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Pacific Geographies

Research | Notes | Current Issues from the Asia-Pacific Region

A new land cover map for the Mekong
Southeast Asia´s largest transboundary river basin

Building states without building nations
Understanding urban citizenship in Dili, Timor Leste

New flags, upward forces & sheltered harbours
The new ´Great Game´ in the Pacific island region

CONTENTS #41 | January/February 2014

State Building and Nation Building in Dili, Timor Leste – 15

New flags, upward forces and sheltered harbours - The new ´Great Game´in the Pacific island region– 4

Green Open Spaces in Indonesian Cities: Regarding their Implementation – 26

GUEST EDITORIAL

Environmental Politics: Regulating Nature & Human Interactions?

Dear readers,

Environmental politics is a wide-ranging field of enquiry with the common basis that it is concerned with analysing the regulation of interactions between nature and humans – if indeed such a distinction is useful. As there are many human-nature interactions in various social, historical, political and economic contexts, at and across different scales, with differing outcomes, it is a challenging and complex field of research. My aim with this editorial is to (briefly) combine the contributions in this special issue with wider thematic developments in the field of environmental politics as a way of introduction.

At the inception of environmental politics as a research interest, politics was squarely at the core of the field. Researchers were interested in analysing the institutionalising of environmental concerns within political parties and the formation of new (green) parties that were embedded in environmental movements and their ideologies. While historically, this has happened in the global North, the contribution by Erhat Sünaldi analyses how the recently created green party in the Philippines has evolved from environmental movements. He suggests that an increasing understanding of the links between sustainable livelihoods and environmental quality have negated Inglehart's (1977) thesis that societies are first and foremost concerned with basic materialist needs of existence before engaging with moral or philosophical needs.

Although the formation of new political institutions (and their stance on environmental issues) is clearly of continued importance for environmental politics, the role of the nation-state and national institutions is changing and has become a point of interest for scholars of environmental politics.

The editors

Pacific Geographies

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In order to uphold scientific standards, the PG is implementing a peer-review process. Articles marked as „scientific papers" have been peer-reviewed by two external reviewers. Articles marked as „research notes" have been peer-reviewed by one external reviewer and a member of the editorial board. All other articles have been reviewed by the editorial board.
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The Association for Pacific Studies (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Pazifische Studien e.V., APSA) was founded in 1987 at the Department of Geography of the University of Technology in Aachen. Activities include workshops, conferences, public lectures and poster exhibitions. The book series Pazifik Forum was initiated in 1990. In 1992, it was complemented by the publication of the journal Pacific Geographies. The latter has developed into the major activity of APSA in recent years.
The APSA sees itself as one of the largest scientific networks in Germany for academics and practitioners with an interest in the Asia-Pacific region as well as academic exchange.

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COVER PICTURE
Street seller Nuong & customer

The 33 years old Nuong has been working in Ho Chi Minh City / Vietnam for 3 years. She is selling diverse goods in the street and sends most of the money she makes to her family back home. She is making around 100,000 Vietnamese Dong a day, in comparison to 40,000 in her home town. Nuong is not planning to stay in Ho Chi Minh City, forever. She is well aware that she will not be able to afford living here. For the time being she rents a bed in shared accommodation.

New flags, upward forces and sheltered harbours:
The new 'Great Game' in the Pacific Islands region

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Abstract: The centre of the global economy and the US-geostrategic focus seem to be shifting to the Asia-Pacific region. The present paper deals with the role of Pacific Island states in this new 'Great Game' between China and Western powers. Pacific Island states have a long tradition in building non-confrontational and open ties with rival powers. While only four countries in the Pacific have known mineral resources, others depend mainly on tourism, fisheries and remittances. China is interested in the vast mineral resources in the Pacific Island region, visible in increasing investment. Nevertheless, Australia remains the principal economic and key security partner for most of the Island states. Besides a painful colonial history, unequal distribution of mining benefits and social disparities are reasons for independence movements. Besides a painful colonial history, unequal distribution of mining benefits and social disparities are reasons for independence movements that are another issue in Pacific Island politics.

Keywords: new Great Game, Pacific Island states, China, development aid, EEZ, mining industry, independence movements

[Submitted as Scientific Paper: 26 September 2013, Acceptance of the revised manuscript: 17 October 2013]

Lately there has been a lot of attention to perceived strategic changes in the Pacific region. Hayward-Jones (2013: 1) from the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney starts her paper with the analysis that "the centre of global economic gravity has moved to the Asia-Pacific". In early 2011, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared in a statement to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that China and the United States are vying for supremacy in the Pacific: "Let's put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in and let's just talk straight, realpolitik. We are in a competition with China" (http://www.reuters.com). Since Clinton's statement Washington has become more cautious in public statements about China's role in the Pacific Islands. But the new 'Great Game' in the Pacific Islands region recently supplied material for many studies. Most of them deal with the interactions of the two 'big players', China and the United States, but do not analyse the perspective of Pacific Island countries. So, the present article seeks to elucidate the priorities and interests of the Pacific Island states in this 'Great Game'. How do they manage competing interests? Pacific Islands have "a long tradition of playing rival suitors to get the cargo" (Christian 2012: 2). The authors refer to Chinese and Taiwanese or American-Russian rivalries and those of different European powers. Can Pacific leaders follow a 'Pacific Way' (Haas 1991), building a non-confrontational and open consensus? What of the region's independence movements?

Methods

The authors draw upon their experience from several years of fieldwork in New Caledonia and a visiting fellowship in Australia. The arguments are based on an extensive review of recent articles published in both the international press and social science journals, and on a great number of interviews and discussions with local actors from civil society and government. Empirical studies with qualitative and quantitative surveys were undertaken in the districts of Voh, Koné and Pouembout in Northern Province, as well as Noumea, Bourail and Yaté in Southern Province. The surveys focussed on the participation of indigenous Kanak people in the mining sector, on integration of traditional authorities into the state and on independence movements in New Caledonia. Collaboration with Graeme Smith (University of Sydney Business School) led to fieldwork investigating Chinese investment in this French overseas territory. Discussions with researchers and doctoral students at the University of Melbourne and the Australian National University about general interests in the Pacific Islands region were analysed and integrated into the present article.

The first section of the paper gives an overview of the economic interests of Pacific actors, including trade, fisheries and mining extraction. The mineral resources in Pacific Island countries attract foreign investors. The authors – while working on state building, local development and mining benefits in New Caledonia – were directly concerned by external interests in the former French colony. The second section continues with actual independence struggles that are often linked to socio-ethnic disparities and economic interests. Finally, the third section of the paper deals with increasing Chinese presence in the region and the new 'Great Game'.

Economic interests in the Pacific?

The Pacific Islands region comprises 22 states and dependent territories dispersed over an area of 48 million square kilometres with a total population of over 9 million people, approx. 7 million of whom live in Papua New Guinea. All 14 independent states of the region are developing or least developed countries. Only Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji and the French overseas territory, New Caledonia, have substantial natural resources, while other countries depend mainly on tourism, fisheries and remittances (MIRAB economies).

Investment, trade and development aid

All of the smaller countries in the region rely heavily on financial transfers. The biggest, Papua New Guinea, receives the most international development aid with US$612 million in 2011 (28% of development aid to the region; Figure 2), followed by the Solomon Islands (15%).

China's trade in the South Pacific has increased sevenfold over the last decade (Hayward-Jones 2013: 7). Impressive through this is, China's trade with other parts in of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, has grown by more over the same period. Trade is most visible in Papua New Guinea where China is interested in that nation's vast mineral resources. Chinese companies often work in cooperation with other foreign investors and multinational partners so that it remains difficult to quantify their share. China's Metallurgical Group Corporation has invested in the Ramu Nickel Project. Smith highlights (2013: 178) the Ramu Nickel mine, situated in northern Papua New Guinea, as China's largest investment in the Pacific to date, at US$1.4 billion. Some Chinese aid is highly visible as roads, bridges and government buildings. Aid spending often ends up supporting China's own economic development by awarding contracts to Chinese companies and employing Chinese citizens. By contrast, Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele mentioned during celebrations of the 50th anniversary of independence that he welcomed Chinese assistance to provide the buildings and other infrastructure that Australia, New Zealand and the US do not offer (Christian 2013: 2). He also accused the US of showing a lack of interest in the South Pacific.

Chinese investment and development aid in the Pacific Island states can be overestimated. Figure 3 shows the Top 10 contributors of official development assistance (ODA). With 1.2 USD billion (55% of total ODA), Australia is the largest donor in the Pacific Islands region, followed by the United States and New Zealand (both 9% of total ODA). The diagram shows not only state donors, but also international funding organisations, such as the Asian Development Bank and the Global Fund. China is far from challenging Australia's dominant position in the region (Hayward-Jones 2013: 11).

Another form of development aid, which is often overlooked, are financial transfers from France to its overseas territories. The French government recently announced that this was one of the only budget items to increase in 2013 (http://www.outre-mer.gouv.fr). In 2010, the French Public Treasury accounted for about US$1.4 billion of fiscal transfers in New Caledonia (US$5815 per capita, ISEE 2009). Even though New Caledonia



Map 1: The Pacific Islands region (states and territories with their EEZ)

Pacific Geographies Cartography: © Claus Carstens 2013

Source: Development aid at a glance, 2013 edition, http://www.oecd.org/



Figure 2: Top 10 receipts by recipient (USD million, net disbursements in 2011)

Figure 3: Top 10 ODA donors (USD million, net disbursements in 2011) to the Pacific Island states

is rich in mining resources and nickel products, which provides about 95% of export value (Kowasch 2012: 205), the country depends heavily on remittances from France. This "remittance economy" is not directed towards the creation of marketable surplus, but to maximize financial transfers.

Fishing

The fishery resources of Pacific Island states and territories are among the largest in the world. Despite the efforts of the various agencies established to control the sector, it is difficult for Pacific Island states to exploit the full commercial value of this resource. The tropical Pacific Ocean shelters the largest tuna resources in the world, but their exploitation is only lucrative near the equator. Further north or south swarms are seasonal (David 2013: 86). Nevertheless, the tuna processing industry has attracted investment from companies in the Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and China (Hayward-Jones 2013: 9). The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) estimates the value of the fisheries catch from the region (including national and international waters) at approximately US$5 billion (in 2010). The objective of the 1979 FFA was to defend fisheries interests in the vast EEZ's. Most of its 17 members are small Island states, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand. New Caledonia has recently bought a multi purpose vessel called "Amborella" to patrol its fisheries. According to the New Caledonian President Harold Martin, this boat could become the embryo of a future New Caledonian coast guard. The control of the vast EEZs is an important issue, because Pacific Island states are often victims of 'illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing'.

The mining industry

Enormous mineral resources are closely linked to the return of the Pacific Islands region to the geopolitical stage. In a world where mineral resources are being depleted, the supply of raw materials is an important strategic issue. China and South-East Asian states seek security of raw materials supply for their growing economies (in particular ores, timber and phosphate). The proximity of the Pacific Islands to these resource-hungry countries will be advantageous for the region over the long term.

In New Caledonia, the mining industry has a 150-year history. Until recently, a single metallurgical plant run by French SLN (Société Le Nickel) produced nickel ingots. Thanks to the latest "mining boom", two new projects including mining extraction and building of a smelter were born: Goro Nickel and Koniambo (Kowasch 2009, 2012).

The world's mining sector is controlled by a handful of giant companies such as Xstrata/Glencore, Rio Tinto, Barrick Gold and BHP Billiton. Recently, companies from BRIC countries have made their appearance, for example the Brazilian Vale and the Chinese Jinchuan. The mining sector has become more open to local stakeholders who take part in mining projects. Seeking mining ownership promises large financial profits for local people, and power in decision-making. For example, the Koniambo project in northern New Caledonia includes the local "Société Minière du Sud Pacifique" (SMSP, 1% of the shares) and Xstrata (49%) (Kowasch 2012). Xstrata financed the exploitation of nickel deposits and provided the technical expertise. SMSP has the mining titles to the Koniambo massif and the support from local Kanak peoples, even if nickel mining has caused widespread environmental pollution. For the Kanak independence party PALIKA (Kanak Liberation Party), which governs Northern Province, and who are the majority shareholder in SMSP, the nickel industry is an 'instrument' for economic and political emancipation from France. Moreover, SMSP has begun applying the 51/49% shareholding split with other multina-

Source: M. Kowasch 2012

Nickel smelter at Koniambo

tional companies from South Korea and China. SMSP and Xstrata, Posco and Jinchuan formed a joint venture for the extraction of nickel ores as well as for building a processing plant. A nickel smelter in Gwangyang (South Korea) has produced ferronickel since 2008, and another smelter in southern China is planned. SMSP has several mines in New Caledonia that can supply the smelters. Mining benefits are reinvested in broader economic development, particularly in real estate, tourism and aquaculture. On the other hand, SMSP and the Northern Provincial government has accumulated a great debt (source: personal communication, 29 August 2013) – to banks and their industrial partner Xstrata in order to participate in the investment of the Koniambo project.

In the future, the extraction of seabed mineral resources will become a fundamental challenge for the mining industry, but also for local governments. The company Nautilus Minerals, headquartered in Canada, is trying to start a project in Papua New Guinea and is seeking exploration licenses in half a dozen countries in the South Pacific, from Vanuatu to Samoa. Seabed mineral extraction is controversial. Many scientists expect significant degradation of water quality and damage to coral reefs. In addition, these highly technical and mechanised projects will have a negligible impact on local employment.

Independence movements

France is the last European colonial power maintaining a territorial presence in the South Pacific, the UK's Pitcairn Island, with a population of fewer than 60 people notwithstanding. New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis & Futuna comprise a land area of 23,373 square kilometres and an EEZ of more than 7.6 million square kilometres. Two of these territories, New Caledonia and French Polynesia are on the United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories. In both countries are home to active indigenous independence movements.

In New Caledonia, named 'Kanaky' by the independence movement, violent anti-colonial struggles in the 1980s by the indigenous Kanak people and some white settlers led to the Matignon Accords (1988) and ten years later to the Noumea Accord signed between the FLNKS, the loyalist parties, and the French state. The French government agreed to transfer all competences to New Caledonia except sovereign powers (defence, foreign policy, police, courts and currency) (Kowasch 2012, 2009). Many loyalists have welcomed the transfer of authority from Paris to Noumea, but they are fiercely opposed to a final breach with the French Republic (Maclellan 2013: 17). A referendum on the transfer of the remaining sovereign powers will be organised between 2014 and 2018. The Noumea Accord provides new identity symbols: a new flag, new banknotes, an anthem, a slogan and a new country name. The flag and the name are highly controversial at present. After an initiative by the loyalist party RUMP (Rally for Caledonia in the Republic), the Caledonian Congress passed a law in July 2010 allowing both the French flag and the Kanaky flag to fly together outside public buildings. This gesture was welcomed by Kanaks, but rejected by some loyalists.

French Polynesia, named 'Tahiti Nui' by the independence movement, was reinstated on UN List of Non-Self-Governing Territories during the 16th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Teheran in 2012. In a speech to the Non-Aligned Movement in New York in January 2013, former President Oscar Temaru rejected autonomy: "It smells like freedom, tastes like freedom, but make no mistake: French version of 'autonomy' is not freedom." (http://overseasreview.blogspot.com.au). Temaru believes that after the end of nuclear tests on Mururoa and Fangataufa the interests of France are mainly economic: "France is now lurking to exploit our ocean. From the fishes to the newly found phosphates of our country, and the huge rare earth mineral reserves found on our seabed." Both French Polynesia and New Caledonia have vast EEZ's with fish and probable seabed mineral resources. In addition, New Caledonia possesses more than 25% of world's nickel resources (Kowasch 2012, 2009). A territorial presence in a region with increasing strategic importance can be advantageous for France. Australia, which over the last few decades played the role of 'sheriff' in the region, supports the French presence in the Pacific as it strengthens the Western powers in the region.

On the other hand, the mood in the Pacific region for decolonisation should not be underestimated. The new chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is the FLNKS, which received support from the independent Melanesian states (Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands and PNG) for its independence campaign. In Bougainville, another resource rich Island (with

large copper resources), the peace process is nearing completion, and the decision on the final status of the Island (autonomy status within PNG or creation of an independent state) will be made soon. And in West Papua, with the world's largest gold mine, indigenous Papuan people continue to fight for political independence from Indonesia.

The China challenge?

On November 27, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama addressed the Australian Parliament in Canberra to announce a rebalancing in US foreign politics: the political interest of the United States is now focused more on the Pacific Ocean than on the Middle East. To maintain its hegemony in the Pacific Ocean is one of its priorities. Apart from military initiatives, economics and diplomacy will play an important role. Obama's speech was followed by a paper published by the White House entitled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence". The document, released in January 2012, mentions the general scarcity of natural resources in the world. Then it elaborates on the apparent need to focus U.S. strategy on the Asia-Pacific region. After ten years of war against non-state actors, mainly in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the objective of American foreign policy should now be focused on 'containing' China's growing power. The United States abandoned the ban on New Zealand ships docking in U.S. navy ports, after reaching a deal with NZ ending that country's ban on US nuclear powered vessels. Obama announced that military aid to Indonesia will be strengthened, a new military base in Darwin opened, and the U.S. Navy would increase its presence. Washington is working to extend its diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Since 2010, negotiations have taking place between 12 states (including the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Rim states from Latin America and Asia) for a Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposal for a new multilateral free trade agreement. China is excluded from the negotiations. In summary, US strategy seems to be focussed on South-East Asia and the northern rim of the Pacific Islands region.

China for its part has embassies in most of the Pacific Island states which recognise the People's Republic. Diplomats leverage Chinese contributions to development in the region and expect support from Pacific Island governments for China's international positions in return. In Tonga, government officials rate outstanding debt to China as nearly 30% of GDP (IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis 2010). From Micronesia comes calls to relax visa requirements for Chinese and Russians entering these once US dominated territories (Christian 2013: 1). Solo Mara, the Fiji High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, said on 6 March 2013 that "China had filled a vacuum left when the US and the UK withdrew and which Australia did not adequately fill" (http://pacificislandssociety.com). China supports the Bainimarama regime in Fiji which is accused by Australia and the Pacific Islands Forum of restoring democracy too slowly. It is certain that China's influence is rising. Crocombe (2007) suggests that Pacific Island countries could shift allegiances from the Western Alliance to Northeast Asia or ASEAN. On the other hand, China has not yet sought to project hard power into the Pacific Islands region (Hayward-Jones 2013: 12). Rumours about China setting up military bases in states have proven unfounded. Its diplomatic and military ties lag behind those of the other powers. Australia remains the key security partner for most of the countries in the region.

Prior to 2008, China's interests in the Pacific Islands were driven by its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. Taiwan is recognized by six states in the region: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (see figure 1). So-called "chequebook diplomacy" ended when Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou proposed a diplomatic truce in 2008. Both Taiwan and China promised they would no longer seek to persuade states that already recognised the other to switch their recognition (Hayward-Jones 2013: 6).

China's increasing presence in the Pacific has involved expanding trade, investment and aid. China is an eco-

nomic actor, but the Chinese government has always been careful to say that it is in competition. Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cui Tiankai, tells journalists at the Pacific Islands Forum in Roratonga in 2012: "We are here in this region not to seek any particular influence, still less dominance. (…) China's assistance to other developing countries is in the framework of south-south cooperation so our origin, our policy approach and our practice are very different from those of the traditional donor countries" (http://news.xinhuanet.com). According to research conducted by Brant (2012), between 2006 and 2011 China disbursed approx. US$850 million in bilateral aid to the eight Pacific Island states that recognise the People's Republic (not including scholarships or technical assistance, which are delivered by separate government agencies in China).

Conclusion

Australia remains the principal economic partner for the Pacific Island states. Nonetheless China's increasing influence in the Pacific Islands region is driven by economic interests; the country looks for security of supply of minerals and timber for its growing economy. Chinese investment in the Pacific Islands region – where it is mostly welcomed – is most visible in resource-rich Papua New Guinea. The Chinese government does not aim for supremacy in the region, and defines its investment more as cooperation. The proximity of the region to the resource-hungry Asian countries will be advantageous over the long term for the Pacific Island states. Besides mineral resources, the great powers are gearing up to exploit the vast EEZs that shelter fish stocks and probable deep sea resources. These may be the subject of frontier conflicts.

The question remains open whether the independent Pacific Island states may pursue a typical 'Pacific Way' in the new 'Great Game', which is based on consensus and open to all. In a period of budget austerity, shifting alliances and partial commitments, Pacific Island states want to play a bigger role on the international scene and determine their own economic partnerships and political alliances. Pacific Island states are no longer automatically in the backyard of the former colonial states and several are still seeking political emancipation. Independence movements, that are often forged by painful colonial histories, socio-economic disparities, and heteronymous resource exploitation, harness this drive for emancipation. The desire for political sovereignty is alive, and is likely to be made by referendums rather than violent struggles.

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Poro Nickel Mine (New Caledonia)

Source: M. Kowasch 2013

A new land cover map for the Mekong:
Southeast Asia's largest transboundary river basin

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Abstract: The transboundary Mekong basin, including territorial parts of China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, is endowed with a rich natural resource base. The rapid socio-economic development of the region, however, substantially increases pressure on its natural resources that are increasingly subject of over-exploitation and environmental degradation. Some of the main environmental problems facing the region are common or transboundary issues that only can be addressed by transboundary approaches based on consistent and regional comparable information on the state of the environment at basin scale. In this context, a regional specific land cover map, the MEKONG LC2010 product, was produced for the entire Mekong Basin, utilising information from the MODIS sensor aboard the platforms Aqua and Terra.

Keywords: Mekong Basin, land use, land cover, environment, remote sensing

[Submitted as Research Note: 14 October 2013, Acceptance of the revised manuscript: 01 November 2013]

The Mekong Basin and its environmental challenges

The basin of the Mekong River in Southeast Asia includes territorial parts of six countries: namely China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Mekong is, with an estimated length of 4,350 km, the world's twelfth longest river and its basin spans a total area of approximately 795,000 km². The Mekong has its source in China's Qinghai Tibetan plateau at an elevation of 5,200m, then flows for approximately 1,900 km through the steep gorges and narrow valleys of Tibet and Yunnan Province of China, towards the border of Laos and Myanmar. By this stage, the river has already lost more than 4500 m elevation. From this point on, the terrain becomes increasingly moderate along the river's southwards course. The river forms the boundary between Laos and Thailand whereby intensively cultivated planes of cropland in Thailand in contrast to less intensively managed areas in Laos are evident. Further downstream, the river enters the alluvial lowlands of Cambodia where the river is linked to the very sensitive flood pulse system of the Tonle Sap ecosystem. In Vietnam the Mekong finally divides into nine tributaries forming the Mekong Delta before emptying into the South China Sea (Kuenzer und Renaud 2012).

The Basin is home to a population of more than 72 million inhabitants who are directly or indirectly dependent on the quality and quantity of its natural resources. These resources have historically supported rural livelihoods in the region and underpin the rapid socio-economic development, which has occurred in the Mekong region over the past decades. Today, it is one of the world's fastest-growing regions in terms of economy and population, though an uneven development is apparent between the riparian states. The rapid socio-economic growth has, however, also substantially increased pressure on the basin's natural resources. Weak environmental governance, poor law enforcement, and corruption further contribute to the over-exploitation and degradation of the environment.

With the transition from subsistence farming to more diversified economies, the governments of the riparian countries are eager to promote the commercialization of agriculture and agro-processing in order to raise incomes and create employment (Rowcroft 2008). This development is further compounded by the growing popu-

Source: Landsat TM satellite data 2009

Figure 1: Different cultivation schemes evident between Cambodia and Vietnam. In Cambodia (upper left corner) cropland is harvested once per year, while in Vietnam (lower right corner) cropland is intensified up to three harvests per year.



Source: ASTER satellite data 2002 and 2010

Figure 2: Conversion of natural forests to cultivated areas near Kampong Reang, Cambodia. The scenes are displayed as colour infrared (CIR) images for a better differentiation of vegetation structures.

lation that stimulates the demand for land and agricultural products. As a consequence, natural ecosystems, and in particular accessible lowland forests and woodlands, are facing increased pressure through the expansion of farmland and industrial crop plantations. Particularly in the economically powerful countries in the region, changes in cropping patterns (e.g. the shift from traditional crops to cash-cops or aquaculture) and intensities (e.g. the shift from one harvest to multiple harvests per year) are well observed phenomena (Vo et al. 2013, Kuenzer and Knauer 2013). The effects of economic development, knowledge, and technology on land use patterns, are for example, clearly evident along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border (figure 1): While soil and climatic conditions are about the same here for both countries, on the Vietnamese side, modern, early maturing, irrigated rice varieties are cultivated for the world market with up to three harvests per year. On the Cambodian side, however, less intensively managed and non-irrigated single season rice crops dominate due to the lack of agricultural knowledge and technology, which were lost as a consequence of the Khmer Rouge regime. Although these highly efficient agricultural practices allow for higher yields and revenues, it is important to note that very intensive farming, inappropriate irrigation, the increased use of fertilizers and pesticides (Toan et al. 2013), and the trend to mono-species cash-crop cultivation may cause an inevitable deterioration of water and soils as well as endangering the ecological equilibrium in the long term.

Another transformation the region has experienced over the last decades is the transition from state-directed economies to more open, market-based economies which has been accompanied by a rapid expansion of commercial relations among the Mekong countries (Rowcroft 2008). With the intensification of transboundary and international trade, however, environmental change may also be induced by drivers from abroad. Thailand for example, imposed a strict logging ban in 1989 after a series of devastating floods and landslides as a result of deforestation by the timber industry. Consequently, timber imports from Thailand's neighboring countries increased rapidly in subsequent years, whereby the environmental threats related to unsustainable forest losses where outsourced. Commercial logging intensified particularly in Laos, where wood products accounted for 56% of the official export revenue by 1991 (Daoroung 1997, Heinimann 2006). A more current transboundary phenomenon is the boom in rubber plantations that Laos has been experiencing over the past few years, mainly in response to a rising market demand for rubber from its neighboring countries, primarily China. As a result, many secondary forest formations and shrublands in the highlands of Laos, which play an important role in securing the livelihoods of local people (Heinimann 2006), have been converted to mono-species rubber plantations which only provide a fraction of ecosystem services compared to natural forests.

The increased transboundary trade is also coupled with the growth of urban structures and infrastructure (Leinenkugel et al. 2011). The promotion of new economic corridors as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programme initiated by the Asian Development Bank, is, for example, accompanied by substantial infrastructure developments valued at about US$11 billion, that have already been completed or are being implemented (ADB 2013). Among these developments are the upgrading of the Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh City highway and the East-West Economic Corridor that will eventually extend from the Andaman Sea to Da Nang in Vietnam. Such infrastructure projects have a direct and indirect impact on the land cover in the region. Directly, due to losses of mostly natural vegetation related to road constructions, and indirectly, because new roads facilitate the physical access to markets and natural resources, and thereby alter economic values (Rowcroft 2008). As a result, formerly remote regions are increasingly becoming a potential for profit with their conversion into managed land, as is evident in figure 2.

Furthermore, the rapid socio-economic development is accompanied by increasing energy demands, which are expected to rise by 7 % over the next 20 years, alone in the lower Mekong Basin (Kuenzer et al. 2012). China is implementing a number of hydropower projects along the Mekong main stem, the so-called "dam cascade" to meet its enormous demand for energy. Additionally, Laos and Cambodia are planning more than 100 dams on the Mekong tributaries to harness the river's hydropower generating capacity more effectively. The environmental consequences, particularly the transboundary impacts, are being controversially discussed and have brought the Mekong into pub-

lic and an international focus through the media. The downstream countries, believe that the dams are responsible for the alteration to the overall flow of the Mekong and its sedimentation. In the long-term, these may result in high environmental and social costs due to bank erosion, water shortage, increased irrigation challenges, and shifts in biodiversity (Kuenzer et al. 2012). In particular, the dams are expected to impede nutrient-rich sediment from settling in the Mekong delta and the Tonle Sap floodplain, which are essential for farming, fishery, and the prevention of saltwater intrusion into the Mekong Delta (Kuenzer et al. 2012, Kuenzer et al. 2013a). Furthermore, the dams are expected to block fish migration routes, which again, in the long term, will increase pressure both on cropland and areas for livestock farming (Kuenzer 2013).

The need for a regional perspective

Thanks to the shared natural resources and increased social and economic interactions between the riparian states, the basin can increasingly be seen as an integrated region with some of the main environmental problems being common or transboundary issues (UNEP and TEI). The Thai logging ban or the Chinese dam cascade illustrate to what extent shifts in land cover policies and practices in one country, can lead directly or indirectly to profound changes in another country's natural resources, economic conditions, or political and economic dependencies. Notably, however, the very heterogenic political, economic, institutional, and cultural conditions between the riparian countries have led to very diverse perceptions and practices in terms of natural resource exploitation and conservation (Heiniman 2006). Therefore, coordinated, trans-boundary management plans that not only correspond to specific environmental and social conditions on local or national scales but also contribute towards a sustainable development of the entire Mekong region are essential (Renaud and Kuenzer 2012, Moder et al. 2012). Furthermore, the inter-dependency between water, land, and other related natural resources requires a perspective encompassing all environmental aspects of the basin following the principles of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) (Moder et al. 2012). This is exemplified by the WISDOM Project, a bilateral research project between Germany and Vietnam (http://www.wisdom.eoc.dlr.de/), which has brought together more than 60 scientists from the fields of hydrology, sociology, information technology, and earth observation aiming at the analysis of socio-environmental issues in the Mekong Basin and the Mekong Delta, in particular. The WISDOM project also initiated the first transboundary conference on the Mekong Region- the Mekong Environmental Symposium, held in Ho Chi Minh City in March 2013, which highlighted the need for consistent and regionally comparable information on the state of the environment across all riparian countries.

A crucial information base that is used to characterize the state of the environment is provided by so-called land cover maps which categorize and quantify the environment according to the discernible vegetation (e.g. forest, grassland), hydrologic (e.g. wetlands, water bodies) or anthropogenic features (e.g. cropland, urban areas) on the land surface. Generally, these land cover maps are derived by the use of satellite imagery and are essential to many geo-scientific applications as seen in the fields of agriculture, ecosystems, biodiversity, climate, health, or energy. Furthermore, stakeholders, decision makers, international organizations, research networks, donor agencies, and others, require regional land cover and land use maps as essential baseline information for reporting and monitoring purposes.



Figure 3a. The Mekong LC 2010 land cover map.

Most government agencies, however, only produce maps that are limited to the extent of their respective national territories and thus, cannot be used for transboundary purposes. The combination and harmonisation of such independent, national land cover maps is generally accompanied by difficulties related to information gaps or thematic incompatibilities and, thus, limit their usefulness for regional, transboundary assessments. On the other hand, regional land cover maps produced over the last two decades that focus explicitly on continental Southeast Asia, also have certain limitations which hamper their applicability for present basin-wide land cover analyses. Many products only focus on a specific topic such as the characterisation and quantification of forest cover, having no or very little information on the remaining land cover characteristics (Leinenkugel et al. 2013). The most recent map having a broader and more comprehensive land cover classification scheme was produced for the year 2000 and has consequently become obsolete for present requirements. Moreover, all regionally specific maps covering continental Southeast Asia exclude the territory of China, thereby effectively providing land cover information solely for the lower Mekong Basin. The option of using subsets of global land cover maps has also shown to be inappropriate since these insufficiently capture the regional heterogeneity in land cover characteristics on local scales (Leinenkugel et al. 2013, Kuenzer et al. 2013).

The Mekong LC2010 land cover map

Within this context, a detailed land cover map for the year 2010, the MEKONG LC2010 product, was produced for the entire Mekong Basin, within the framework of the WISDOM project (figure 3). This land cover map is based on satellite data from the Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) instrument aboard the Terra and Aqua satellites that provide nearly full daily coverage of the Earth at a spatial resolution of 250-1000 m, being well suited for regional- to global-scale terrestrial environmental monitoring. The MEKONG LC2010 map addresses sub-regional characteristics by the inclusion of locally specific land cover classes, such as alpine grasslands, mangrove forests, or aquaculture while simultaneously ensuring a consistent classification of basin wide land cover types, such as evergreen or deciduous broadleaved forests. Furthermore, the temporal growing stages of the vegetation cover (land surface phenology) were analysed by a synthesis of near-daily satellite observations, which allowed for the differentiation between cropping intensities over cultivated land.

The Mekong LC2010 product, produced and provided by the team "Land Surface Dynamics" at the Earth Observation Center, EOC, at the German Aerospace Center, DLR, is freely available upon request and a comprehensive scientific description of the product can be found in Leinenkugel et al. (2013). Next to the production of single date land cover maps, current activities in the team involve the production of annual canopy cover maps from 2000 onwards. These maps focus particularly on woody land cover types and allow for the continuous monitoring and analysis of the valuable forests and woodlands in the Basin throughout the last decade.



Figure 3b. The Mekong LC 2010 land cover map.

Conclusion

The transboundary Mekong Basin in South East Asia is endowed with rich natural resources that are increasingly subjected to much pressure from the rapid socio-economic development within the region. Although geographically, culturally, economically and politically diverse, growing transboundary trade and the increased exploitation of shared natural resources have transformed the Basin into an integrated economic region. In this respect, it is inevitable that the Mekong riparian countries are keen to promote a sub-regional dialog to maintain the balance between economic development on the one hand, and the need for ecological protection and conservation on the other (Kuenezer et al. 2012, Moder et al 2012, Renaud and Kuenzer 2012). The establishment of regional and transboundary environmentally related institutions and programmes, such as the Mekong River Commission or the Core Environment Program and Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Initiative (CEP-BCI) of the Greater Mekong Subregion, has shown that the significance of transboundary cooperation for promoting sustainable growth in the region has been acknowledged. However, regionally consistent information on the state of the environment for the entire basin is still rare, and either not accessible or outdated. In view of this, the Mekong LC2010 product, being the only current basin-specific transboundary information data set on the land cover distribution in the area, provides scientists, stakeholders, and decision-makers with an updated and comprehensive picture of the diverse land cover characteristics of the region. As the first regional specific land cover product covering both the lower and the upper Mekong Basin, the Mekong LC2010 map is also of particular value for basin-wide hydrological modeling in the context of integrated water resource management (IWRM).

The Tibetan Plateau, where the Mekong originates, is predominantly covered by alpine grass- and rangeland. Below the tree line, at approximately 4000 m, needleleaved forest formations and shrubland become dominant which increasingly give way to broadleaved evergreen forests and woodlands, from elevations at 2000-2500m downwards. Particularly in the more densely populated southern part of Yunnan province and northern Laos, however, large extents of these evergreen forests have been degraded by small scale shifting cultivation practices, resulting in very heterogenic patterns forests and forest regrowth interspersed with patches of shrub-, grass-, and cropland. The land cover distribution in the lowlands of Laos and Cambodia shows lower proportions of evergreen vegetation but higher distributions of cropland, cropland/vegetation mosaics, and dry-deciduous broadleaved wood- and scrublands. Intensive cultivated areas, mainly rice cultivation, are concentrated in the Mekong Delta, in the lowlands surrounding Tonle Sap Lake, and in the extensive plains of the Khorat Plateau in Thailand. In the Mekong Delta double- and triple-season rice paddies, orchard cultivation, aquaculture, coastal mangrove forests, and mixtures of the latter, known as integrated shrimp-mangrove farming systems dominate.

Box 1: Land cover distribution in the Mekong Basin

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Building states without building nations:
Understanding urban citizenship in Dili, Timor Leste

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Abstract: State and nation building, although often used interchangeably in international relations policy and literature, are in fact two distinct, although closely intertwined, processes: the (re)construction of a state cannot be reduced to a technical exercise, that is, state building; rather, it needs to focus just as significantly on the (re)construction of the country's social fabric in order to develop the sense of citizenship upon which its sovereignty and legitimacy rest, that is, nation building. This research note introduces urban spaces as interesting contexts to explore the relationship between state and nation building, arguing that their diversity is both a challenge and an opportunity for the state to create a sense of citizenship amongst its population. The case of Dili, the capital of Timor Leste, where a violent past and rapid urbanisation have combined to shape extremely diverse social, political and economic urban spaces, is used here to explore how the population of three case study areas perceives the impact of state policies and to question how these perceptions influence the scales at which people build their identity as well as how these scales affect the construction of local, urban or national citizenship in Timor Leste.

Keywords: Nation Building, State Building, Citizenship, Urban Space, Timor-Leste

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Timor Leste has no pre-colonial state history. Before the arrival of the Portuguese and, subsequently, the Indonesian military, the territory on which Timor Leste now stands was divided into several kingdoms with their own leaders, dialects and customs, and whilst the long struggle against external rule contributed significantly to uniting the hearts and minds of the population in the hope for self-rule, substantial obstacles persist today for the creation of a population bound together toward a common goal. Indeed, in addition to traditional – pre-colonial – and historical – during Portuguese and Indonesian times – differences, new socio-economic and power issues have emerged as side-effects of the state building project, and the recurrent episodes of violence witnessed in Dili, the capital, since independence – urban riots in 2002, a three weeks long demonstration in 2005, and the political crisis of 2006 (dos Santos Monteiro 2010) – show that there is still some way to go in fostering the cohesive society necessary for building a nation. The objective of the field research carried out in Timor Leste, over a period of eight months within the framework of a PhD, was to understand how the decisions made as part of the state building process of the young country had an impact on building a national identity. The choice of Dili's urban space, as opposed to other parts of the country, fit within the research framework where the role and potential of urban space, to create either common or fragmented identities, are central to the analysis of the relationship between state building and nation building. As such, the research explored the following issues: (a) how do people perceive the impact of the state's market-oriented and social policies on the social, economic and built environment of Dili; (b) how do these changes affect the scale at which people build their identity; (c) what is the impact of these different scales on nation building and, consequently, the state building process.



The relationship between state and nation building

Although international relations literature and policies often use the terms 'state building' and 'nation building' interchangeably, an overview of the relationship between 'state' and 'nation' demonstrates that they are, in reality, two distinct though interconnected processes. The use of social contract theory is very useful here to understand that states do not emerge in a vacuum; rather, states are the product of a group of people, within a given space, that choose to form a body politic where the protection of a community's interests is considered more just than everyone protecting their personal interests, and where these interests are protected by a government, the form of which is chosen by the community (Locke 1952; Rousseau 1923). The emergence of the body politic, commonly referred to as the nation, is therefore at the basis of state sovereignty and requires a constant negotiation of different identities and interests in order to form one common social identity. As such, the ability of the state to remain in power, once formed, resides in its capacity to build adequate institutions that facilitate the dialogue necessary for these negotiations, for if the state is perceived as promoting unjustly some interests over others, common will to be governed by this state is undermined and a new body politic can emerge. This capacity is what is commonly referred to as state legitimacy.

The relationship between state sovereignty and legitimacy, as articulated through the lens of social contract theory, is underpinned by the notion of citizenship – both relational and juridico-legal. Indeed, citizenship in its relational sense is 'linked to various notions of identity, attained through action, not only vis-à-vis the state, but in other sites of politics as well, be they in the home, acts of cultural resistance or social movements' (Gaventa 2006), and is at the heart of how the nation is formed. Nonetheless, as noted above, the ability to maintain these relations lies within the state and is ensured through the fair implementation of rights – protection – and duties – common values and civic culture – that is through juridico-legal citizenship. Consequently, a state's sustainability resides in the quality of its citizens' interaction on a daily basis, and whilst these interactions take place at the local level within a variety of spaces, it is the capacity of the state to foster good relations between these spaces, where communities emerge, that enables it to create a wider national social identity, extending state sovereignty and legitimacy over a wider territory.

In the context of state and nation building, however, the relationship described above has been undermined by the introduction of an external element: international assistance for (re) building "functioning and durable states capable of fulfilling the essential attributes of modern statehood" (Dinnen 2007). State building has implied that sovereignty is now conferred to the state by international organisations through the fulfilment of certain priorities, whilst legitimacy is gained by electing from a list of parties that may not represent the interests of the whole population. As such, new states are faced with the immense challenge of building a national social identity – a nation – within a socially fragmented citizenry, and failure to do so – through unjust application of citizenship rights and duties, corruption – can lead to the emergence of new, more local forms of citizenship that "often run counter to the dominant images given to them" (Isin 2002 in Secor 2004).

Cities, as opposed to rural areas, provide a very good opportunity for analysing how citizenship is developed in the context of state building. First, their position as centres of attraction for international aid and investment, and as poles of development for a new labour force organised around a market economy, makes them attractive to a wide variety of population migrating from rural areas in search of a role to play and a better situation in the new country. Consequently, urbanisation and sudden increases in investment converge to produce spaces of difference within cities. Furthermore, the creation of these new spaces has a significant impact on the relationships between different groups of citizens. The urban fabric produced by the implementation of state policies creates new spaces of difference as some areas become richer, others appear to stagnate whilst others yet seem to become increasingly ostracised as their inability to participate to the new state project contributes to rising unemployment and economic insecurity. Thus, in the relationship between state building and nation building, urban spaces articulate how state policies have an impact on how 'ideas are formed, actions are produced, and relationships are created and maintained' (Marston, 2005; p.427) and how, in turn, the way in which such relations are framed, organised and lived in the everyday spaces of urban life has an impact on the creation of a national identity.



Source: Census Atlas, 2004, p. 31. Cartography: © Arne Löprick 2013

Figure 1: Population flows between districts

Fieldwork research in Dili, Timor Leste

Dili is particularly interesting compared to other urbanised or rural areas of the country because, as a result of its position as the capital, it has been the heart of administrative decision-making since Timor Leste's indepen-

Culao

Church in Liriu

Metin IV police post

dence in 1999. As such, in the past twelve years it has become host to a wide variety of international organisations that have contributed, with the significant presence of their staff, to the development of the urban area – e.g. infrastructure, housing, businesses, etc – and has attracted, as a consequence, a significant level of rural-urban migration stemming from people moving to the capital in search of a better life for themselves and their families.

Consequently, Dili has attracted significantly more migrants than any other district in the country – as the 2004 statistics show (National Directorate for Statistics – DNE 2004) – reaching, in 2010, a total population of 234,026 inhabitants (NDS 2013), that is 21% of the population of Timor Leste (NDS website 2013), and becoming, as such, Timor Leste's most diverse district – the data on population flows between districts shown in the table (DNE 2004) is the most recent available, nonetheless the continued absence of development in other areas of the country suggests that these patterns are likely to have remained unchanged since 2004. However, to date Dili remains without a master development plan to manage the high levels of migration and urbanisation that have been taking place in the past decade (Soares Reis Pequinho 2010), leading to the emergence of informal settlements and extremely uneven levels of development across the whole urban area.

The aim of the fieldwork in Dili, therefore, was to understand how the contexts in which people interact – affected by history, development, socio-economic differences and conflict – affect the way in which different groups perceive government policies and, as a result, the scales at which they construct their sense of social identity – local, urban, national. For this purpose, the research methodology was designed following a social constructivist view, that is, a methodological perspective based on the assumption that people's identities are shaped by their interactions with other people and by the milieu in which they live and work (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). By interacting with others, people create subjective meanings that are negotiated to become social identities, and renegotiated socially and historically (Creswell 2009) as new milieux come to create new interactions and, therefore, the need for new identities. Thus, the field research focused on two elements: (a) asking interviewees broad questions related to their environment, their interactions with other people, their movements and their perceptions of their governments since 2002, in order to understand how they construct their sense of belonging; (b) a mapping and analysis of the urban spaces in which they interact, to gather an overview of the milieu shaping their identities. In this context, no specific state policy was selected for discussion with the interviewees; rather, interviewees were left the freedom to highlight what they believed to be the main issues with their government and community, thus revealing patterns within and across communities that pointed to determining factors in the construction of their social identity. Furthermore, three areas presenting very distinct characteristics were selected in order to ensure that people's perceptions were constructed in different environments and, by cross analysing, investigate whether these have an impact. The following criteria were chosen: history of violence, development, and socio-economic characteristics. Finally, the research aimed at ensuring variety amongst interviewees, thus people spanning across these categories were selected for interviews:

District	In- Migration	Out- Migration	Net- Migration	% Living in District of Birth
Baucau	5,692	15,91	-10,218	94
Viqueque	3,727	12,845	-9,118	94
Bobonaro	4,853	12,484	-7,631	94
Lautem	1,726	6,515	-4,789	97
Manatuto	2,92	7,113	-4,193	92
Ainaro	4,137	8,111	-3,974	89
Ermera	6,223	9,663	-3,44	94
Liquiçà	3,879	5,505	-1,626	93
Aileu	6,117	7,452	-1,335	84
Manufahi	4,975	5,324	-349	89
Covalima	4,942	4,785	157	91
Oecusse	3,094	2,508	586	95
Dili	79,757	8,277	71,48	54

Source: Census Atlas, 2004; p.30

Table 1: Net lifetime migration, by District

Source: Google Earth 2013

Figure 2: Map of the three research areas in Dili

age, gender, level of education, employment status and community leaders.

Main findings

The following three areas were selected for the case study research: Culao, Liriu and Metin IV. For the purpose of this article it is not possible to present all the findings of the eight months fieldwork – including area characteristics – therefore the following findings represent only two aspects of the issues uncovered in the three areas – the ones most highlighted by interviewees – and only the areas' characteristics relevant to those issues are presented when necessary.

One of the main questions interviewees were asked was to explain what they believed the main causes of conflict – or absence thereof – in their area to be. The answers to this question, left intentionally open-ended, were interestingly very similar in all three areas: people appeared to be relating the absence of, changes in, or presence of conflict in their area to levels of education and employment of the population. In Culao, for example, the majority of interviewees asserted that episodes of violence started decreasing since youth started attending school more regularly and had better access to employment – a result, in their view, partially due to international and national programmes responding to the 2006 political crisis. In their view "education and employment keep young people off the streets and keep them busy", which prevents them from getting involved with street gangs or from drinking and causing trouble. As a result, there is a higher sense of security in the area, clearly visible from the high levels of activity on the main road – e.g. children playing, women interacting and playing bingo.

Conversely, in Metin IV, interviewees noted that violence in their area was the heart of a vicious circle. Indeed, violence in the area – stemming originally from a variety of causes, including land property rights and gangs formed during Indonesian times – has meant that few teachers want to teach in the school, unfortunately situated where much of the violence happens, resulting in low quality of education – which is not facilitated by the school often closing when episodes of violence occur. In people's views, this has meant that youth are unable to attend university, thus contributing to high youth unemployment levels in the area and resulting in a disenfranchised youth that enters gangs or drinks and causes trouble – many episodes of stones being thrown at high-income houses have revealed significant levels of social jealousy, as noted by Metin IV's inhabitants themselves. For many people in Metin IV, the way in which the government has been handling these issues has been conveying a very negative message. First, rather than attempting to understand the root causes of violence, the government has either responded with strong repression or, lately, has addressed the issue by expediting condemnations of perpetrators, rather than hearing them out. Second, many interviewees have lamented the absence of statistical data revealing both the number of unemployed and the skills lacking in the labour market. In their view, this type of actions would facilitate training for the right skills, decrease unemployment and, consequently, decrease violence.

Another interesting finding across the three areas was the analysis of people's patterns of movement in their area and across Dili's urban space. In Liriu, the central position of the area and its numerous transport connections allow most of the population to move around in the surrounding areas quite regularly. Similarly, in Culao, despite the somewhat external position of the area, the good transport connections revealed that most people travelled at least to other immediately neighbouring areas. In contrast, Metin IV is quite isolated: bad roads and bad area reputation mean that taxis seldom accept to travel there, whilst a walk to the nearest bus stop takes between twenty and thirty-five minutes in an often unsafe environment. Furthermore, people's employment status appeared to make a difference to their movement: unable to afford transport, and without the necessity to move, low-income people appear to remain within their area, whereas employed people travel more often across Dili.

Implications for state and nation building

The findings briefly highlighted above revealed important patterns regarding the construction of citizenship in Dili. People in Liriu, and to a certain extent Culao, with better access to education, employment and infrastructure – roads, transport –

showed, when asked about their perception of the government, the ability to critically put their problems into the wider perspective of the city and the country as a whole. This seemed to result both from the facility to move to other areas, which gives people the ability to put their situation into perspective, and from access to good education and employment, which offer people the opportunity to interact with other groups and therefore form a more comprehensive picture of the challenges facing the population as a whole. Their views on government policies were consequently more nuanced and demonstrated legitimacy of the government – through ability to participate in the economy and/or in open discussion of government issues.

Conversely, the situation in Metin IV showed that people perceive state's repression of violence as a "de-politicisation" (Dikeç 2002) of the issues at hand, that is, a refusal to see the episodes of violence as a direct contestation and response to some of the state's policies, thus leading to a strong sense of injustice and disenfranchisement. Furthermore, lack of movement outside the area showed a strong emphasis on issues immediately at hand, and a stark lack of perspective regarding government policies. As a result, much of the issues in the area – e.g. lack of infrastructure, conflict resolution – are being increasingly addressed by local leaders, whilst there is strong distrust of state institutions.

These perceptions regarding the perceived impact of state policies within different communities bear important consequences for the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. Indeed, the lack of adequate infrastructure, access to education and employment and the de-politicisation of violence are perceived by the people who suffer from them as an inability of the state to provide for their basic needs. In this sense, juridico-legal citizenship is perceived as unfulfilled by these groups, who subsequently turn to the leaders in their community for support – for instance, people in Metin IV indicated that much of the existing infrastructure is the result of community efforts, e.g. wells. Consequently, in these areas the legitimacy of the state is severely undermined. Conversely, in areas such as Culao and Liriu, with better infrastructure and socio-economic conditions, the legitimacy of the state is less questioned. Moreover, the analysis of people's movements reveals that that "every story is a travel story – a spatial practice" (De Certeau 1984 in Secor 2004), and the ability of the state to facilitate, or not, movement across areas affects significantly the relationships between different communities and groups of people. In this context, whilst good ties may emerge within communities, the socio-economic and infrastructural contrasts between areas may contribute to creating a gap between different groups, which may be further increased by the lack of movement across certain urban spaces. Consequently, the impact of state policies on the relationships between different areas and groups of people within Dili may have important consequences on the sovereignty of the state as different perceptions of the state emerge and there are no opportunities or mechanisms in place to foster a renegotiation of identities to create an urban, then national, citizenship. These processes therefore lead to the creation of fragmented forms of urban citizenship, for "who we happen to see regularly as we move through the world has an influence on who we think of as citizens and who we think to engage with as citizens" (Bickford 2000); and if these new, more local, forms of citizenship run counter to the national image the state is trying to promote, they can significantly hinder the functioning of the state.

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

Conservation, REDD+ and the struggle for land in Jambi, Indonesia

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Abstract: The Hutan Harapan project in Jambi is implemented within Indonesia's first private ecosystem restoration concession. Ongoing disputes over land access and control challenge the project implementation. Drawing on field work conducted in 2012 and 2013 this paper analyses how smallholder access land and how different authorities and discourses are used by smallholders to legitimate land claims. We argue that the Harapan case shows that marginalized smallholders and indigenous groups are able to establish powerful actor coalitions across scales. Actor coalitions provide smallholders the ability to maintain land claims within the protected Hutan Harapan. La Via Campesina and its Indonesian branch Serikat Petani Indonesia use the Hutan Harapan conflict as a showcase to criticize REDD+ at global venues such as UN climate change conferences.

Keywords: Land conflicts, Forest Conservation, Peasant movement, REDD+, Indonesia

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Source: Jonas Hein 2013

Picture 1: Slash and burn farming within Hutan Harapan conservation project

Introduction

Indonesia has the third largest tropical forest cover in the world. Its rich biodiversity makes Indonesia a key country of concern for donors and international conservation NGOs. Due to recent debates on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) the attention towards Indonesia's tropical forests further increased. In 2008 the conservation company PT. Restorasi Ekosistem Indonesia (REKI) received the first ecosystem restoration concession (ERC) from the Ministry of Forestry (MOF) and established the Hutan Harapan Project. REKI was founded by three NGOs namely Burung Indonesia, Birdlife International and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB). The project area covers 100,000 ha in the provinces of Jambi and South Sumatra (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). It aims to protect one of the last remaining patches of tropical dry land rainforest. The German International Climate Initiative (ICI), the Danish International Development Agency DANIDA and private donors such as Singapore Airlines provide funding for the project.

This article analyses how smallholders gain access to land and how different authorities are used by different actors to legitimate land claims within the Hutan Harapan. Ongoing disputes over land access and control challenge the project implementation. Mainly because parts of the project area are claimed by local indigenous groups and smallholders supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and peasant associations. Multiple partly blurred conflict lines exist between REKI and the transnational peasant movement claiming land but also between sub-national governments and the Ministry of Forestry. Indonesia has a long history of land conflicts caused by weak community rights, overlapping authorities, inconsistent regulations and incomplete land reforms. Hutan Harapan, literally "Forest of Hope" is a space of friction, a space where conservation movements encounter peasant movements and a space where different stakeholders have uneven abilities to engage with authorities holding the power or the legitimacy to enforce land claims (Tsing, 2005, p. 4; Pye, 2013, p. 457; Sikor and Lund, 2009).

This article is based on multi-sighted qualitative research conducted in 2012 and 2013 in Jakarta, Bogor and Jambi. Interviews on forest governance, land tenure and Indonesia's emerging REDD+ governance framework were held on the national and sub-national level with representatives of the Indonesian government and various NGOs. In the village of Tanjung Lebar semi-structured interviews with farmers and village elites and participatory observations were conducted. Interview guides with open and closed questions were used to identify historical and current modes of land access and land use and to assess the local population's knowledge of existing forest and conservation regulations. Tanjung Lebar partly overlaps with the project area of Hutan Harapan. Interviews have been recorded, transcribed (partly by Indonesian assistants) and coded with Atlas Ti. Furthermore, this paper builds on the review of Indonesian land tenure and forest regulations.

The research note starts with a conceptualization of access to land drawing on Jesse Ribot and Nancy Peluso's Theory of Access (2003) followed by a description of key aspects of Indonesia's forest and land governance systems. We proceed with the introduction of the main actors struggling for access and control of land within the Hutan Harapan. In the section "the local conflict arena" we analyze historical roots of the conflict, actors strategies to gain access to land and their specific strategies to legitimate their land claims.

Conceptualizing access to land

Ribot and Peluso (2003, p. 155) define access as "[…] the ability to benefit from things". Access refers to de jure and de facto options to benefit from given opportunities of any kind or in this specific case from land. Any analysis of access has to consider power relations. Power rather emerges from people and is performed through networks or "webs of power" (Ribot and Peluso, 2003, p. 156). Different actors have differing positions within "webs of power" and consequently have uneven abilities to access land or to prevent access of others. Right-based access refers to property arrangements which are backed up by formal or customary authorities (Sikor and Lund, 2009). Societies with plural land tenure systems are characterized by nested and plural legal authority arrangements with unequal ranges of validity and unequal abilities to enforce claims. Claims backed by high-level administrative authorities may have a higher legitimacy than claims backed by a village official or vice versa.

Influential actors with access to political institutions on different political scales may have the ability to actively choose specific political scales to achieve their objectives (Lebel, Garden & Imamura, 2005). Access to specific institutions on different scales is an important factor in explaining socially differentiated abilities to benefit from resources (Leach et al., 1999: 233). In the context of private conservation and REDD+, new actors and transnational sources of authority emerge. REDD+ establishes a transnational layer of forest governance through decisions taken at conferences of the framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC), donor safeguards



Figure 1: The research area Jambi, Sumatra

Source: Center for International Forestry Research, Peta Ruba Bumi Indonesia (Bakosurtanal), own village survey. Cartography: Niklas Rehkopp, Institute of Geography, University of Goettingen

Source: Jonas Hein 2012

Picture 2: Reforestation efforts of the Hutan Harapan project

and certification schemes developed by NGOs.

In frontier regions with confusing and dynamic institutional landscapes, access to authority and social identity are outstanding determining factors shaping the ability to benefit from resources (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009; Rhee, 2009). Ethnicity and kinship shape patron-client linkages and permit privileged access to state officials and consequently to formal or semi-formal processes which facilitate resource access (McCarthy, 2005; Rhee, 2009). Ethnicity is context-dependent and determines affiliation to groups with specific customary arrangements permitting access for its members (Wimmer, 2008). Discourses about meanings and values of nature also structure access to land and forest resources in an important way. Discourses of specific "natures" such as conservation or environmental justice discourses are in some cases used to legitimate state control over forest resources or to legitimate access to land designated for conservation

Non- state actors	Description	Role within the conflict
REKI	Conservation company founded by NGO consortium	Holds the concession for the Hutan Harapan project Negotiates conservation agreements with smallholders Seeks to push illegal loggers and oil palm farmers out of the concession
Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI)/ La Via Campesina	Peasant movement, promotes agrarian reform	Actively occupies land within the concession (Hutan Harapan) and distributes land to smallholders
Customary authorities	Customary leader of Batin Sembilan	Enabled land access for rural migrants and SPI Claim parts of the Hutan Harapan project as their *Wilayah Adat* (customary land)
State actors	**Description**	**Role within the conflict**
Ministry of Forestry	Responsible ministry	Legal authority over forest land Issued the private conservation concession (ERC) for REKI
Village government of Tanjung Lebar	Village head and sub village heads	Issues IDs for settlers Accepts the informal settlements as official sub-villages (*dusuns*) and neighborhoods (RT, *rukun tetangga*)

Table 1: The main actors

(Ribot and Peluso, 2003, p. 169).

Forest governance and land tenure in Indonesia

Indonesia has two main land tenure categories which are governed by different laws. The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) regulates non-forest land while the Forest Law 41/1999 governs forest land (Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011, p. 3, Indrarto et al., 2012). All forest land belongs to the state (with a few exceptions). Private and formal property exists only on land classified as non-forest. Formal access to forest land for economic and conservation purposes (ERCs) are provided by the MOF through a concession system (Indrarto et al., 2012; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001). Conservation concessions date back to forest management reforms in 2004. For the first time they provide the opportunity for private actors to implement forest conservation and ecosystem restoration activities within state forest land (Walsh et al., 2012, p. 35; Hein, 2013). Responsibilities previously exercised by the central government such as environmental protection, environmental monitoring and even the allocation of land use permits can be exercised by the conservation companies holding an ERC concession.

Forest and agricultural regulations and legislation only give limited recognition to customary land rights or adat land rights (Moeliono and Dermawan, 2006, p. 109f). In many cases, forest concessions, plantation permits and protected areas overlap with land claimed by local communities. Local and indigenous communities have the opportunity to apply for various community or village forest concessions while it is usually difficult for these communities to gain access to these concessions (hutan desa). Experts from academia and NGOs interviewed in July 2012 mentioned that requirements such as the preparation of management plans and performance of forest inventories, and the levying of administrative charges represent significant barriers to local communities which cannot be overcome without external support.

The struggle for land: the main actors

Crucial actors within the local conflict arena claiming forest land either for conservation, subsistence agricul-

ture or cash crop cultivation are the conservation company REKI (the company implementing the Hutan Harapan project), the peasant movement Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI) member of La Via Campesina, the Ministry of Forestry, and village governments (see Table 1). REKI seeks to generate income through non-timber forest products (NTFP), eco-tourism, ecosystem services and potentially REDD+ (see Picture 2). Overall goal of the Hutan Harapan project is to protect patches of lowland rainforest which have the potential to sequester 10-15 million tons of CO2e within 30 years (International Climate Initiative [ICI], 2013) and to establish conservation agreements with local communities to incentive environmental friendly land-use. With the local ethnic group Batin Sembilan, living in neighbouring Bungku village, REKI sucessfully negotiated conservation agreements (Hein, 2013). The agreements will allow smallholders to use a parcel of land and to collect non-timber forest products (NTFP) within the Hutan Harapan project, in accordance with guidelines developed by REKI (e.g. no oil palm cultivation and no slash and burn). In addition REKI provides healthcare and school service free of charge.

The main opponent of REKI is SPI, founded in 1998 in North Sumatra with currentlly 20.000 members in Jambi Province. SPI argues for a pro-poor land reform supported by their main slogan "Land for Peasants" (Serikat Petani Indonesia, 2013). SPI is not only a lobby and advocacy group for smallholders but promotes land occupations and informal settlement projects of landless farmers. The umbrella organization of SPI, La Via Campesina, represents 200 million famers in 70 countries. The main objective of the organization is to achieve food and land sovereignty for smallholders (La Via Campesia, 2011).

The local conflict arena

Tanjung Lebar with officially 2,876 inhabitants is located in the district of Muaro Jambi at the northern edge of Hutan Harapan. Main ethnic groups are Javanese, Batak and Melayu Jambi (Polsek Sungai Bahar, 2011). The village dates back to the pre-colonial era and was founded by the indigenous Batin Sembilan (sub-group of Melayu Jambi). Under Suharto's presidency transmigration settlements were established in this area in 1986 forming enclaves within the village territory of Tanjung Lebar and became independent villages later on. Batin Sembilan from Tanjung Lebar state that the land located between Bahar River and Lalan River tributaries is part of their Wilayah Adat (customary land). The concession of Hutan Harapan is located south of the main village of Tanjung Lebar. It was used as a logging concession by PT Asialog until the early 2000s. The project area overlaps with the Wilayah Adat of the Batin Sembilan. Since logging activities did not require the permanent use of the whole concession area, the Batin Sembilan were still able to practice dry rice farming and to collect NTFPs such as latex, rattan and fruits within the logging concession.

After PT Asialog stopped logging but before REKI started the conservation project in 2010 the situation changed fundamentally. Political turmoil and decentralization policies after the fall of Suharto led to the reemergence of adat rights as a means to claim land and natural resources within the former Wilayah Adat (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann, 2001, p. 34). Customary leaders and individuals pretending to be customary leaders of the Batin Sembilan started to engage in informal land trade. Rural migrants received land from Batin Sembilan families; in most cases below market prices on condition that they settle permanently, invest in village development, and deliver agricultural techniques to the Batin Sembilan.

SPI members claim that their settlements and land conversion activities were approved by Batin Sembilan and members of the village government of Tanjung Lebar. The first members of SPI affirm that live within the project territory since 2007. At the same time, the conservation company claims that SPI members only started to settle within the project area after the conservation project started in 2010 and accuses SPI members for destroying the most valuable forest of the project area. Today SPI occupies more than 2,000 ha of land within the Hutan Harapan project. SPI members mentioned that farmers have to meet two criteria to obtain land use rights for up to 6 ha land per household from SPI. First, they have to be poor thus unable to buy land on the formal land market. Secondly, they have to agree to not planting oil palms. REKI, however, accuses SPI members for growing oil palms as well as for illegal logging.

To legitimize their land claims SPI refers to Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), transnational anti REDD+ discourses and global environmental justice discourses. SPI members cite the



Figure 2: Detailed map of the conflict arena

Source: Center for International Forestry Research, Peta Ruba Bumi Indonesia (Bakosurtanal), own village survey. Cartography: Niklas Rehkopp, Institute of Geography, University of Goettingen

Source: Jonas Hein 2013

Picture 3: Informal SPI Settlement within Hutan Harapan

Picture 4: SPI Members at a Mosque construction site within Hutan Harapan

clauses of the BAL which states that "land has a social function and that every Indonesian citizen has equal rights to obtain land rights (unofficial translation)" (Ministry for Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia, 1960). In regard to REDD+, SPI members and SPI leaders in Jakarta argue that industrialized countries should reduce their emissions domestically instead of "offsetting" them in Indonesia. SPI argues that REDD+ and private conservation projects should not put the rights of smallholders at risk. SPI, with support of La Via Campesina, takes local land conflicts related to conservation and REDD+ to the transnational scale. They use the Hutan Harapan conflict as a showcase to criticize REDD+ at UN Climate Change Conferences and other global venues (La Via Campesina, 2012). Furthermore, they use the high attention towards Indonesia's forests to highlight inequalities within the Indonesian land and forest governance system and link them to transnational environmental justice discourses related to forest carbon offsets (Hein and Garrelts, 2013, p. 441). Active scale jumping or in other words active scale choices and environmental justice discourses are used to legitimize land claims within the Hutan Harapan Project (Pye 2013, p. 433, Lebel et al., 2005).

REKI responded by stressing that its' ERC permit issued by the MOF is the only legal claim in place. Consequently, the company considers most of the land claims by migrants and SPI members as illegitimate as well as illegal and seeks to relocate in particular those groups involved in logging, land trade and oil palm cultivation. Land claims by Batin Sembilan and those of local communities living permanently in the area are regarded as more or less legitimate by REKI. Lines between actor categories as used by REKI are fluid. As forest conversion activities, smallholders and SPI members (both groups stigmatized as encroachers) were approved by customary authorities while Batin Sembilan are converting forests for oil palms inside the project area as well. Most of the settlements inside the project territory are ethnically diverse and recognized as official RTs or dusuns by the village government of Tanjung Lebar.

Apart from seeking the support of legal forces to tackle encroachment activities REKI tries to dissociate itself from REDD+ to avoid REDD+-offset related controversies and attempts to display the project as biodiversity project instead of a climate change project. This is demonstrated by the new project homepage which neither refers to REDD+ nor carbon sequestration. Nevertheless, the main donors DANIDA and ICI still list carbon sequestration or REDD+ as objectives of the Harapan project on their web pages (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2012; ICI, 2013).

Conclusion

Aim of this paper was to analyse how smallholders access land and how different authorities are used by smallholders to legitimate land claims within the Hutan Harapan project area. The contested land claims of the Hutan Harapan case show that REDD+ implementation and conservation is embedded in existing formal and informal struggles for political power and resource access linking different scales of decision-making (McGregor 2010). Smallholders typically draw on regional authorities to legitimize their claims. Yet the Harapan case shows that marginalized smallholders are able to establish strong actor coalitions within networks or "webs of power" (Ribot and Peluso, 2003, p. 156). Smallholders in Tanjung Lebar who became members of SPI draw on at least three sources of authorities linked to different discourses to legitimize their land claims. These sources of authority provide smallholders in Tanjung Lebar with the opportunity to resist powerful claims of the conservation company REKI.

First, they draw on the re-emergence of adat law as institutional arrangements mediating access to land and natural resources. Adat provides additional transnational "bundles of power" (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Adat as place-based, ethnic-group specific arrangements of indigenous groups are recognized by international

agreements such as ILO Convention 169, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and by the Cancun Safeguards (1/CP.16). These agreements provide the opportunity to advocacy groups to initiate campaigns at transnational venues. The second source of authority is the BAL. The BAL, still in use but today only applicable to non-forest land, was formulated during the presidency of Soekarno as a comprehensive land law (Bakker and Moniaga, 2010, p. 188). Indonesian agrarian reform activists argue that the BAL is the only Indonesian land-related law recognizing the social function of land and limiting the maximum land size of individuals and companies. Indonesian Agrarian reform activists and the Indonesian peasant movements quote the law to underpin their campaigns as it reflects the more socialist oriented Soekarno era. SPI even uses the BAL in a more concrete way, as the organization claims to actively redistribute land to landless farmers within Hutan Harapan. The third source of authority are discourses linked to environmental justice. SPI and La Via Campesina refer to anti REDD+ discourses to legitimate their actions and to attract global attention for the concerns of smallholders.

The case study shows that Indonesia's last frontiers are a space of friction (Tsing 2005, p.4). Overlapping and competing authorities are a major challenge for conservation and REDD+ implementation. Conflicts over land access and control within Hutan Harapan are rather initiated by historical inequalities caused by the non-recognition of community rights within state forest than by the project intervention itself. REKI seeks to establish new land use regulations (conservation agreements) providing land use rights for biodiversity friendly and for low carbon land-use practices. So far, REKI has only negotiated agreements with indigenous Batin Sembilan groups in Bungku village. A general problem however is that the benefits REKI provides through the conservation agreements are not sufficient to meet the opportunity costs of oil palm cultivation and illegal logging (c.f. Hein 2013). Since SPI claims that their members are not cultivating oil palms anyway a possible first step for conflict resolution might be to accept land claims of SPI members which are not growing oil palm and to start negotiating conservation agreements.

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Green Open Spaces in Indonesian cities: schisms between law and practice

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Abstract: International organizations consider Green Open Spaces (GOSs) to be an indispensable asset for the health of urban inhabitants. Indonesian cities consist of about 9% of these spaces, even though the Law of Spatial Planning (SPL) 2007 of the Republic of Indonesia stipulates 30%. Massive cleavages are obvious between the international target of min. 9 m²/capita GOS, the adaptation and translation of it into the SPL 2007, and finally the real practice on the local level of increasing the amount of GOSs. The question follows: what are the challenges facing the realization of GOSs? Eighteen interviews have been conducted with representatives from the national government, local governments and NGOs in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Semarang. In planning GOSs, a long-term is necessary but contrary to business interests and the short-term consumer preferences of the powerful modern middle-class. Nevertheless, examples of reducing the oppositions to the mandated regulations and requirements do exist.

Key words: Green Open Spaces, Law of Spatial Planning 2007, Indonesia

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Whenever one thinks of Indonesian cities, one rarely associates them with vast amounts of open spaces, even less so with green open spaces (GOSs). Surprisingly, the Indonesian Law of Spatial Planning (SPL) 26/2007 stipulates that 30% of urban areas must consist of GOS. But where are they?



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City Park Wonosari under construction

Introduction

Urban areas have become the focal spatial entities of emerging economies, not only regarding innovations but also rising ecological footprints. In Indonesia, the percentage of the urban population increased from 12.4% (1950) to 48.1% (2005). It is expected that in the year 2050, 58.5% will live in urban spaces (Vorlaufer, 2011: 86). Due to massive urbanization, questions of healthy living in urban areas have become more crucial for urban planning and management, especially for the 10 million (2012) urban poor (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2013). People with little access to basic resources will be the first to experience the negative effects of urbanization (UN Habitat, 2010: 17).

Flower pots to prevent squatting, Kebon Kacang, Jakarta

International organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are focusing on healthy living conditions in urban areas (WHO 2008). Green Open Spaces include major features which contribute to the improvement of aesthetic conditions and numerous bioclimatic functions: reducing CO2 emissions and urban heat islands, serving as water regeneration and noise attenuator, acting as wind breakers, and also doubling as a habitat for animals. These possible functions have resulted in the mandate of min. 9 m²/capita or optimal 10 to 15 m²/capita GOS.

Those interviewed doubt that the Indonesian government would have become active without the involvement and pressure from international institutions. The Indonesian government adopted these policies and adapted them to the Indonesian case (DJPR, 2008; Arianti, 2010). The most ascribed function of GOSs in Indonesia is the provision of a decentralized flood system as conservation areas for hydrological sustainability and water control in runoff areas. Undoubtedly this can be regarded as one of the strongest pro-GOS arguments (Dewi, 2011). For example, the flood 2007 in Jakarta was "the greatest flood in the last three centuries, inundated about 40% of the city, killed 80 people and forced about 340.000 to flee" (Brinkmann & Hartmann, 2009: 2). The damage caused by natural disasters like floods, which occur with great frequency and severity, also cause more transformations of GOSs into commercial areas and soil-sealing.

Arguments for social benefits like recreation or the importance of public spaces in democratic societies are less prominent (DJPR, 2008; Arianti, 2010). However, in many Indonesian cities, the current situation of GOSs is alarming: "In the big cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and Medan, GOS have decreased from 35 percent on average into less than 10 percent of today's condition" (Kirmanto et al., 2012: 4). Jakarta has only 7.1 m² GOS per capita. Indonesian cities fall far below the worldwide average of 11 m² to 34 m²/capita (ibid.). Jakarta's official population numbers 9.6 mil. people (2010) who live in an area of 661.52 km² (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2013). If everyone were to get the requested min. of 9 m²/capita, Jakarta would have to establish 2693 ha of additional green spaces. 30% GOS means min. 20 m²/capita in Jakarta.

In addition to measurable indicators, soft parameters like place, distribution and access should be considered. For example the 87 ha of Bogor's Botanical Garden in the city center bars many from access through an entrance fee. Distribution is also highly unequal, because barely any green areas exist in certain other neighborhoods. Also, GOSs in the urban periphery have almost no impact on living conditions in the inner city. Access depends on mobility and its costs.

Thus, several reasons have caused the national government to extend regulations for city development in 2007. They added a new section to the Indonesian Law of Spatial Planning, establishing a target of achieving 30% GOS share of the total urban administrative area (Kirmanto et al., 2012).

The main question of this research note focuses on discussing what problems can arise in realizing this ambitious goal. To understand the complexity of this topic, we look at the institutional framework related to GOSs. Furthermore eighteen semi-structured interviews were arranged with representatives from the Ministry of Public Works, the local government of the City Wonosari, the Badan Lingkungan Hidup (BLH) Yogyakarta and several NGOs in Yogyakarta, Semarang and Jakarta. The interview partners belonged to the educated and politically active middle-class or hold official government positions and are consequently more reticent to express critical opinions to a foreigner. With this method, differences between law and real practice were revealed. The research was conducted between February and April 2013 while working for United Cities Local Government Asia Pacific (UCLG ASPAC), located in Jakarta.

The Institutional Framework

There have been various attempts to amend GOSs to adhere to the stipulations of the SPL 2007. The law clarifies how one of the most powerful instruments for implementing GOSs is designed: the institutional framework is mainly determined in the SPL 2007 and PEDOMAN (Penyediaan dan Pemanfaatan Ruang Terbuka Hijau di Kawasan Perkotaan = Preparation and Utilization of Green Open Space in Urban Areas). The goals of SPL 2007 must be fulfilled twenty years after the approval. Article 29 men-

tions that the 30% GOS in urban areas consist of properties which are 20% public and 10% private (DJPR, 2007). It was not stated how the amount of 30% was determined.

Open Spaces are defined as spaces in the city or the wider region that are either an elongated spot or lanes which are free of buildings and where use is more open. Open spaces consist of green open space (GOS) and non-green open space. Non-green Open Spaces are open spaces in urban areas which are not included in the category of green spaces; they are paved areas and water bodies. Private GOSs are owned by a particular institution or individuals and access to them is limited to others. It can be a garden or the courtyard of a house, public building or private planted land. Public GOSs, such as parks, streets, and areas such as riverbank greenery are owned and managed by local cities or counties for the benefit of everyone. The so-called Coefficient of Basic Buildings (CBB), defined as the percentage of first floor buildings to land area (DJPR, 2008), should be low to allow a high percentage of GOS. The land-use targets shall be related to the spatial distribution of the urban population (Fig. 1).

SPL encourages decentralization and more opportunities on the level of local governments (Dewi, 2011). In Indonesia, SPL 2007 follows a dual system of hierarchy and parallel planning. "A parallel system refers to the fact that each government unit possesses more or less similar authorities in spatial management, which creates the impression that districts have autonomy in spatial management. In contrast, the hierarchical system indicates that district spatial planning is considered an elaboration of higher ranking spatial planning" (Moelino, 2011: 180). The framework used from spatial planning to implementing GOSs involves several steps. Aside from PEDOMAN, the agencies involved in spatial planning at the national, provincial, regency, and city levels have to determine the spatial plan in accordance with their abilities. The Spatial Plan has to give information about the minimum size of the area, the type and location for GOSs, the stages of implementation for the provision of GOSs, and its intended use more generally.

Furthermore, the Detailed Plan, created by the urban regions and cities, includes information about specific GOS provisions by type, location and dimension on a smaller scale (1:5000). The Detailed Plan determines tools and measurements for a five year plan, including the acquisition of existing GOSs, creating local strategies for long- and short-term objectives, and the evaluation of priority GOS areas. It indicates how to realize concepts in each area and city district and provides the zoning regulations (ibid.) (Fig. 2).

Experts judge the clause as a milestone because, compared to former laws, SPL 2007 includes the empowerment of people and gives citizens more rights to participate in the decision-making process. Spatial plans and construction projects must be published, so local people can object more easily if abuse is suspected. The people's point of view is reflected more than in former laws. The law takes GOSs into consideration, which has never been done before. Sanctions will (theoretically) be enacted if the guidelines of the detailed plan are not implemented. Within the former legal framework, GOSs could easily be transformed into commercial or residential areas with no consequences.



Source: Own display based on DJPR, 2008: 64

Fig. 1: Land-use targets in Indonesian cities according to SPL 2007 (CCB = Coefficient Basic Buildings)

Challenges in the Implementation

The next step is to look in to the practice of realizing GOSs. Several cities have achieved 30% of green space, but as mentioned in an interview, the practical definition of GOS is sometimes disparate from the official one in the law. Zoning separates GOSs from other green spaces like agricultural areas or roof top gardens. The law requires action, especially from the local governments. Sanctions in form of administrative fines threaten the local government as well as allegations from the civil population of failed city management policy. As mentioned in an interview, mayors are judged by their performance in the last legislative period, especially in context of economic stability, more so than by how they have kept up with long-term environmental standards. Consequently, most city governments lag behind the target increase of the share of GOS. However, these spaces are in competition with the interests of investors and land acquisition by city developers, who have built new towns like Kebayoran Baru in Jakarta. Such complexes of hotels, office buildings and other facilities are in competition with other new towns. The boost of mega projects since the 1980s (Rimmer&Dick, 2009) ends up courting customers and results in the transformation and decline of green areas. The interview partners expressed that local governments are not prevailing enough against the economic powers that force their hands. The government will ultimately define any green area as GOS.

An interviewee from the Ministry of Public Works affirms that since the new law has come into force, land transformation does not happen anymore, but "many local governments are in euphoria in claiming their resources with less consideration of public good" where GOS is included (Dewi, 2011: 24). The risk of being prosecuted rose with the legal empowerment of the people, however, instruments of control and sanctions are quite weak or nearly nonexistent.

Taman Langsat, Jakarta with equipments for a modern lifestyle

Corruption was named as a major reason for why transformations and the decline of GOSs are still happening. Questions of responsibilities regarding planning, controlling and managing GOSs are an additional challenge. In Jakarta, for example, three agencies charged with planning, managing and controlling exist side-by-side: the Park, Forest, and Agricultural Service. The fact that Jakarta is divided in six municipalities with their own agencies, visions and needs adds to the institutional fragmentation of human resources and coordination between institutions and funds (Hakim, 2007). Pacione (2009) calls this "absence of unified or coordinated governance structures" (ibid. 113) a typical attribute of Asian mega-urban regions like Jakarta.

GOS as a Non-urban Life Pattern

Interview partners expressed that having a green city is not actually sought after by urban inhabitants, who do not expect green in cities. It seems that modern Indonesian society does not associate greenery with the patterns of modern life. Scientists have identified the consumer society in Asian cities and also how its "promotion of lifestyles of leisure has become […] defining characteristics in Indonesia" (Gerke 2002: 136). "They are consumers par excellence in pursuit of new lifestyles; they 'consume' media products, housing, cars, electrical and electronic ware, fashion and luxury goods, cuisine, entertainment, tourism and educational services" (King, 2008: 74). For the buying-class, consumption is part of everyday life, an element of status, a way of image construction and identity (ibid.). It thus seems as though there is no desire for more 'nature' in their lives. This consumerism symbolizes 'modernity' and urban lifestyles (Gerke, 2002: 136). The urban middle-class can live in gated communities and purchase "green" within them, but it does not lead to the required equal distribution of GOS and public accessibility. The number of people who are really able to participate in the middle-class lifestyle did not actually take part in consumerism; they did "lifestyling" (ibid.). This means that people who exhibit a middle-class lifestyle project symbols of wealth, and consume virtually instead of physically. As expressed in interviews, increasingly higher incomes, which can be seen as driver of cultural and political changes, are strictly discouraging the adaptation of rural values and customs. If the rural is opposed to the urban lifestyle, then rural citizens and their manner of food production are associated with low education, premodern routine, traditional values and less known for personal self-fulfillment. The Indonesian principle of Gotong Royong – mutual help – is an element of everyday rural life, combined with familiarity, a lack of individuality, and traditions. Greenery is mostly located in rural areas, connected to agrarian production and does not fit into people's images of cities, which offer new lifestyle opportunities. Urban inhabitants do not use green spaces for recreational activities. They often participate in recreation in air-conditioned private sports parks located within their gated communities. These may be reasons why local urban political decision-makers, as a part of the modern middle-class, lack the desire to implement GOS. They also associate GOS with a rural lifestyle. At the same time, they are probably the people who are most concerned about it. As long as they get elected, they have to handle ecological topics to ensure the health of urban inhabitants. The mayor of Surabaya, a rare exception, is known for her green city policy. She has established several parks in the last few years.

Despite this, actions in several cities have expressed an ongoing debate about public spaces in general. Yogyakarta's huge street art community, for instance, has made public and private property a topic of mayoral debates. Many cities



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Fig. 2 Framework from the idea to GOS

like Bogor, Bandung or Jakarta have also implemented car-free Sundays, when main roads are temporarily closed and the middle-class is encouraged to participate in recreation and spend time relaxing.

Flicker of Hope

While the awareness of GOSs and their benefits is low, some examples show ways that Indonesians have established GOSs anyway.

1. National Governments´s Green City Program

The national government started projects that speak to the government's increasing awareness of green issues. The Ministry of Public Works wants to create a park culture including an annual Park Festival. They collected first experiences with the Taman Langsat (5.000 m2), Jakarta, where artists installed sculptures and art, Wi-Fi was accessible and children could join various actions.

Another program, which started in 2011, applies a comprehensive approach to promote urban sustainability by means of the so-called „eco-friendly city" initiative (Kirmanto et al., 2012: 6). A balance of economy, efficiency, ecological preservation and social justice are included in the "Program Pengembangan Kota Hijau" (P2KH 2011). It is based on eight interlocked attributes but focuses only on three: green community, green planning and design, and GOS. The Ministry is not responsible for others things like waste and water management. Since spatial planning is part of the responsibility of local governments, such programs have to collaborate with them. Out of 491 regencies and municipalities, 112 (2013) have decided to join the program on a voluntary basis thereby fulfilling three previously defined criteria: strong leadership by the mayor, good performance in spatial planning, design and management, and a strong commitment to local environmental quality, which includes sharing the local budget, acquiring land for pilot projects and public participation (Kirmanto et al., 2012: 7). The budget of the program increased in recent years to 200 million USD in 2013 without any international donors. In the case of GOS, the participants have created a master plan that defines the amount of GOS. A GOS should have a minimum size of 5,000 m², be located in a strategic location, and function as a City Park. In 2015, it will be decided how the program continues. Then cities will be evaluated on their performance in various ways: the value of the GOS location, and how to replace the Ministry in financial responsibility through the inclusion of other stakeholders and budget sources. Depending on the result of the evaluation, the cancelation of the program can negatively affect local governments. With such pressure and limited financial resources, it is necessary to be responsive to the suggestions of the private sector. The program tries to protect the existing public GOSs and find new possible locations in public areas. The success on the local levels cannot be assessed now, but budget and the number of participants grew during the first period. In the following section, a project in Yogyakarta, a participant of the program, will be explored as it represents one way that the requirements have been fulfilled.

Green City Quarter Badran, Yogyakarta

2. Kampung Badran, Yogyakarta

Yogyakarta has already achieved 43.4% GOS (Brontowiyono et al., 2011). Of this, 17% is public and the rest is private, but the GOSs by definition consist of only 11.2% (ibid.). One project by Badan Lingkungan Hidup (BLH) Yogyakarta, which began just recently in 2012, particularly addresses the kampung (lit.: village) directly. BLH provides material valued at 1,000 USD for projects that consider environmental issues and integrate into the community. Kampung Badran, one participant, proposed project of "Green Kampung" to the BLH that includes waste management, GOS, and education programs.

The people in Badran have also planted trees in flower pots and planned an open space with a pool along the river bank. This has led to activities like garbage collection along the river and the creation of attractive surroundings. Before, the people did not face the river and used the current as waste disposal. The community is able to generate money with the harvest from planted fruit trees and this money can be reinvested in the expansion of the area and community needs. If projects take economic issues into consideration, they are able to gain more acceptance at the stakeholder level, because while arguments regarding potential climate change are not pressing for the local people, higher incomes would have an immediate effect. This example particularly involves the participatory and community development components of the SPL. Within the program, equal distribution of GOS and low barriers of access are encouraged.

3. Taman Kota Kebun Palem, Wonosari

The City Park Taman Kota Kebun Palem (1.7 ha) of Wonosari, Gunung Kidul (Prov. Yogyakarta) is an example of the local government implementing a GOS regardless of the costs for services, patrolling, or waste management. Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), which voluntarily follows the governmental regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), will finance the project for the next five years. With CSR, the financial pressure of local governments can be relieved and, in this case, a Green Open Space is made accessible for citizens. However, while regulations

such as CSR might be a step towards enlarging the amount of GOS, it creates problems such as limited access and privatization of public spaces (Cheung, 2012). One representative of the local government expressed that Wonosari's primary problems are health care and education, and not creating parks.

Conclusion

International organizations and standards demand healthier living conditions for urban inhabitants. Health for urban inhabitants can be improved through various means, such as the implementation of GOSs with an optimum 15 m²/capita. Indonesia followed this mandate by encouraging GOS development in the SPL clause 26/2007, which clearly states that 30% of total urban area should be green. Only a few Indonesian cities have reached this share of green space, but this discrepancy reveals the schism between the ideal prospect established in the law and reality. The private sector, which can be included in establishing GOS, is powerful in Asian cities and exerts a strong influence in the globalized economy. Interest conflicts with the private sector inhibit changes for a greener city; their ventures often result in the transformation of GOS into mega-projects. Furthermore, corruption and a weak capacity to control, regulate and manage the city and enforce laws must also be considered. For effectual urban planning, responsibilities must be consolidated among agencies and mayors. Additionally, control and sanctions have to be realized. As long as GOS is seen as an element of rural lifestyle, broader society will have no demand for it. This means that GOS will not become valued by the Indonesians and the implementation of the SPL will remain limited to the current level. Indonesian society is also learning what it means to have public areas that everyone can access, although the areas are not green at all. Everyone can benefit from Green Open Space, but that issue has to be emphasized n Indonesia overall and on every single level.

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Car-free Sunday on Jakartas main avenues between Thamrin Place and National Monument

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