellt haben, hat sich auch das äußere Erscheinungsbild der Pacific News leicht verändert. Auch hier gab es einen personellen Wechsel: Daniel Meilwes konnte die Arbeit am Layout der Pacific News nicht fortsetzen, da er derzeit in Japan einem längeren Studienaufenthalt absolviert. Insgesamt hat Daniel Meilwes in den letzten vier Jahren acht Ausgaben der Pacific News gestaltet und das Layout der Zeitschrift immer mehr professionalisiert. Auch ihm sind wir zu sehr großem Dank verpflichtet.

Als Nachfolger wurde Long Tran ausgewählt, der eine abgeschlossene Ausbildung als Mediengestalter aufzuweisen hat und momentan noch in einer Werbeagentur tätig ist, um später das Lehramtsstudium im Bereich Druck- und Medientechnik in Angriff zu nehmen.

Trotz dieser personellen Veränderungen und weiterer Widerstände „von oben“, bleibt unser Bestreben, eine inhaltlich wie visuell ansprechende Zeitschrift zu erstellen, die ein weites Themen- sowie Länderspektrum abdeckt, unverändert.

So werden auch in dieser Ausgabe wieder spannende Gegenwartsthemen aus Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur sowie Wirtschaft behandelt; der geographische Focus reicht von Vietnam, Burma, China und Japan bis hin zu Australien.

Immer wieder ist es uns auch möglich, bereits diskutierte Themen wieder aufzunehmen und im aktuellen Kontext zu betrachten. Während die Dezemberausgabe 1999 in „Tourismus in Myanmar“ positive wirtschaftliche Aspekte der Tourismusentwicklung Burmas hervorhebt, hat Manfred Keilert's Leserbrief von 2004 dies bereits deutlich kritischer beurteilt und Pros und Contras eines Boykotts durch internationale Touristen abgewogen.

In dieser Ausgabe diskutiert nun Andrea Valentin vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen tragischen Geschehnisse und möglicher Zukunftsszenarien den Tourismusboykott Burmas.

Die Redaktion

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Die einzelnen Beiträge spiegeln nicht in jedem Fall die Meinung der APSA wieder.

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COVER PICTURE:
Kambodschanischer Hirtenjunge auf dem Weg zum täglichen Baden mit seinen Wasser- Büffeln. Um die mit Schnellbooten vorbeifahrenden Touristen zu beeindrucken, vollführte der Junge einige Kunststücke auf dem Rücken des Büffels.
Ort: Südliche Provinz Takeo (Kambodscha) - Angkor Borei
© März 2007 Carina Gertig

BACK PICTURE:
Titel: Menschen des Inle-Sees
Ein Mann vom Volk der Intha rudert mit der traditionellen Einbeinruderer-Technik über Inle See/Burma.
© 7/2007 Maraile Görgen

Boycotting Burma in 2007 – Has the Debate Changed in any Way?

Andrea Valentin

Burma, a land of golden pagodas, ancient capitals, traditional arts and crafts, vast topographical diversity and a warm friendly people, offers a richly rewarding travel experience. Today the country is opening up rapidly, giving the visitor access to more of its wonders than ever before. Burma, however, also has a repressive military regime accused of serious human rights abuses, and a detained opposition leader who has repeatedly urged people not to visit. Therefore travel to Burma has been rather contested, and has been the subject of a long-running disagreement: is it ethical for tourists to visit Burma?

For poor, isolated and repressive regimes, foreign tourists - preferably those high spenders on a controlled route - represent an excellent opportunity to gain much-needed foreign exchange in large amounts in a short period of time, on top of increased investment and infrastructure development. On a more subtle level it is argued that the tourists coming to the country may also give legitimacy to the military rule. The visitors deciding to go to Burma may or may not consider the ramifications of supporting a military regime, which is ruling Burma illegitimately since 1988.

Yet the question arises in what way could a tourist exert any influence, by travelling there or not? The ethics of going to Burma are more complex than they seem on the surface: tourist numbers have increased significantly over the years, at least according to its government (Myanmar Ministry for Hotels and Tourism, 2007). This is despite the fact that prominent figures such as Tony Blair, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi and many more are telling the world to stay away and boycott Burma as a tourist destination. This article examines the complexities of the Burma travel boycott debate, whilst providing potential future tourism scenarios post 'Saffron-monk-uprising' of late 2007.

'Burma' or 'Myanmar'?

It is necessary to elaborate on the name use for many reasons. The recent military crack down on pro-democracy protests by the monks in the country showed the 'war of words', which has started again over what to call the nation (e.g. BBC 2007a). Political exiles, the United States and the BBC prefer the old name 'Burma', which stems from British colonial days. The United Nations, ASEAN, Japan and many other nations have adopted 'Myanmar' as the official name. The Military Junta officially switched to 'Union of Myanmar' in 1989, which was followed by an official name change for the capital – from 'Rangoon' to 'Yangon' (The Boston Globe 2007). Yet, critics argue that this move lacked legitimacy, as it was made by an unelected Junta, who paid no attention to the actual 1990 election results: a landslide 82% voted for the National League of Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi (Burma News International 1990, Democratic Voice of Burma 1990). Today exile groups still use 'Burma' because it was the name of the country before they fled during the 1988 protests, and also organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) use the name 'Burma' intentionally. The US have made an official stance in saying that they will also stick with the pre 1989-name, emphasising:

> **"The democratically elected but never convened Parliament of 1990 does not recognize the name change, and the democratic opposition continues to use the name 'Burma'. Due to consistent support for the democratically elected leaders, the US government likewise uses 'Burma'."**
>
> **US State Department 2007 website, no page number**

On the other hand, the United Nations, bound by what the sovereign government says, uses the name 'Myanmar'. Notably however, Mathieson (Human Rights Watch Asia 2007) notes that the name change is more hotly debated *outside* the country than by its citizens, many of whom are now used to the change. It might be tempting to accept the name-change of 1989 given the colonial associations with 'Burma', but the author will continue to use the name 'Burma'.

The tourism boycott debate

To go or not to go - that is the question in the context of Burma. The boycott on tourism began in response to the military government's Visit Myanmar Year of 1996, which aimed at bringing foreign investment into the country through business, especially tourism (e.g. Hall 1997). Hotels were being built, infrastructure was developed, and cosmetic renovations were taking place in order to attract visitors. Much of this work notoriously used forced labour. The response from the National League for Democracy (NLD) and international organisations was a call to boycott Burma as a tourist destination, until the government had made visible progress towards democracy. It is argued that visiting Burma can be seen to give moral support to the military junta, as it transfers to the dictatorship a sense of respectability and credibility. In the view of the Myanmar State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), "tourism will replace criticism from abroad" (General Khin Nyunt 1995, Human Rights Watch 2007).

Don't go!

The wider issue of tourism to Burma also needs to address the fact that each tourist, unwillingly or not, financially supports a totalitarian miliary regime. The junta is known for eliminating any formal opposition to their rule, but have over the years provided extremely stable political environments in which tourism has flourished. The military junta constantly uses visitor counts as an excuse to legitimise repression – if 660.000 people visited Burma in 2006, then they all accepted the fact that Burma was a nice place to visit (Myanmar Ministry of Hotels and Tourism 2007). However, another fact is that much, perhaps all, of the Burmese tourist infrastructure is military-owned (see Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Karen Human Rights Group, Burma Watch International, Aung San Suu Kyi). Thus each tourist who visits any of the Pagodas, who uses any of their airlines, or who stays at any hotels, puts money directly or indirectly into the generals' pockets. The foreign exchange that tourism brings to the regime helps it to increase its oversized military: the SPDC was virtually bankrupt in 1988, but used foreign investment and currency to double the size of its military throughout the 1990s (Burma Campaign UK 2003; Guardian 2007). The presence of tourists alone, whether or not they use such facilities, may even be seen to provide justification to carry out such projects. Also the highly-aware, 'ethical' tourists will find it difficult to avoid using some government-linked businesses and facilities, particularly public transport (Voices for Burma 2007), and it is impossible to escape the purchase of a visa and airport tax; also, 80% of money exchange facilities in the country are filled by the government, and the other 20% are quite possibly linked to the government (Lonely Planet 2003).

Human rights reports (see for instance Amnesty International, OXFAM, UNESCO) on Burma/Myanmar also illustrate the interrelationship between human rights abuses and tourism: slaved labour in the name of tourism has been reported continuously, but particularly since the Junta's announcement of its 'Visit Myanmar Year'. There are cases of overnight-displacements of young girls and boys, who are forced to build hotels during daytime, are raped at night, and often die of malnutrition during the construction (Human Rights Watch 2007b, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development 2005; Shan Women's Action Network; Tutu, Havel and Suu Kyi 2006). At the same time the Military Junta has acknowledged that tourism is a vital source of much-needed income and investment. Clearly, the situation in Burma is bleak, with the Economist (2007b) noting "George Orwell's best book about Burma is not 'Burmese Days', but '1984'". So overall, the question on whether to go or not brings into focus, in a personal way, the same dilemma that also international businesses and foreign governments face when deciding whether and how to deal with one of the world's most pernicious regimes. Do we isolate, believing that any contact would add legitimacy to the unelected military junta? Or do we engage, hoping to gain some influence?

Maraile Görgen 2007

Quo Vadis Burma?

The tourist loves coming to Burma, if only because it has been closed off for so long, and is perceived as relatively 'new and exotic' compared to neighbouring countries. Burma lures because it still seems to have an air of 'old Asia' to it, which other countries are losing quickly, and 'the old' is what many travellers seek (see ThornTree Travel Forum Myanmar). So it is no secret that there are taboos about travelling to Burma because many political figures have joined the 'I'm not going' campaigns (Guardian, BBC, Rough Guide). Amongst them is Tony Blair, who stressed that "I would urge anyone who may be thinking of visiting Burma on holiday to consider carefully whether by their actions they are helping to support the regime and prolong such dreadful abuses" (Burma Campaign UK 2005). Clearly, campaigners want to discourage trade, investment, and tourism, which is highly influenced by Aung San Suu Kyi - for many people, her call for a boycott is a good enough reason to stay away.

Go!

On the other hand, several organizations argue exactly the opposite, in that they believe in cultural exchange, bringing foreign ideas into the country, engaging with the people and simply showing the Burmese that the rest of the world has not forgotten them. But 'the Lady' (as she is called in Burma) responded:

"Burmese people know their own problems better than anyone else. They know what they want - they want democracy - and many have died for it. To suggest that there's anything new that tourists can teach the people of Burma about their situation is not simply patronising - it's also racist."

Aung San Suu Kyi, 1999

Notably, Suu Kyi was, for many years, beyond criticism, her reputation emphasised by memories of the NLD's electoral triumph, her 1991 Nobel peace prize, and the many interviews she gave during temporary relaxation of her house arrest. Now it seems that her reputation is suffering some backlash. Critics argue that the failure of the democratic movement in Burma may be partly due to Suu Kyi's inflexibility, particularly regarding her support for the international boycott of investment and tourism, which has led the Junta to arrange partnerships with ASEAN, Russia, and India (Economist, 2007). In fact, some critics go as far as saying that her unyielding stance jeopardises the hopes of the democratic movement, adding that she may have become part of the problem, not the solution. The anti-boycott side also argues that more than 10 years of boycotting has not helped the situation in any way, but has rather hurt the 'people on the ground' (Voices for Burma 2007).

Another compelling argument against the tourism boycott is the lack of economic importance of tourism, compared to trade with its Asian neighbours: Thailand, India, and China. Time Asia discussed the importance of Chinese trade, aid and investment to Burma, with trade alone being worth US$1.1 billion in 2004. China is by far the largest supplier of foreign investment to Burma, accounting for US$126.6 million in 2004/05. Burma's other principal exports include teak, pulses and textiles, and it is one of the world's largest producers of opiates. In 2004/05, exports brought in a total of US$ 2.9 billion in foreign currency (Myanmar Ministry of Hotels and Tourism 2007; Xinhua News Service 2007). Until this situation changes the tourist's visa fee, or the lack of it, will probably make very little difference to the regime's coffers.

Interestingly, when asked about 'alternative tourism' in an interview, Aung San Suu Kyi conceded "visitors to the country can be useful, depending on what they do and how they go about it". Clearly, there is still the moral argument for not supplying the regime with any revenue at all – which is impractical -, and the 'ethical' tourists to Burma are advised to spend their money carefully, in order to ensure that the amount of money going to the government is kept at a minimum (see for example: Voices for Burma 2007). Still, the fact remains that visiting Burma will inevitably supply the regime with at least a small amount of income, which some see as a necessary evil that can be outweighed by the benefits of spending money on small-scale, locally-owned products and services.

But two questions arise: how many tourists really travel like that, and how does the tourist know that his money is staying in the community? According to the Myanmar Ministry figures, there are 733 registered travel and tour companies. Tourist arrivals in the country through Rangoon entry checkpoint were over 47.000 in the first four months of 2007, which represents a remarkable 20% increase from the previous year, at least according to the government statistics (Ministry of Hotels and Tourism 2006, Xinhua General News Service 2007).

The Myanmar government states that of all types of tours, package tours accounted for 25%, while free independent travelers accounted for 47%. The Myanmar statistics office, however, does not elaborate on how one is classified as a free independent traveler. Burma so far features over 600 hotels with 23.000 rooms, in addition to the 733 tour companies.

The future?

The question of whether to go to Burma remains a pressing issue, and a very personal decision for each potential traveller. Will boycotting tourism bring democracy to Burma? It has now been 10 years since the boycott started, and Burma is perhaps only a little bit closer to achieving political change, which might possibly have nothing to do with tourism. Instead the boycott 'short-term strategy' is starting to look like a 'long-term position'. Have the recent events in Burma changed the debate in any way? What is the future?

On the surface, normalcy has returned to Burma: people go about their daily chores with grave faces and avoid talking to foreigners. The fact that normalcy has returned to Burma so quickly is sad. This marked the first time during military oppression that the monks started a peaceful march, and now around 2000 of them have been detained (Burmanet 2007; Irrawady Media 2007), their fate unknown. Those that have not been detained are "waiting for the knock on the door" (Economist 2007a, pg 35).

Currently, the visitor does not see many smiling faces in a country that is usually known for its 'friendly people' – but the brutality of the Junta's reaction to the monk's peaceful march seemed to have touched a deep nerve in the Burmese, a devout Buddhist people. Serious negotiations between the regime and the opposition, followed by a transition to power-sharing and quasi-democracy is not entirely out of the question, yet. This can only happen, however, with increased pressure from Burma's neighbours, and clearer signs from within

Michael Waibel 2002

Huge Prison Complex in Mandalay

showing the regime that it is losing its grip on the country. But how does tourism play into all this? The arguments for and against the boycott remain the same, yet there are several speculative, future-scenarios that could happen in Burma.

Scenario ONE:

Burma's future remains bleak, and the generals are there to stay. Due to media's short attention span, people will slowly forget about the Burma situation. As the Military has successfully cut off all Internet in the country, the signs of decreasing media attention are already evident. The world's media will move to other issues, and will only sporadically re-capture the issue of a totalitarian regime in Burma. Tourism will recover from a short slump in incoming tourists. If anything, the 'Saffron uprising' has put Burma on the tourist's map, because any publicity is good publicity. Those who were against the boycott before are not likely to change their position, but will rather argue for increased dialogue with the Burmese people themselves, and thus encourage tourism further. The pro-boycott side, on the other hand, will probably continue their quest as well, arguing that only increased pressure on the Burmese Generals will effect some change. The debate will be continued, and emotions are likely to run higher than before.

Scenario TWO:

Burma is moving towards democracy and peace. In the best-case scenario, Burma's generals will start negotiations with Aung San Suu Kyi, which go beyond the token meetings they have had before. Perhaps Suu Kyi will, one day, legitimately lead her country into a new era of democracy. Democracy in Burma also means that a substantial number of tourists will come to Burma suddenly as the boycott debate is likely do die in the event of democracy. Also, the number of tourists will be possibly increasing exponentially over the years, similarly to other countries in South East Asia, which have been closed off for a long time (e.g. Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos). It is here to note that Burma could learn from its neighbours' tourism planning mistakes, and be aware of the traps of 'well-practiced' capitalism.

Scenario THREE:

Burma is moving towards democracy, but is shattered by civil war. Unfortunately, a civil-war scenario is not too unlikely, because the Burmese are a very divided people. Not only will it be difficult to sustain some sort of 'normalcy' in a democratic Burma after 45 years of military oppression, but also it will be difficult to please the diverse ethnic groups that are scattered all over the country. It may be frivolous to add here, but if there is civil war, then there will be no tourism, except of a very few 'adventure tourists'.

Sympathy will not solve the problem, but action is needed. Overall it is clear that the Burmese monks have been bravely showing the world that the situation is not hopeless, but that there are, in fact, activities happening *inside* the country. These protests however, will only gain momentum if they are supported from *outside*. Countries such as China, India, Thailand, and Singapore (ASEAN) hold the key in negotiating peace in the region, and must therefore be held accountable for their actions, or non-actions.

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The Vietnamese Market Economy – What Remains of its Socialist Orientation?

Axel Neubart & Katja Roeckel

During the cold war, two antagonistic economic models were advocated by the two political blocks: The model of a centrally-planned economy and that of a decentralized market economy were part of an ideological confrontation that did not allow for discussion. With the end of the cold war, many countries have opted for market-based economic systems. This also applies to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. As a transition country, that still calls itself socialist, it is now in the process of transforming its economic system from a planned to a market economy. This article portrays the Vietnamese dynamic process of economic transition and illustrates its unique concept of a market economy with a socialist orientation. As the socialist aspect of the Vietnamese economic system has not been clearly defined, the authors discuss the extent of its ideological influence on the country's impressive growth performance and its future course.

Vietnam's market economy with a socialist orientation

After failing to reach economic output targets under the centrally-planned economy in the 1980s the country faced serious financial, economic and social problems. The planning process and other main state interventions in market processes led to sub-optimal results. In response to this acute state failure, in 1986 (at the 6th Party Congress) the Vietnamese political leadership formally abandoned the centrally-planned economy and began introducing market-oriented policies. These so-called *Doi Moi* (renovation) reforms initiated a development process, during which Vietnam has achieved high economic growth performance. With annual GDP growth rates of 7 to 8% on average, and export growth exceeding 20% per year over a 20-year period Vietnam is one of the star performers in Asia and the world (CIEM 2006).

Compared with many other developing countries, Vietnam's progress in reducing poverty has also been impressive. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), internationally agreed-upon targets for poverty reduction, may serve as an indicator for this: Vietnam has already achieved five of the eight MDGs, most notably the first and overarching MDG 1 *"Eradiate hunger and poverty"*, or will do so in reasonable time, except MDG 7 *"Ensure environmental sustainability"* (See UNDP 2006). As fundamental drivers of its economy growth remain strong the country is expected to graduate from the status of a *low income country* to a *middle income country* by 2010 and in the five-year plan it is projected that Vietnam will become a *modern industrial country* by 2020 (SR Vietnam 2006, The World Bank 2006).

Historical background

Several measures have been taken to reform the state's role in economic management to ensure it does not inhibit the functioning of the market mechanisms and to enable it to move from detailed management tasks to more indirect interventions via the legal system or macroeconomic regulatory instruments. Four main stages of development can be distinguished:

Land reform: Directly after introducing *Doi Moi* in 1986, the government at the VI. Party Congress decided to give Vietnamese farmers more rights on land and for the first time the right to decide what to produce on their own. As a result, agricultural output increased so much that within 2 years, Vietnam was transformed from a rice-importing to the second largest exporting nation.

Recognition of private ownership: In 1990/91, for the first time, Vietnam has officially recognized the lawful existence of non-state economic sectors by issuing the *Company Law* and the *Private Enterprise Law*. This step was confirmed in 1992, when private ownership was recognized in the Vietnamese constitution, and since then 2.5 million household businesses have registered.

Liberalization of foreign trade: Since 1995/96 the re-establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the USA constituted the starting point for an opening of international economic relations – allowing private enterprises to engage in import/export activities. Since the signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2001 the United States has become Vietnam's largest export market and Vietnam has successfully completed WTO-accession negotiation in 2006.

Right of business freedom: In 1999 clarification of entrepreneurs' basic rights to operate in any and all business arenas not explicitly forbidden by law. As

All Photos by Michael Waibel

a result 150,000 enterprises have newly registered creating 2 million new jobs within 5 years.

Modern interpretation of Vietnam's socialist orientation

Even two decades after initiating *Doi Moi* the Communist Party continues to advocate a *market economy with a socialist orientation*, a strong role of the state is advocated for, as it is felt that leaving economic processes to the market alone would result in social instability and an increasing poverty gap (Neubert, Roeckel 2007).

A renunciation of the socialist ideals is not to be expected as the Communist Party itself has closely linked its fate to their implementation. However, the term *socialist* remains opaque, as both the Vietnamese Communist Party and government officials admit (Dinh Van An 2006). Furthermore, some of the recent steps of reform clearly contradict the historic concept of socialism, for example regarding the ownership of factors of production which, in theory, must be owned by the workforce. The traditional notion of socialism even implies a redistribution of economic gains towards equal shares for all members of society, going far beyond the objective of the social market economy of fair shares for everybody. This unrealistic ambition might be the reason, why the socialist character of the Vietnamese economic system has not yet been clearly defined. Political think tanks, such as the Ho-Chi-Minh-Academy, are thus busy developing new interpretations for the term *socialism*, "adjusting" the political ideology to its fast changing environment.

In a modern definition the term *socialist* applies to a process in which the people's interests are paramount as the state's main guiding principle. The Vietnamese party and government aim at achieving socialist ideals (e.g. equality and solidarity) by relying on market principles that promote an accelerated growth process. This understanding is depicted in the 2006-2010 five-year socio-economic development plans' overall objective: "Boost the economic growth rate, achieving rapid and sustainable development... [and] significantly improve people's material, culture, and spiritual life…" (SR Vietnam 2006). And clearly, up to today, the Vietnamese policy makers have been successful in initiating a growth process to reduce the all-embracing poverty of the 1980s.

The institutional change processes initiated more than 20 years ago can no longer be detained – dozens new laws have been approved and a new institutional framework has been set up. With the issuance of the *Law on Foreign Investment* (1987), the *Company Law* and the *Private Enterprise Law* (1990) Vietnam has officially recognized the existence of the private sector and has accepted foreign direct investments. By now, a more or less equal playing field has been created for both Vietnamese and foreign investment and the majority of prices are determined by the market.

Conclusion

Traditionally, the Vietnamese leadership has approached any issue of reform cautiously and has attempted to follow this observant and deliberate course with regard to the economic reform process – allowing dynamic economic development without jeopardizing political stability. The Vietnamese culture expects and accepts a strong role played by the state, even influencing individual lives. Among others, this explains why the Vietnamese State is very involved in the economy and continues to play a considerable role in terms of organization, ownership, management, and distribution. Looking back it becomes clear that the Vietnamese reform process *Doi Moi* (meaning renovation) was not so much about renovation of existing institutions because the Vietnamese people were also liberated socially and economically.

Therefore, colloquially, the reform process is often called *Coi Troi* (meaning liberated) referring to an increase of personal social and economic freedom. Instead of heavily regulating its people's economic activities, the Vietnamese State is now offering basic economic opportunities, for example by giving them land use rights or the possibility to start a business. In fact, allowing and encouraging the Vietnamese to take part in economic activities has been the main driving force for Vietnam's economic success. Consequently, the Vietnamese growth process is of an inclusive nature – directly benefiting the poor. However, the quality of future growth will be different as fewer people will benefit directly and disproportionately, for example from trade liberalization and privatization. Disparities within the society will probably widen due to the concentration of growth in certain geographic areas or within specific groups of society – contradicting the official commitment to a *market economy with a socialistic orientation*. As economic inequality is probably the greatest threat to political stability and Vietnam's single-party system, the Communist Party and the government, may need to adjust their development concept: future poverty reduction can no longer be a by-product of dynamic economic growth, redistributive mechanisms need to be established, providing all members of society at least with some share of the economic gains may justify the Party's and the government's hold on power.

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The Winescape of New Zealand

Tobias Danielmeier

Between the 16th and 18th centuries, in the time of exploration and conquerors, wine making found its way into the New World countries.
The discovery that, in both the Northern and Southern hemispheres, wine grapes best grow between the 30th and the 50th latitude lead to the quick dispersion of viticulture.



Dispersion of viticulture around the world

As the New Zealand example shows, the cultivation of wine seemed particularly desirable as it was regarded as a cultural asset in the new claimed regions. A new era in not only the history of wine but also our colonial history had begun. At the time, the production of wine in the Old World countries was in the hand of the monasteries.

The monks had a strong attachment to their lands and accumulated an immense local knowledge about soils and climate (Wilson, 1998). This continuity resulted in the ever increasing quality of not only the grapes but also the methods of production and equipment.

Till today, wine in the Old World countries is named after its region which is still obvious in the names of European wines such as Bordeaux, Chablis or Burgundy. In the New World countries the majority of wines are named after their grape variety.

First wine growing efforts in New Zealand

The first to import wine stocks into New Zealand was the Church Missionary Society missionary Samuel Marsden in 1819. Not only did he lobby for New Zealand to become christianised, he also planted 100 different grape varieties in Kerikeri on the North Island. Today, almost two hundred years later, some of the varieties Marsden introduced form the backbone of the New Zealand wine industry, notably Sauvignon Blanc, Pinot Noir and Gewurztraminer.

A few years later, in 1832, James Busby was appointed to the position of the first Official British Resident of New Zealand. Aside from drafting the Declaration of Independence of New Zealand, he also lived up to his strong background in viticulture and winemaking. Busby was deeply convinced that wine would contribute significantly to the development of the new society and its sophistication and he felt it was instrumental in creating this young nation (Stewart 2007).

Romeo Bragato's 'Prospects of Viticulture in New Zealand'

In the late 1860s the phylloxera epidemic destroyed between 65% and 90% of the vines in European winegrowing regions. Phylloxera is a type of mildew that is highly detrimental to grape plants and is believed to having been introduced to Europe in the 1860s, possibly on imported North American vines.

New Zealand's first Department of Agriculture, established in 1894, and the then Premier Richard Seddon appointed the Austrian-Hungarian oenologist Romeo Bragato to identify regions that are suitable for viticulture. Arriving in the South of the South Island, Bragato travelled to the tip of the North Island to collect the data needed. In his final report 'Prospects of Viticulture in New Zealand', the wine specialist addressed three aspects for the development of the wine industry: firstly, he identified ten major regions that are suitable for wine growing (see Map). Then, Bragato suggested the formation of district associations, and, thirdly, he recommended the import of phylloxera resistant vines for grafting (Mabbett 1997).

His report emphasised the excellence of the New Zealand maritime climate, with the sea moderating the weather, producing cooler summers and milder winters than one would expect at similar latitudes in Europe and North America. Maritime climates also tend to demonstrate higher variability of temperatures. Even in summers the wine regions tend to experience cold nights, the effect is that the plants produce fruit that are nearly always high in acidity. Even though Bragato's findings proved highly relevant from today's point of view, they did not aid the immediate advancement of the wine industry in New Zealand.

Development of the New Zealand wine industry

Three major factors prevented an early advance of the wine industry. Firstly, the economy was focused on the meat and dairy industries, which seemed to promise higher profits; winemaking in comparison was regarded as inefficient. Secondly, the legislation encouraged prohibition and temperance.

In 1918 a petition with more than 240.000 signatures was presented to the Parliament, demanding an end to the manufacturing and sale of alcohol. Finally, this legislative restriction reflected a wider absence of a cultural appreciation of wine. There was religious advocacy of temperance, and these people would not hear of drinking alcohol, let alone in public. Other New Zealand immigrants preferred beer and spirits to wine since they were not used to consuming and appreciating wine.

Up until the end of the 1960s, the official rejection of alcohol in public was also expressed through another New Zealand institution, the 'six o'clock swill'. Before that time, pubs were open for only one hour after the end of the working day and closed on Sundays. Hence, many people tended to drink spirits or beer. This 'binge drinking' habit still reflects today in the drinking behaviour of many New Zealanders.

The Sale of Liquor Act (1989) had another profound effect on New Zealander's attitudes to wine. The introduction of BYO (Bring Your Own) licences for restaurants that allows people to bring their own bottle of wine to a restaurant and only pay a small corkage fee was part of the same legislative reform. This amendment had an astonishing, profound and more positive effect on New Zealanders' cultural approach to wine.

On these accounts, there was hardly any wine industry in New Zealand until the 1970s. This changed in 1973, when Britain entered the European Economic Community, which required the termination of existing trade terms for New Zealand meat and dairy products.




'New World meets Old World': contemporary wine cellar and traditional oak barrels at the Peregrine Winery, Gibbston Valley, Otago.

In the following years, a remarkable reorganisation of the agricultural economy took place. Before this restructuring was fully implemented, diversification away from traditional products to commodities with potentially higher economic returns was explored. Wine was now seen as an appropriate replacement for previously predominant products in some regions.

Another reason for an increasing demand is the fact that, due to advanced passenger aircrafts and starting from the late 1960s, air travel suddenly becomes affordable for many. This changed the travel patterns of New Zealanders dramatically. Travelling, living, and working abroad, predominantly in Europe, became desirable for New Zealanders and during their OE (Overseas Experience), Kiwis experienced the wine cultures of Europe - and the domestic wine industry experienced a surprising new demand.

The structure of the New Zealand wine industry

The production of wine in New Zealand involves multiple methods. Certainly, one can find the traditional set-up of a family-owned vineyard and the corresponding estate. Where grapes are grown on the owner's section of land and the winemaker employs his or her own facilities to refine the juice. In contrast to this more conventional model is the concept of contract growing. Here, a number of well-known quality wine producers use solely contract fruit (bought fruit) while their own vine grapes matured into production. Some producers use contract fruit to supplement the range of varieties they market, even using fruit from other geographical regions.

By doing so, winemakers can match or blend the wine to the preferences of the consumers. This is quite different from the European cooperative model, where the fruits are grown on one vineyard, but the winemaking is practised in centralised production facilities. Contract growing is a typical example of the use of indigenous agricultural methods that predate the New Zealand wine industry.

The Peregrine Winery, Gibbston Valley, Otago, combines the wine cellar experience with event architecture.

All Photos by Tobias Danielmeier

Innovation and Tradition

Probably the most radical innovation that the New World countries exported back into the traditional wine making countries was the equipment used in winemaking. The conversion of stainless steel equipment, originally used in the dairy industry, is one example of the adaptation of New Zealand industry standards. When the New Zealand wine industry set off in the 1970s, winemakers worldwide trusted the natural antibiotic properties of alcohol.

The sterile technology that was utilised in the dairy industry promised to be the answer to a new, hygienic method in the production of wine. The early wines that employed the new technology were lauded for the intensity and purity of the fruit in the wine (Beverland 2001). While stainless steel does not increase the intensity of the fruit taste, it allows for the dispersion of the originalities of the grapes. The success story of the stainless steel technology in the winemaking process gained recognition not only nationally, but also globally.

Another example for progressive thinking in the industry is the -highly disputed- screw cap. While between five and seven per cent of all wine bottles with a traditional cork turn bad, the industry searched for new solutions. Screw caps allow for a taint-free wine and a consistent aging can be ensured. Skinner (2005) notes that no other country has taken advantage of the positive features of a screw cap as well as the New Zealand wine industry. By now, many European wineries have also turned to using screw caps in order to benefit from the aforementioned advantages and it is safe to suggest that more will follow that example.

Where to from here?

Even though New Zealand's contribution to world wine production is only about 2%, the number of wineries as well as size of the area under cultivation is rising. While this will certainly make New Zealand wines more available outside of New Zealand, it will also increase the competition between wineries in the country; especially since a large proportion of New Zealand wine is still consumed in the country.

Very recently, some New Zealand wineries have followed the path that some Old World wineries have chosen and have employed quality architecture as a brand strategy. Together with the competitive production methods that have become an important selling and marketing point, there is certainly much innovation to expect from wine 'down under'.

However, what works for the wineries and innovative production methods certainly also holds true for the product: Let the quality decide - and here and there New Zealand can positively be counted on for some very pleasant surprises.

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Er beschäftigt sich mit der Rolle von Identität bei der architektonischen Gestaltung von Weingütern.

Multikulturalität am anderen Ende der Welt
Studieren an der Macquarie University in Sydney

Jeannette Geesmann

Sydney – eine der schönsten Städte am anderen Ende der Welt. Hier gibt es das berühmte Opernhaus, die Harbour Bridge und unzählige traumhafte Strände. Mit etwa 4 Millionen Einwohnern ist es die größte Stadt Australiens. Von den eigentlichen „Sydneysidern", wie die Bewohner liebevoll genannt werden, sind jedoch nur 70% in Australien geboren. Der Rest der Bevölkerung ist multikulturell, was im Stadtbild sehr deutlich zu sehen ist. In Chinatown, Hurstville und Chatswood leben die meisten Chinesen, Cabramatta ist bekannt für seine vielen Vietnamesen, und auch Südkoreaner, Inder, Libanesen, Griechen und Neuseeländer haben ihr eigenes Viertel.

Anna-Lena Kranz 2006

Das internationale Flair Sydneys spiegelt sich auch an der Macquarie University (MQ) wider, einer von fünf staatlichen Universitäten der Stadt. Von den 30.000 Studenten kommen 8.500 aus dem Ausland und studieren dort durch private Finanzierung, Austauschprogramme oder Stipendien. Viele von ihnen sind Asiaten. Zudem sind mehr als 6.000 nicht in Australien geborene, ebenfalls meist asiatisch-stämmige Studenten, die dauerhaft nach Australien immigriert sind oder mit ihren Eltern hergekommen sind. Dies bedeutet, dass etwa die Hälfte der Studenten an der MQ keine Australier sind, was die Uni sicher zu einer der Internationalsten der Welt macht. Der hohe Anteil an Asiaten mag zum einen an der günstigen geographischen Lage liegen, denn Asien ist der nächste Nachbar des fünften Kontinents und spielt in Hinblick auf Wirtschaftsbeziehungen eine immer bedeutendere Rolle.

Insgesamt studierten im Jahr 2003 210.400 ausländische Studenten in Australien, davon allein 146.500 aus Asien. 1994 waren es gerade einmal 46.400, was einer Verfünffachung in weniger als einer Dekade entspricht (vgl. Universities Australia 2005). Dieser starke Anstieg ist insbesondere auf eine forcierte Internationalisierungspolitik der australischen Universitäten zurückzuführen, die erkannt haben, dass ausländische Studierende eine bedeutsame Einnahmequelle darstellen. Dadurch führte man 1989 Studiengebühren ein.

Gegründet 1964, liegt die MQ nördlich des Port Jackson, etwa 30 Autominuten vom CBD entfernt. Durch ihre Lage an dem einzigen privat finanzierten Industrie- und Forschungspark Australiens sind ideale Voraussetzungen geschaffen worden, Theorie und Praxis miteinander zu verknüpfen. Vielen der Absolventen gelingt daher ein müheloser Einstieg in das Berufsleben. Die Studentenwohnheime der MQ liegen direkt auf oder in der Nähe des Campus, sind jedoch vergleichsweise teuer. Da der Campus relativ weit im Norden Sydneys liegt, entscheiden sich viele Studenten für eine private Unterkunft in zentralerer Lage oder in Nähe einer der zahlreichen Strände.

Das australische Studiensystem

Australische Universitäten und somit auch die MQ haben in der Regel zwei Semester mit einer Dauer von je vier Monaten, nur wenige haben Trimester. Außerdem gibt es während der Vorlesungszeit nach etwa sechs Wochen einen zweiwöchigen „Semesterbreak". Dieser dient zum einen zur Fertigstellung von sog. Assignments (etwa Hausaufgaben, Essays, Übungsaufgaben u.ä.) oder einfach als kurzweilige Erholung. An allen australischen Universitäten gilt das angelsächsische Studiensystem, welches den Bachelor, Master und schließlich den PhD vorgibt. Den Bachelor bekommt man hier nach sechs Semestern, bis zu diesem Abschluss belegt man Undergraduate-Kurse. Im Masterstudiengang wählt man Kurse aus dem Postgraduate-Programm. Für internationale Studenten bedeutet dies, dass man nur dann Postgraduate-Kurse belegen darf, wenn man an seiner Heimatuniversität bereits im siebten Fachsemester oder höher studiert.

Als internationaler Student bezahlt man an der MQ für ein Semester einen Festbetrag von AUS$ 8.400 (~ € 5.300), wenn man sich privat und nicht durch einen Austausch oder über ein Stipendium bewirbt. Anders als in Deutschland belegen sowohl die Australier als auch die

internationalen Studenten in der Regel lediglich drei bis vier Kurse pro Semester: Undergraduate-Studenten dürfen zwischen neun und 14 Kreditpunkte pro Semester erwerben und die Kurse sind jeweils mit drei bis vier Kreditpunkten veranschlagt. Meist bestehen die Kurse aus einer Vorlesung und einem dazu gehörigen Seminar oder Tutorium. Vier Semesterwochenstunden und diverse Assignments lassen sich, zusammen mit der wöchentlichen Vor- und Nachbereitung eines Kurses, auf 12 bis 16 Stunden pro Veranstaltung pro Woche addieren. Damit ist der Arbeitsaufwand für einen Kurs in Australien im Vergleich zum deutschen Studium deutlich höher. Der Vorteil dieses Systems liegt jedoch darin, dass man während des gesamten Semesters regelmäßig gefordert wird und sich die Kurs-Endnote aus der Vielzahl von Bewertungen der einzelnen Teilbereiche zusammensetzt. So ist man nicht - wie häufig in Deutschland - ausschließlich auf eine erfolgreiche Abschlussklausur angewiesen. Vorlesungen werden, wie in Deutschland, vom Lehrkörper allein gestaltet, in Seminaren und Tutorien wird jedoch sehr auf Gruppenarbeit und aktives Mitgestalten der Studenten geachtet. Somit ist das Studium deutlich verschulter als in Deutschland und lässt insgesamt weniger Freiräume für eigenverantwortliches Arbeiten. Dies ist sicher auch auf das vergleichsweise junge Alter der australischen Studenten zurückzuführen. Viele sind erst 17 Jahre alt, wenn sie ein Studium beginnen. Dadurch ist der Schwierigkeitsgrad insbesondere der Undergraduate-Kurse häufig geringer als in Deutschland. Durch das Studentenzentrierte Arbeiten ist der Lerneffekt jedoch recht hoch. Ausländische Studenten werden in keinerlei Hinsicht bevorzugt, ihnen ist es nur nach besonderer Absprache mit der Universitätsleitung gestattet, in Klausuren ein Wörterbuch zu benutzen. Sehr positiv zu bewerten ist der im Vergleich zu Deutschland deutlich lockere Umgang zwischen Dozenten und Studenten: Man spricht sich gegenseitig mit Vornamen an und in den Büros vieler Lehrender kann man bei Fragen unangemeldet erscheinen, ohne etwa eine Sprechstunde einhalten zu müssen.

Die MQ besteht aus der Australian School of Advanced Medicine sowie drei großen Colleges (College of Commerce, College of Humanities and Social Sciences und College of Science and Technology). Jedes dieser Colleges ist in Fakultäten, und diese zusätzlich in Institute, gegliedert. Das Fach Geographie gehört zur Fakultät für Natur- und Umweltwissenschaften (Environmental and Life Sciences) am College of Science and Technology. Hier gibt es sowohl ein Institut für Human- als auch für Physische Geographie. Die Nähe zu Asien spiegelt sich in den Inhalten der Geographie-Kurse wider, wie auch im Kursangebot der gesamten Universität. Am Institut für Humangeographie werden Veranstaltungen wie „Geography of the Asia-Pacific-Region", „Asia Pacific Development", „Asia-Pacific Economies" oder auch Exkursionen in den asiatischen Raum angeboten, wohingegen man kaum Kurse zu Europa, Amerika oder Afrika findet.

Jede Veranstaltung wird mittels eines Mikrofons aufgenommen und nach der Veranstaltungen als Audiodatei in das Internet gestellt. Dieses Angebot können zum einen Nachbereitung zu Hause genutzt werden, zum anderen gibt es viele sog. „Off-Campus"-Studenten, die weltweit verstreut leben, an der MQ eingeschrieben sind, aber keine Veranstaltung besuchen können. Klausuren schreiben sie in dafür eingerichteten Zentren und die Kommunikation mit den Dozenten verläuft über Emails.

Internationalisierung als Markenzeichen

Für australische „On-Campus"-Studenten bietet die MQ zahlreiche Möglichkeiten, im Ausland zu studieren. So hat die Universität Außenstandorte in Singapur, Seoul, Tokio, Peking und Hongkong, an die man während seines Studiums wechseln kann, jedoch weiterhin Student der MQ bleibt. Bestimmte Veranstaltungen kann man außerdem während der Semesterferien als Sommerkurs im Ausland belegen und sich anschließend für seinen Abschluss anrechnen lassen. Seit September 2007 gibt es außerdem die Möglichkeit, auf einem Kreuzfahrtschiff zu studieren und in ein oder zwei Semestern um die Welt zu reisen. Das Projekt „The Scholar Ship", das interkulturelles Lernen fördern soll, ist eine Kooperation von sechs Universitäten aus Marokko, Wales, China, Mexiko, den USA, Ghana und der MQ. Die Gebühren für ein Semester betragen allerdings deutlich über 20.000 US$, zusätzlich fallen Kosten für Anreise, Visa, Bücher und Landausflüge an. Dieses Programm ist sicherlich einmalig im Kontext globaler (Bildungs-) Internationalisierung.

Fazit

Die Macquarie University ist sicher eine der internationalsten Unis der Welt in einer der attraktivsten Städte der Welt. Das eher verschulte System ist zwar anders als in Deutschland, durch das Studentenzentrierte Arbeiten wird inhaltliches Wissen jedoch gut vermittelt. Um Kurse mit Anspruch auf höherem Niveau belegen zu können, empfiehlt sich ein Postgraduate-Studium. Es muss allerdings darauf geachtet werden, dass man in Deutschland mindestens ein Vordiplom und zwei weitere Semester studiert hat, um diese Angebot zu nutzen. Einen Nachteil bilden allerdings die Preise auf dem lokalen Wohnungsmarkt, die deutlich höher sind als an vergleichbaren Universitätsstandorten in Deutschland. Nicht zuletzt das internationale Flair und die Multikulturalität machen jedoch einen Aufenthalt an der MQ zu einer unvergesslichen Erfahrung.

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PACIFIC NEWS **PICTURES**

Der Countdown läuft: Die Fertigstellung des Olympiastadions in Beijing steht bevor

Benjamin Kuck

Das *Beijing National Stadium* ist das sich derzeit noch im Bau befindliche Olympiastadion der Olympischen Sommerspiele 2008 in Beijing. Von der Form her ähnelt es einem Vogelnest, weshalb es häufig als *Birdnest* bezeichnet wird. Es verkörpert eindrucksvoll das Selbstbewusstsein des wieder erstarkten Chinas.

Entworfen wurde es vom Schweizer Architektenbüro *Herzog & de Meuron* und der *China Architecture Design & Research Group*. Die Schweizer konzipierten mit dem *St. Jakob-Park* in Basel und insbesondere der *Allianz Arena* in München bereits weltweit bekannte Stadionbauten. Als *Artistic Consultant* wirkte *Ai Weiwei*, der bekannteste zeitgenössische chinesische Künstler, entscheidend am Design mit.

Die eigentlichen Bauarbeiten, an denen insgesamt über 30.000 Arbeiter, zumeist Migranten aus ländlichen Gebieten, beteiligt waren, begannen im März 2004. Doch schon im folgenden August wurden die Arbeiten aufgrund massiver Kostenüberschreitungen für ein halbes Jahr unterbrochen. Nach einer Neuplanung wurde das durchsichtige Schiebedach, welches das ganze Stadion überspannt hätte, weggelassen.

Die Fertigstellung ist für Ende 2007 vorgesehen. Während der Spiele im August 2008 werden in dem Stadion die Leichtathletik-Wettkämpfe, das Finale des Fußballturniers sowie die Eröffnungs- und Schlussfeiern stattfinden.

Während der Olympischen Spiele wird das Stadion eine Kapazität von 91.000 Zuschauern aufweisen, diese wird nach der Veranstaltung auf 80.000 reduziert. Die Anlage ist 330 Meter lang, 220 Meter breit und 69,2 Meter hoch. Die Baukosten betragen rund 325 Millionen Euro.

Direkt neben dem *Birdnest* befindet sich das architektonisch ebenfalls bemerkenswerte *Beijing National Aquatics Center*, dessen Gerüst auf einer Leichtbaukonstruktion basiert. Die wegen ihrer Form auch als *Water Cube* bezeichnete olympische Schwimmhalle wurde vom australischen Architekturunternehmen PTW und dem internationalen Ingenieurbüro *Ove Arup* entworfen. Eine Reihe unregelmäßiger Waben bilden ein extrem leichtes Raumfachwerk. Die einzelnen Waben der Außenhaut und des Daches wurden mit über 3.500 Folienelementen, vergleichbar der *Allianz Arena* in München, bestückt.

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





All Photos by Michael Waibel

Japan's Demographic Future and Policy Directions

Chihiro Ishii

Japan is currently experiencing a drastic shift in population distribution, having had a high fertility rate following the baby boom era after World War II, but falling to one of the lowest rates in the world only 50 years later. Today, Japan confronts critical issues concerning declining fertility and an aging society.

The global population continues to increase annually, yet many developed countries and Asian NIEs are confronting national concerns of depopulation. The United Nations projects in its medium variant that by 2050, the total population will reach 9.2 billion (UN, 2007) with most of this increase happening in urban regions of economically less-developed regions (Cohen, 2003). This means that population concerns are divided between the developed countries and developing countries. In many developing countries, fertility rates remain high and the continuing population increase is considered one of the hindrances to national economic development. On the contrary, in all the developed countries except the United States, fertility rates are below replacement level, with fewer children being born to replace their parents' generation, and an increasing proportion of seniors. Securing sufficient working population to sustain the current economy and society is a growing concern.

Europe and the East Asian countries have received the most attention for their low fertility rates. Figure 1 shows the total fertility rates (TFR) for selected Asian countries for years 2002 and 2006. Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the lowest among the Asian countries, but TFR of other countries such as Thailand and Vietnam are also decreasing at a significant pace. Vietnam's TFR was above replacement level in 2002, but was no longer so in 2006. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan promoted family planning programs in the past in an effort to control their fast growing populations, but within these same countries couples are now encouraged to bear more children. A declining fertility rate will be difficult to reverse as economies mature and more people have access to a greater range of life opportunities and choices.

In Asia, policy efforts concerning the demographic transition have focused on addressing declining fertility and aging society. Taking Japan as an example, this article will present some policy considerations for these two problem areas, as well as the related yet commonly ignored factor of international migration. International migrants are responding to the demands arising from the countries with declining populations and the impact is significant for countries such as Japan and South Korea which still maintain state ideologies of homogeneity.

Fertility Decline

Tokyo's demographic transition is in line with the country's post WWII economic development. As Japan underwent a period of rapid post-war growth (1955-1973), the TFR declined, and became stable at around 2.1. This was followed by slow growth (1975-1985) with TFR at approximately 1.75. Japan's success in heavy industry during this era triggered the kaso phenomenon where population began to concentrate in industry-centered urban regions, and regional villages and towns began to experience depopulation. From the end of the 1980s until 1990, Japan experienced a bubble economy where the price of assets increased more than the real economic growth. TFR declined further with the high employment rate and more women participating in the paid workforce. After the bubble burst, it was followed by the 'lost decade', a lingering recession resulting in bankruptcies and 'risutora' (restructuring, corporate downsizing). TFR of Tokyo leveled at 1.0 after 2000.

As Figure 2 shows, the total population of Tokyo grew rapidly until the early 1970s, and has only experienced a slight annual increase since then. Tokyo's population stabilized within 30 years after WWII. Tokyo is expected to grow until 2020 from domestic migrants and then begin depopulating. Every prefecture except Okinawa is expecting to experience depopulation before Tokyo with many prefectures already depopulating. The national population began to decline in 2005.

The responses from the government pertaining to this problem have centered on efforts to increase the fertility

Figure 1.
Total Fertility Rates for Selected Asian Countries in Years 2002 and 2006

Year	Hong Kong	Singapore	South Korea	Japan	Taiwan	Thailand	China	Vietnam
2002	1.3	1.23	1.72	1.42	1.74	1.84	1.82	2.44
2006	0.95	1.06	1.27	1.4	1.57	1.64	1.73	1.91

Source: CIA (2002 & 2006)

rate and promote child-rearing support. The government took active measures in response to declining fertility as they realized the potential economic shrinkage and collapse of the pension system. The first of the major actions taken by the government was the implementation of the 'Angel Plan' in 1994 followed by the 'New Angel Plan' in 1999 (MHLW, 1994) (MHLW, 1999).

The main aims of the plan were to:

(1) Improve employment environment to reconcile work and family responsibilities
(2) Enhance child-care services
(3) Strengthen maternal and child health facilities
(4) Improve housing and public facilities for families with children
(5) Promote child development, improve educational environment for children
(6) Ease the economic cost associated with child-rearing

Successful programs included providing sufficient child-care facilities and services, and after-school activities for children. Some policies included child allowances and childcare leave. In recent years, allowances and partial salary during childcare leave have increased, with the support of the private sector. The 2001 amendment to the Employment Insurance Law now guarantees 40 percent of salary while on childcare or family care leave (Retherford & Ogawa, 2005). Softbank, a large-scale communication company, pays their employees 50,000 yen upon the birth of their first child, 100,000 yen for second, 1 million yen for third, 3 million yen for fourth, and 5 million yen for their fifth child (Yomiuri, 2007). Many other corporations have adopted similar systems.

Reducing workweek hours has been attempted, but has not been successful. Many employees are implicitly required to work during the weekends and overtime without additional pay. The proportion of the Japanese workforce who worked more than 50 hours a week was 28 percent in 2000, significantly larger than in the US and Europe (Retherford & Ogawa, 2005).

Another unsuccessful policy has been

Figure 2. The Total Fertility Rates (National Level and Tokyo)



Source: from (TMG Bureau of Social Welfare and Public Health, 2005) (MHLW, 2005)

childcare leave for men. In Japan, only 0.56 percent of married men took childcare leave in 2004, significantly lower in comparison to 5 percent for EU countries, or 64 percent in Sweden (Saraceno, 2004) (MHLW, 2004). This can be attributable to the framing of childcare leave policies and the level of financial and career security involved in taking childcare leave, but another important factor is the social division of gender roles where many men still believe it is primarily the woman's job to raise children, preventing them from taking the childcare leave granted to them (Saraceno, 2004).

Aging Society

The effect of a continuously declining fertility rate is the growing senior population over time. As baby boomers (born between 1947 and 1952) reach retirement age beginning in 2007, Tokyo will witness a growing senior population, with a smaller proportion of children (under age 15) and working population. Figure 3 shows that the proportion of the population age 65 and older will continue to grow larger. The proportion of the population age 75 and above is expected to grow from 7.7 percent in 2005 to 12.52 percent in 2020.

The future working population will face an increased economic and social burden without meaningful policies and programs to effectively address the problem. They will be pressured to bear more children, sustain the economy with a decreasing population base, and will also be obligated to support the growing senior population. Matsumura (2005) predicts that office population in 23 wards of Tokyo will decline by approximately 3 percent every five years from 2005 until 2020. Many regional communities are already facing difficulties in securing workers such as nurses, senior caretakers and hot spring resort employees. Tokyo is expected to experience similar shortages for other occupations as well, when the absolute numbers of the labor population begin to decline.

The government allocated approximately 13 trillion yen in 2006 to address issues relating to the aging society (Government of Japan Cabinet Office, 2007). Some of the significant policies and programs included (ibid):

(1) Raising the retirement age from 60 to 65
(2) Promoting the re-employment of middle-aged to senior workers
(3) Encouraging a more relaxed work culture
(4) Creating and allowing different working styles, including allowing work at home or outside the workplace
(5) Establishing a pension system that is stable and sustainable
(6) Promoting healthy living and lifestyles
(7) Developing establishments for promoting health

Figure 3. Proportion of Population by Age Group



Source: TMG Statistics Division Bureau of General Affairs, 2003

The first and the second initiatives were particularly difficult given the economic situation in Japan. Many companies are actually encouraging early retirement of their employees, and promoting re-employment of middle-aged to senior workers contradicts the ongoing corporate restructuring process. The policies stemming from the third initiative include improving the working environment through reduced work hours and a balanced work lifestyle such as involving people in community volunteer activities outside work. The fifth initiative aims to address one of the most controversial topics today. In addition to the proportion of the working population declining, the younger generation has been neglecting pension payments due to their suspicions that the pension system will collapse before their retirement age. The government has failed to assure these people of the security of the pension system in the future. The sixth and seventh initiatives have been heavily promoted in many cities in order to alleviate the burden on the healthcare system.

Accommodating International Migrants

The parallel phenomenon to the declining working population is the gradual increase in Tokyo's international residents.

There was an annual increase of 1.8 percent in registered international residents in Tokyo in 2006 (TMG Statistics Division Bureau of General Affairs, 2007). At the national level, the increase was higher at 2.9 percent (Immigration Bureau, 2007). Japan currently does not conduct any official projections on the future international resident population, but past figures show an upward trend that seems likely to continue into the future. As more international migrants settle down in Tokyo, the region will become a destination within the global social network of international migrants and may expect to draw additional workers.

Increasing the number of international migrants as a solution to the problems of a declining population seems unrealistic according to the United Nation Model where 30~87 percent of the total population would have to be made up of international migrants and their descendents by 2050, depending on the numbers of the working population or support ratio the country decides to maintain (UN, 2000). Nevertheless Tokyo is expecting to witness an increasing number of migrants to fill in the depopulation gap, though not to the extreme levels represented by the UN model.

Jung (2004) points out an important reason why the Japanese government should take this issue seriously; Japan will soon have to compete with other countries facing similar problems and in order to win over the international migrants, Japan has to create more livable cities attractive and preferable to these migrants. Such an approach would facilitate a smoother societal transition into a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural Tokyo minimizing the development of issues that might arise from racial or ethnic inequalities and biases.

Urgent problems that the international migrants face are the lack of support in basic service provisions such as education, housing, and healthcare. For the future, there needs to be a serious re-consideration of the residential status system in Japan. International migrants must be integrated into a system that allows them to advance with their job skills in their occupation (which is prevented in the current system).

Migrants also need to be able to form communities and groups in which they may participate for reasons of cultural identity and social solidarity, as well as to form different types of household arrangements with the means to sustain them. How this can be achieved provided the historical background and the current urban ecology of Tokyo remains an open discussion.

Conclusion

Ultimately, all these policies and programs will have an impact on child-bearing and rearing at the household level. Household patterns today are diversifying quickly in Japan. Many households are now composed of two full time workers, while in many others, the nuclear family is split into two with the husband working and living in another city. There are also an increasing number of single mother households, with approximately 60,000 in Tokyo in 2000 (Census Japan, 2000). Households with international marriages and households of international couples of the same ethnicity are also on the rise, comprising a little under 3 percent of all couples in Tokyo in 2005 (Census Japan, 2005). As household patterns change, the household responsibilities that members hold will have to alter to accommodate the changes. For example, with more women working full time and earning as much income as their spouses, household responsibilities traditionally assigned to women's care become an additional burden. As suggested by Saraceno (2004), policies aimed at reversing the trend of declining fertility can be ineffective if cultural tradition does not allow policies such as childcare leave for men to take effect. A similar situation also applies to workplace culture.

Many employees do not use up their entitled paid vacation time, either because they feel they are too busy to take the vacation, or they feel guilty using up the vacation time. The government is now required to not only effectively address the declining fertility-related issues through policy implementation, but to formulate ways for people to overcome cultural barriers for the measures to take effect.

All of this being said, the greater issues for Tokyo and Japan is to reconstruct a social and economic environment in the city that is desirable to live in for all residents, as individuals and as households. To do this, the government will have to look at ways in which to improve the livelihoods of the workforce and families from various perspectives: from the angles of an individual, households, local communities, and workplace. This will also include accounting for the unique concerns of international migrants as many other countries are also beginning to experience depopulation and will increasingly reply upon international workers to support and sustain their societies and economies. For example, in the foreseeable near future, Japan may be in competition for quality senior caretaker and nurses with South Korea and Taiwan. Providing services and support for these workers will be a competitive advantage in securing high quality human resources. Livability for international residents in cities will become an important decision factor for the international workers, requiring a drastic social and cultural shift in perspective for Japan that is difficult for the government to grasp. In any case, as witnessed in Japan's recent Diet debates where pension reform and childcare support have become two top agenda items, Japan has slowly initiated a step back from their economy-centered approach to development and begun a more holistic approach towards creating urban regions that are inclusive of all residents and meeting a broader range of social needs.

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Girls of an Art Club - Ho Chi Minh City

Subculture in Hanoi – Different from the West, Different from the Rest

Jörg Lanca

Various scenes within Hanoi´s popular culture have started to acquire the characteristics of subcultures. What are the factors and attitudes that cause Vietnam´s youth to engage in these social niches?

When the reform program known as *doi moi*, which marked the beginning of a market economy in Vietnam, was introduced in 1986, one of its side-effects was a fundamental transformation of society. Over 20 years later, one result of this change is a growing diversity of popular culture in Vietnam. Today, in the continuing process of transition, many young people are seeking for new identities, which some of them find at the periphery of youth culture. Although they constitute only a small minority, these Hanoians are fairly representative of the new values have that developed under the conditions of the *doi moi* era.

During a six-month research project, conducted in Hanoi between 2006 and 2007 and funded by a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) scholarship, the author tried to find and describe subcultural aspects of Hanoi´s contemporary youth culture. The concept of "subculture" as used in industrialized and post-industrialized societies is controversial, and it is difficult to give a general definition of "subculture". Although numerous studies have been conducted in European countries and North America, questions remain as to which groups can be called subcultures and which ones cannot. I have therefore tried to relate features usually associated with the term in Europe and North America to the scenes I found in Vietnam's capital city. This article examines the different groups, the feaures that make them attractive for some young Hanoians, and the preconditions that brought them into being. With regard to the current stage of popular youth culture in Hanoi, it might be more appropriate to talk about *scenes* with certain subcultural features than about common subcultures. None the less, I will sometimes resort to the simplifying term.

I observed different scenes and sought to find common characteristics to compare them to one another. I thus came into contact with hip-hoppers, graffiti artists, homosexuals, oppositional artists, hard rock and heavy metal fans, illegal motorbike racers, and break dancers. All these groups would deserve to be further investigated; my intention, however, was to find out what the term "subculture" could be understood as referring to, or what it could become, in a Vietnamese context.

During the research process, I focused on shared interests within the groups, normative values of their own, distinctive visual markers, and a common group identity that differentiates a scene from the rest of society that in this context may be called "the mainstream". Furthermore, hierarchies sometimes exist within subcultures, and one concept used to explain how those hierarchies work is that of *subcultural capital*. Following BOURDIEU's concept of *cultural capital*, this idea by SARAH THORNTON is based on the assumption that degrees of popularity, relations to other scene members, visible markers, actions, or experiences in the subculture are related to prestige among the participants of the scene. The more *sub-cultural capital* individuals are able to accumulate, the higher their reputation in the scene and the more important their opinion about which style is "in" and which is not.

Traits of subcultural scenes

In Vietnam, subcultural scenes have only begun to emerge during the last 5-10 years, and many of the scenes existing now still lack some of the features usually associated with the notion of subcultures. Probably the most obvious difference between the scenes I came across in Hanoi and those described in Europe and North America is the fact that participants of the local scenes hardly ever distinguish themselves from the surrounding society by the use of visual markers. There are, of course, young Vietnamese with eye-catching (and, in this country, seriously provocative) outfits, hairstyles, or accessories, but even if they imitate styles pre-defined by Western subcultures, they do not necessarily express their affiliation with them. Instead, most current members of Hanoi's subcultures follow the fashion style of the mainstream rather than trying to define a scene-specific one. Then again, it is also interesting to note that a certain style expressing affiliation with a scene does not prevent an individual from taking part in events or entering the social spaces of another scene. A young man I encountered at a hip-hop event organized by the British Council serves as a good example for this: He had long hair and wore torn black jeans with a heavy leather belt and a T-shirt of the popular heavy metal band Metallica. I asked him whether he regularly listened to hip hop music and he denied it. “"I like metal better"”, he told me. Asked why he had then come to the concert, he explained to me: “"It is just something different from the rest. I dislike *nhac vang* (a kind of melancholic Vietnamese music) and all that. Whenever there is something new, I have a look to find out whether I like it.”

Many young people I talked to thought like that. As access to their own preferred music is often limited in Vietnam and the scenes are quite small, members of Hanoi´s subcultural scenes are not as reluctant as those in Western countries to mix with other scenes. The boundaries established between the scenes are not as strictly drawn as in Europe, and the presence of an obvious heavy metal fan at a hip hop concert does not cause the same degree of bewilderment as it might in Europe. The scenes here are less exclusive than those in North America and Europe. On the contrary, their members rather encourage each other and communicate, thereby sometimes recognizing that what they share is the wish to differentiate themselves from the mainstream.

In most of the scenes I examined, the self-awareness of being a group has only just developed in the past few years, and it is not even taken for granted by all of its members. Although the participants are well aware that they share an interest that is rather uncommon, some of them do not yet regard themselves as members of a defined group distinct from the mainstream. Of course, each of the scenes has different ways of allowing its members to gain sub-cultural capital. Whereas illegal motorbike racers can gain credibility by winning races and through their willingness to participate in these events even after suffering an accident, graffiti artists can do so through the size and location of paintings, and hip-hoppers can gain subcultural capital through a knowledge of lyrics of American artists or through their clothing. In the inner circle of those practising and performing break dance, credibility is mainly gained through dancing skills.

What they all have in common is that they are loose formations in Hanoi's society rather than exclusive clubs with clearly defined boundaries. And while some members representing the inner core try to spend as much time as possible within the scene and involved in scene-specific activities, other individuals may be only loosely attached to the group. This is especially true for the hip-hop scene, which has an inner circle of people that constitute a "subcultural core", who listen and produce music, but also has a vast audience that does not count as scene members.

Most of those engaging in Hanoi's subcultures are young males between 17 and 25. Hence, in most cases, one could easily argue that these groups are part of the youth culture. The only case in which the age of members is not limited at all seems to be the gay scene, where I encountered individuals of an age range from 18-45. I was also told about younger and older gay men who were considered scene members. The most important reason for the rather restricted age span in most scenes is that the individuals involved need to have a certain degree of spare time at their disposal for on the group-specific activities. After they have taken up work or started families of their own, they often lack the time to do so.

It is hardly surprising that Hanoi's scenes are not at all gender-balanced. As already mentioned, the vast majority of their members are male. And usually, the few women are not treated or regarded in the same way as men. They are also able to gain subcultural capital, but would and could hardly ever claim the same power to define what is "in" and "out" as males, or take over a leading role within the group. This shows better than anything else that these subcultural scenes, though different from the mainstream and equipped endowed with their own values, are never completely separate from the bigger social context.

The participants of youth scenes with subcultural features I found in Hanoi, are for the most part not unwilling to conceive of themselves as being part of their bigger social context. They see themselves as being different from the mainstream, but hardly ever as being outside of society. In the vast majority of cases, the social network within a given scene in Hanoi adds to the one outside, and though it sometimes diminishes the importance of the latter and loosens ties, it hardly ever endangers and virtually never completely replaces it. Attachment to the scene is usually less important than the one to the family, for example. This might be a characteristic trait of Vietnamese subcultures.

The benefits of subcultural involvment

Given this description of subcultural

scenes in Hanoi, the next chapter will focus on their attraction and fascination for young Hanoians to them. First of all, there has to be a basic interest in the group"s specific activity, e.g., a shared preference for specific musical styles. But beside that, my interview partners often pointed to a high degree of boredom in their lives due to the fact that they were not entirely satisfied by the leisure activities available to them. According to them, there is too little social space and opportunity for young people in Hanoi to structure their leisure time independently. The activities with which young people fill their free time, such as playing online games in iInternet cafes, for example, seems to be fairly boring for them. So when they find a field of interest that they share with a few others, this makes them feel special in a way. If they find it enjoyable, they will spend more and more time in this special group of people that to some of them seems like a unique circle with special skills or knowledge that none of their peers are able to share or understand. Especially when they perceive that they, or the ones who introduced them to the scene, have the chance to gain a high reputation among the scene members, regardless of their social stance in everyday life, they are likely to enter this social niche willingly.

Despite the feeling of not being completely understood by peers outside the scene, many of them soon realize that the mystique of being special also surrounds them outside the group when they talk to others about their scene activities and scene friends (if they do) and wins them the admiration of others. Many scenes have role models in Western societies, but their own perception of their connecting element (for example, the style of music) and their ways of expressing their membership and enthusiasm differs from the scenes in the West. While trying to copy the West, they generate own scene identities, but still regard what they do as being "Western", and thereby modern. This is very much appreciated, and seen as a marker of independence and maturity.

As mentioned before, the majority of those engaged in the subcultures are young males, and I was often told with a wink: that "the girls like it, too."

Especially those who participate regularly in big spontaneous illegal motorbike races told me that being a racer is regarded by many females as a sign of masculinity and courage. So, in most scenes, *cherchez-la-femme* is a motive not to be underestimated.

Of course, there are also a couple of female members in the various scenes, and they are interesting objects of research with regard to their male friends' perception of them and the gender relations within the scenes. The deeper the involvement of females in the subculture and the more subcultural capital they gain, the more accepted they are by the males, and the higher their reputation. But that happens at the cost of this advancement is the loss of their femininity, because then they are no longer regarded as "proper girls" whom one could appreciate as a girlfriend.

In order to be regarded as a good girlfriend, it seems, one would have to admire one's boyfriend for his courage and skills when he races, probably even trusting these skills enough to sit on the back of the bike in a race. For a female to drive her own bike is by no means acceptable, because that would not only challenge the boyfriend's driving skills, but his very masculinity as expressed in the race as well. And after all, expressing his masculinity is an important feature of the race to him, as a means to impress "proper girls".

For some females, especially young women, this is another attractive feature of subcultures: to find a place where they can leave the boundaries imposed on them by the society due to their gender. Within the scene, they may be able to find and appreciate the opportunity to do what "proper girls" are not supposed to do - and even gain respect for doing it.

But the main reason for males and females to engage in subcultures is to do something different than the rest, thereby generating and expressing *individualism*. Even if, as argued earlier, common social ties are hardly ever abandoned, by far the most important reason for many subculturally active Hanoians to engage in their scenes is the urge to individualize and emancipate themselves from traditional bonds to a certain degree. This is a comparably new trend in Vietnam´'s social structure, that can be traced back to a certain set of preconditions. The same preconditions reveal the social-economical framework from which Hanoi'´s subcultures evolved and help to understand why the capital city offered such fertile grounds for these scenes.

Preconditions for the occurrence of subcultures

Overall progress has been enormous since the Communist Party started the *doi moi* reforms in the mid-1980s. Furthermore, the increasing diversity of the media has since provided Vietnam's contemporary youth with an input of impressions from all around the world that are still not unrestricted, but fairly broad-ranging.

Additionally, Hanoi had a dense population with a low average age, which meant that a large number of its inhabitants were young and had grown up in the environment described above. For them, the party's call for people to enrich themselves and the ambition to lead the country into a prosperous future was linked to their conceptions of other, economically further developed countries in Asia as well as in the West. The challenge to strive for prosperity was therefore, for many, connected to ideas of modernity and a Western lifestyle. One major factor in this process was access to the internet, which has now become an integral feature in the lives of many young Vietnamese, especially those living in urban areas.

Furthermore, a relatively high number of foreigners come to Hanoi, stay there for months or even years, and promote intercultural exchange. These factors are much more evident in Hanoi than anywhere else in the northern part of the country.

Not only did Hanoi's youth draw inspiration from different lifestyles from abroad, but the growing economical potential also made it possible to follow these trends. In trying to show their modernity, young people started to imitate these new styles, generating social practices and preferences that were, and are, more and more defined by fashion rather than by the limited choices and resources their parents had at their age. Of course, not everybody has been able to follow these new patterns

Get Rich or Die Tryin' (U.S.-Rapper 50 Cent): Young Breakdancers before the Lenin Statue in Hanoi.

of consumption to the same extent. For the small minority of the upper-class, abandoning traditional lifestyles may have been not only a matter of comfort, but also a way to show that they had escaped poverty that they, too, had to cope with in pre-*doi moi* times. Their example was followed by a then-During this period, a young fashion mainstream was established.

Besides the rise of new values associated with consumption and lifestyle, traditional social values also started to be questioned in a country with a nominally Socialist government and principles and a rapidly growing market economy that is giving rise to increasing social polarization. In this contradictory situation, previously well-established ideas of collectivism as a way to reach collective goals were challenged by individualism, which was much more promising given the new parameters.

For those who grew up during that time - a generation aged between 15 and 30 today - these new values seemed to be the way forward, and it is still too early to predict the long-term consequences of that social change. But since this generation had unprecedented opportunities to shape their lives and were able to choose role models from all over the world, many chose the new, modern, and seemingly individual way of life.

Impressions of other countries, only poorly reflected, were often adapted in a rather uncritical way. The few people who had encountered elements of foreign popular culture and who did not fit into the mainstream of youth fashion, became attracted to the former and sometimes started to imitate or even idolize them. Thus, they established loose circles that gradually acquired the characteristics of subcultures.

Conclusions

Subcultures, especially in Hanoi, do not emerge in ways that conform to theoretical concepts of subculture. They are triggered by unpredictable events and circumstances, and in the course of their formation, rather casually generate their own values and distinctive markers along the way. But their self-image and identity is partially consolidated by the discourse within the scene as well as the one outside of it. If they had clear concepts as to their identity and what defines them as a group, that could probably help them gain consciousness, assist them in finding ways to express their needs in a constructive way, and lead to a certain degree of self-organization. This would allow them to utilize their full creative potential and to contribute to creating better opportunities concerning social life and social learning for young people in Hanoi and elsewhere.

Subcultural life is a comparably new phenomenon in Vietnam's capital city. The scenes have permeable boundaries, and are characterized by an intuitive knowledge of their group identities rather than by clear concepts of what defines them as a distinct crowd. But this may change during the ongoing process of social transition experienced by Vietnam's population today. They are the avant-garde of a generation that will soon have to define the future of the country.

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Implications and Challenges of Climate Change for Vietnam

Michael Waibel

The recent assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and various other scientific sources confirm that climate change is already taking place and having discernable impacts. Reducing vulnerability to climate change has become an urgent issue, especially in developing countries, which are more vulnerable because of their lack of financial resources, institutional and technological constraints, low local expertise, and limited research capacity (Grasso 2007: 223, Huq & Reid 2007, IPCC 2007). Although Vietnam has only played a small part in creating the problems of global environmental change and faces many other challenges, it cannot avoid the impacts of climate change. Implementing adaptation policies seems mandatory.

Global perspective

As shown in a recent World Bank Study (Dasgupta et al.: 2007), Vietnam is among the countries most heavily affected by the consequences of climate change: Of the 84 coastal developing countries investigated in terms of sea level rise (SLR), Vietnam ranks first in terms of impact on population, GDP, urban extent, and wetland areas, and ranks second in terms of impact on land area (behind the Bahamas) and agriculture (behind Egypt). The authors maintain that the consequences of SLR for Vietnam are "potentially catastrophic" (Dasgupta et al.: 2007: 2/44) and demand "intermediate planning for adaptation".

According to the latter study, 10.8% of Vietnam's population, mostly those people living in the two river deltas, would be impacted by an SLR of just 1 m (Dasgupta et al.: 2007). According to the IPCC (2007: 59), a 1 m SLR in Vietnam would lead to flooding of up to 20,000 km^2 of the Mekong River delta and 5,000 km^2 of the Red River delta. In the Mekong River delta alone, more than 1 million people would be directly affected. Also, the Stern Review on the economics of climate change confirms Vietnam's high vulnerability to climate change (Stern 2006): Vietnam ranks fourth behind China, India, and Bangladesh in terms of the absolute number of people living in vulnerable, low elevation coastal zones (LECZ), defined as the contiguous area along the coast that is less than 10 m above sea level. About 43 million Vietnamese, or about 55% of the country's population (38 % of Vietnam's urban population), are living in those LECZ (McGranahan et al. 2007: 11/28). This is the highest percentage of all countries worldwide. The authors conclude that "vulnerable settlements in low-income countries clearly deserve international support […] to adapt to climate change".

All in all, the country would face losses totalling US$17 billion per year in case of a SLR of 1 m (VNS: 6 June 2007). According to the first national report on climate change, in the "Vietnam Initial National Communication" to the UNFCCC, published in 2003, the sea level along the coasts of Vietnam has already increased slightly in the past 30 years and is expected to rise by up to 33 cm by 2050, and by 1 meter by 2100 (SRV & MoNRE 2003).

Increase of Weather Extremes

Climate change also increases the likelihood of extreme weather events such as floods and heat waves as well as more gradual changes in temperature and precipitation (Mukheibir & Ziervogel 2007). It is already evident that settlements in the coastal lowlands (like the metropolis of Ho Chi Minh City) face the risk of tropical storms, too. These prospects are amplified when they occur in combination with high tides and/or high river flows (McGranahan et al. 2007: 20). Vietnam is particularly threatened by powerful storms, as the country is situated at the end of one of the most powerful cyclone tracks in the whole world, and virtually no sector of the coastline of 3,260 km can be considered "cyclone-free" (Kelly & Adger 2000: 333). An increase in the sea surface temperature in higher latitude regions leads to more typhoons occurring in the northwest Pacific Ocean, affecting Vietnam. The higher sea surface temperature will also cause higher wind velocity in typhoons. In this context, the authors of the World Bank study conclude that even a rather small increase in SLR can significantly magnify the impact those storm surges (Dasgupta, Susmita et al.: 2007: 2). A higher frequency of storms hitting the southern regions of Vietnam has already been noted (VNS 2007: 6 April 2007).

Limitations of Global Studies

However, the above-mentioned global comparative country studies on the impact of climate change have limitations in assessing vulnerability: There are still uncertainties in national and regional climate change scenarios, as these mainly consist of simplistic downscaling of global scenarios, based on model-driven scenarios with limited variables. Very often, SLR is used as the sole indicator of climate change. Also, the number of exposure/sensitivity variables (population at risk, land/area exposed) is quite limited. Therefore, as a rule, the assessment results of these global studies can not be used in spatial planning and for decision-making on a regional scale. (Schneiderbauer 2007: 85ff.)

Nevertheless, these studies have played a prominent role in raising awareness among political stakeholders and the population. For example, (for the first time ever) in Vietnam, there has been a wave of articles published in the local media on the critical issue of climate change, especially after the publication of the World Bank study mentioned above as well as after the publication of the 2007 assessment reports by the IPCC.

Without doubt, climate change will result in disruptions of human populations and consequent migration in Vietnam. This would significantly increase population pressure on the urban agglomerations of Vietnam, most of all on the economic hub of Ho Chi Minh City. So far, climate policy has mainly focussed on the national level of Vietnam, while research on the effects and challenges of climate change in urban areas has been neglected.

Conclusions

Dealing with the serious implications of climate change will be a major challenge for Vietnam in the next decades. Its effects may threaten the impressive economic progress the country has made in the course of the transition towards a market economy. In this context, implementing adaptation policies should be prioritized over mitigation strategies.

As there is now a broad consensus among scientists that climate change will definitely occur, regardless of whether emission reductions or even stabilization measures are achieved, it will be necessary for Vietnam to mainstream climate change into development planning at all levels, scales, and sectors as well as to empower communities and other local stakeholders, encouraging them to participate actively in vulnerability assessments and implementation of adaptation measures.

Among the institutional constraints in the implementation of adaptation planning in Vietnam are a lack of a national and local framework for climate change adaptation and a lack of co-ordination among ministries, agencies, and institutions in areas pertaining to climate change. Also, there is limited knowledge on the relationship between climate change strategies and the attainment of sustainable development objectives, as well as limited knowledge and capacity-building on climate change issues among local stakeholders. In this process, incremental adaptation strategies and policies to exploit "no-regret" measures and "win-win" options are to be preferred over other options (IPCC 2007: 472).

As research on the potentials and costs of adaptation by industry, settlement planning and society to climate change is still at an early stage, Vietnam urgently needs expertise and financial support from the international community.

Impact of 1 m Sea Level Rise in Vietnam



Source: Dasgupta et al 2007

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What Hinders the Path to Sustainability?
A Study of Barriers To Sustainable Tourism Development in Gili Trawangan, Indonesia

Sonya Graci

Despite international recognition that the tourism industry needs to move towards sustainability, action has been mainly conceptual to date and has not translated into industry wide practice (Pryce 2001). It is therefore important to understand why the move towards sustainability has been relatively limited in the tourism industry in order to determine how this industry can be encouraged to introduce more sustainable practices (Diamantis 1999; Bramwell and Alletorp 2001; Pryce 2001; Dodds 2005).

In order to contribute to this knowledge, a study examining barriers to implementing sustainability initiatives in Gili Trawangan, Indonesia, was undertaken. This study examined an existing paradox in tourism sustainability. Positive attitudes regarding sustainability from the majority of stakeholders were evident; however, sustainability initiatives were still not being implemented.

Research Setting

Gili Trawangan is a small island located amongst the Gili Islands off the coast of Lombok in Indonesia. Gili Trawangan is a sun, sand and sea destination. It is approximately three by two kilometers and low-lying with a small hill to the south, rising to 72 meters above sea level (Hampton 1998). Gili Trawangan is the most developed of all three Gili Islands (the other two islands being the newly developed Gili Air and the mostly undeveloped Gili Meno).

Gili Trawangan has an approximate population of 474 families comprising about 1900 local people (Interview # 1, 2005; Interview # 26, 2005). There are also several expatriates living and working on the island. The majority of land use on the island is for tourism and the remainder is coconut plantation and some small fields of agricultural crops and livestock.

Tourism is the dominant economic activity on the island and more than 80% of the families on Gili Trawangan are employed by tourism in some form (Interview 26, 2005). The main tourism season is June- September with smaller peaks in December, January and February (Interview # 2, 2005; Hampton 1998). Gili Trawangan is not a very developed tourism destination in terms of mass tourism resorts, infrastructure or services. The main tourists on Gili Trawangan are backpackers as there are currently only two high end resorts and few mid level accommodations on the Island.

Island transportation consists of non-motorized sources such as bicycles and cidomo's (horse drawn traps) and the roads are unsealed dirt tracks. The island has limited fresh water shipped in barrels from the mainland on a daily basis. Only the high end resorts, mid level accommodations and restaurants use the fresh water (personal observation, Interview 10, 2005, Interview 13, 2005, Hampton 1998).

In terms of sustainable tourism, there have been some initiatives implemented prior to this study being conducted. These initiatives however have been faced with a slow implementation, and although developed in theory, have not been entirely adopted in practice. One of the initiatives developed by the dive operators on the island is the Gili Trawangan Eco-trust.

The purpose of this organization, which is head by one of the owners of a dive establishment, is to manage the collection of a dive tax ($3 US per diver and $1 US per snorkeller). The dive tax has been used to pay the local fisherman to stop detrimental means of fishing such as bombing and using drag nets (Interview #1, 2005).

The Gili Trawangan Eco-trust has tried on numerous occasions to start initiatives such as the collection of waste and beach clean ups but as the next section will discuss, they have encountered numerous barriers that have halted any action. This has led to the large frustration on the island as the stakeholders, although motivated, have been faced with a number of barriers that they cannot overcome.

Method

This paper is based upon fieldwork that was conducted in Gili Trawangan, Indonesia over two visits in May-July and October-November 2005.

A multi-method research approach (Sommer and Sommer 1991) was used for this study. In-depth, semi-structured key informant interviews were conducted with twenty six business owners and managers (local and western) on the island resulting in a 50 percent response rate.

Snowball sampling was used to obtain the key informant sample. Interviews were also conducted with the previous and current local government. This consisted of three interviews, one with the previous head of the island, one with the current head of the island and one with the deputy head of the current government. The interviews discussed the history of sustainable tourism initiatives on the island, identified barriers to implementing sustainable tourism, strategies to overcome the identified barriers and innovative means to increase the level of sustainability on the island.

Interviews were also conducted with tourists, employees and the local community on the island.

Using a random sampling procedure, a total of 45 informal interviews were conducted. An environmental impact assessment of the island was also carried out to determine the greatest env-


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The pier at Gili Trawangan

ironmental and social impacts that need to be addressed whilst developing a sustainable tourism strategy.

Findings and Discussion

A number of barriers were documented in this research.

Five themes outlining the main barriers to implementing sustainable tourism initiatives were identified.

These five themes consist of:

(1) inadequate resources particularly funds and information;

(2) lack of momentum from business owners

(3) island culture and the isolation of sustainability issues from all other business aspects of the destination/ organization

(4) government bureaucracy and corruption; and

(5) physical attributes such as infrastructure impediments.

Theme One:

Inadequate Resources

Despite the enthusiasm from a number of business owners on the island, sustainable tourism initiatives continuously faced a number of barriers. The first theme identified was related to the barriers associated with inadequate resources such as high costs, lack of information, skills, knowledge, expertise, time and the reluctance to acquire assistance from outside consultants. It was these particular barriers that were identified as the most significant and often experienced. Several of the key informants indicated that despite the numerous ideas for initiatives (i.e., payments to fisherman to stop illegal fishing), without adequate resources many of these plans fail.

For example, the Gili Eco-trust attempted to implement a waste management collection system including the building of a landfill with areas to separate and organize recyclables. Due to inadequate resources such as the lack of information, skills, expertise and the reluctance to acquire assistance from outside consultants, the landfill development failed.

What resulted was an open dump pit and no real collection system of waste in general let alone sorted at source. The walls built around the landfill were stolen piece by piece by deviant locals and an open area of hazardous and non hazardous waste resulted in breeding rodents and leachate in the water stream (Interview #2, 2005; Interview #17, 2005; Interview #25, 2005).

A number of business owners and the current local government identified this as the most prominent barrier because without proper systems in place the environment will degrade even further. The problem remains the ability to implement those systems with the necessary funds and knowledge to be feasible.

Theme Two:

Lack of Momentum from Business Owners

The second theme was related to the lack of momentum to take action regarding sustainability initiatives by business owners (accommodations, dive operators, restaurants and bars). There was a common belief by a number of business owners that current practices were inadequate, however, there was a lack of momentum to move forward and implement sustainable initiatives.

Despite the concern that the environment on the island was in dismay, several business owners did not want to take responsibility for managing the implementation of the initiatives especially when it involved time and funding. It was evident that several of the business owners on the island had numerous complaints about the management of the environment yet it was difficult to rally up support in terms of volunteer time to manage the systems on the island. For example, only one business owner in conjunction with the local government managed the eco-tax funds to pay the fisherman, a practice that was not looked upon favourably as a sustainable solution by many of the business owners, however no other solutions were put forth. In addition, it was this one person that managed a number of the complaints on the island because they had a great working relationship with the local people, government and other businesses. However, it is impossible for one person to organize and maintain the development of initiatives on the island and despite the numerous ideas and enthusiasm from the other business owners, there has been a slow implementation of ideas relating to sustainability. This was evident with the organization of a beach clean up team that was funded by the Eco-Tax collected by the Gili Trawangan Eco-trust.

The beach clean up team was an idea that was supported by all businesses in the Eco-trust however without any management of the team it quickly disintegrated. As the beach clean up team did not receive any direction or motivation on how to proceed with the clean-up on a regular basis, it quickly ceased (Interview #19, 2005).

Theme Three:

Island Culture

The third theme was related to the corporate culture of the island. Corporate culture is comprised of the attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values of an organization. An organization, and in this case a destination, has a corporate culture that has its own behavioral quirks and interactions which can affect the development and implementation of programs and projects. Isolation of environmental issues from other aspects of the organization or destination, an incompatibility with the current corporate culture of the organization and/or destination, and the bureaucracy that exists within each organization as well as inter organizational are barriers that have affected the implementation of sustainable tourism initiatives in Gili Trawangan. In Gili Trawangan, the corporate culture is one where employees and the local community are resistant to change despite the identified benefits associated with sustainable tourism initiatives (such as reducing health problems that have occurred from the lack of garbage collection and standing sewage that breeds disease such as dengue fever in the community). Several of the local children have asthma due to the local community burning garbage (including hazardous materials and plastics) (Interview #11, 2005). It is due to the lack of education regarding the benefits of sustainable tourism initiatives that the local people are not willing to participate. This results in unsuccessful attempts at developing initiatives such as a waste management system. This is also evident with illegal fishing as locals will continue to bomb and use nets to fish despite the payments to many of the local fisherman. In one instance, a local person caught a nurse shark with the intent to sell to a Chinese customer, , despite the policy that bans the catching and selling of sharks (personal observation, October 2005).

Theme Four:

Government Corruption

The fourth theme identified was related to government. Government corruption is a significant barrier in this destination (as in many developing nations). The provincial and national governments have consistently collected taxes from the island without any investment in infrastructure or development of policy. In addition, the previous local government accepted bribes to build in unauthorized areas (such as beach front) which has caused several environmental and social problems such as erosion of the coastline, sedimentation in the ocean and barring access to a public resource.

In 1998, the provincial government of Western Nusa Dua developed the Gili Mantra Marine National Park Strategy. In Indonesia, marine park strategies have been highly successful in destinations such as Komodo National Park. The marine park strategy, which was developed as a policy, was never implemented in practice. Locals and westerners, in addition to the local government, were all unaware of such a strategy. It was the Gili Trawangan Eco-trust that implemented initiatives to curb illegal fishing to protect and generate the coral reefs.

On the local level, corruption has occurred through the random pricing structure that government appointed businesses charge in terms of waste collection. Expatriate businesses are charged an enormously inflated rate over local businesses despite the success and size of the business. In addition, expatriate business charges for collection continue to be based on personal relationships so that one expatriate business owner can pay up to triple for the same services (Personal Observation, 2005; Interview #2, 2005; Interview #17)

The disparity of policies on the island is dependant upon personal relationships, bribes and government corruption. This has led to frustration on the island especially in terms of volunteering time and money to implement sustainable tourism initiatives. Many initiatives are funded independently and several stakeholders feel powerless to oppose the current structure for fear of making their own lives difficult and negatively affecting their business (Interview #14, 2005; Interview #11, 2005).

Theme Five:

Infrastructure

Physical attributes such as infrastructure was the last theme identified. Working within the current infrastructure of the island, as well as physical attributes such as the location and age of facilities are common barriers faced in a destination. This barrier was also closely linked to the first theme of inadequate resources as there was no possibility for purchasing new technologies on the island.

Gili Trawangan currently ships in barrels of fresh water on a daily basis to the island. Structures such as a sewage treatment plants (sewage is currently either disposed of in homemade septic tanks or open pits on the side of the road in the village) cannot be built as salt water will degrade the infrastructure.

In addition, technology continues to be a barrier. Even if initiatives such as solar power or a sewage treatment plant were installed it would be difficult to fix or adjust technologies due to the remoteness of the island. In addition, space is an issue on the island as many businesses would like to install composters to dispose of their own organic waste but do not have the room available (Interview# 1, 2005; Interview #2, 2005; Interview #6, 2005).

Strategies to Overcome Barriers

The interviews identified strategies and innovative initiatives to overcome the stated barriers. Several of the interviewees suggested ways to overcome barriers and move toward sustainability based on past experiences and initiatives undertaken on other Asian islands. This contributed to the development of a sustainable tourism strategy for the island of Gili Trawangan.

The strategy incorporated alternatives such as composting, employing financial mechanisms such as tourist taxes and developing a multi-stakeholder island committee to oversee the development and implementation of sustainable tourism initiatives. In addition, extensive consultation with the local community and all stakeholders on the island will be conducted to ensure that there is buy-in and motivation to implement the initiatives. The strategy, through the use of an island committee, will provide accountability to stakeholders on the island in hope of reducing corruption. The strategy was widely accepted by the local government and businesses and is currently undergoing public consultation with the local community to begin implementation.

Conclusion

The results of this study provide a further understanding of the factors that affect the implementation of sustainable tourism initiatives in a regional context. This paper provides further evidence to what hinders sustainability in island destinations, particularly within the developing world context. As demonstrated, despite efforts from a number of local businesses, barriers to sustainable tourism implementation exist in Gili Trawangan, Indonesia.

Recommendations for a number of strategies to overcome the identified barriers are in the process of being implemented. These strategies can be applied to other island destinations in a regional context to overcome the identified barriers to sustainable tourism development in island destinations.

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Pacific Forum

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Am Beispiel gewaltsamer Konflikte in Südthailand, Aceh, Birma (Myanmar), den Südphilippinen, Kambodscha, Osttimor und dem pazifischen Inselstaat Salomonen diskutiert der Band die vielfältigen ökonomisch begründeten Interessenkonflikte als Grundstruktur gewaltsamer Auseinandersetzungen in der Region und zeigt dabei die strukturellen Beziehungen zwischen ‚alten' Konfliktlinien und ‚neuen' Kriegen im pazifischen Raum auf. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Frage, ob und inwiefern aktuelle Konflikte in dieser Region unter dem Gesichtspunkt ‚neuer Kriege' betrachtet werden können.

Mit Beiträgen von Shane Barter, Volker Böge, Ea Meng Try, Andrea Fleschenberg, Rolf Jordan, Alfred Oehlers, Helmut Schneider, Michael Waibel und Patrick Ziegenhain.

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