

# Pacific News<sup>#31</sup>

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Peacekeeping in Southeast Asia

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# EDITORIAL

Die 31. Ausgabe der Pacific News bietet erneut einen Einblick in die Vielfalt der wissenschaftlichen Debatten um Gesellschaft, Kultur, Politik und Wirtschaft der Region. Der geographische Focus dieser Ausgabe umfasst Neuseeland, Indonesien, Vietnam, die zu Bougainville gehörenden Carteret Inseln, sowie das ASEAN-Bündnis.



Caroline Orchiston schreibt über potentielle natürliche Risiken in Tourismus und Naherholung in Neuseeland sowie administrative und technische Massnahmen der Risikominimierung. Wie wünschenswert dergleichen Massnahmen sein können, und zugleich wie wenig implementiert, wird auf traurige Weise durch das Schicksal Diane Campbell-Hunts, einer Pacific News Autorin der letzten Ausgabe, dokumentiert. Am 7. Oktober wurde Diane während einer Wanderung am Mount Taranaki von der starken Strömung des Kaupokonui River weggerissen und ist ertrunken. Diane war eine erfahrene Wanderin und begeisterte Naturschützerin. Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass die Weiterentwicklung von Frühwarnsystemen für Naturereignisse helfen können, in Zukunft ähnliche Vorfälle zu vermeiden.

Gleich zwei Beiträge befassen sich mit dem hochaktuellen Thema des Klimawandels. Während Basil Peso von der lokalen NGO Tulele Peisa in einem Interview Auskunft gibt über die Probleme der Umsiedlung der ersten Klimaflüchtlinge von den Carteret Inseln, analysieren Ronald Eckert und Michael Waibel die Herausforderungen des Klimawandels für die erste mega-urbane Region Vietnams, Ho Chi Minh City.

Nichtregierungsorganisationen sowie deren Rolle in der Umsetzung von Menschenrechten auf regionaler Ebene in asiatischen Ländern sind das Thema eines Artikels von Dorrotya Atol. Bert van Dijk diskutiert in seinem Beitrag zu zeitgenössischen Theaterdarstellungen im Südpazifik politische sowie ethische Aspekte der Darstellung.

Intern ist zu berichten, dass Henry Küper, Student der Geographie und Stadtplanung an der Universität Hamburg, das Redaktionsteam verstärkt hat. Das APSA-Mitglied erstellt für die Pacific News vor allem visuell ansprechende Karten und Abbildungen.

Wir wünschen Ihnen viel Freude beim Lesen!

*Die Redaktion*

## Pacific News

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Ziel der Pacific News ist es, ihren Lesern durch eine Vielfalt interdisziplinärer wissenschaftlich fundierter Beiträge aktuelle soziale und ökonomische Entwicklungen im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum nahe zu bringen.



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### COVER PICTURE:

Title: Heading towards the Future  
Motorcycle Driver in Quang Trung  
Street, Go Vap District of Ho Chi  
Minh City  
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Christian Berg [[christianberg79@web.de](mailto:christianberg79@web.de)]  
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Fotograf für AsiaLIFE HCMC, einer örtlichen  
Lifestyle Publikation, steht er für freie  
Aufträge in Vietnam und ganz Südostasien  
zur Verfügung.

### BACK PICTURE:

Sunset in Bagan/Myanmar  
© 2007 Jürgen Bussmann

# The Absence of ASEAN: Peacekeeping in Southeast Asia

Belinda Helmke

Since the end of the Cold War peacekeeping has become an increasingly popular tool to address conflicts worldwide. More than two-thirds of all peacekeeping operations have occurred over the past eighteen years alone. Contemporary peacekeeping has been used foremost to settle internal unrest and violence, rather than conflict between states. Unlike military enforcement action, peacekeeping has to adhere to what Alex J. Bellamy refers to as the 'Holy Trinity' of operational principles: consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. (Bellamy, 2004). Consequently, states tend to accept peacekeeping operations on their territory more readily than they do peace enforcement action.

An examination of both armed conflicts and multilateral peacekeeping operations (MPO) worldwide shows an interesting relationship between the two in some regions. In the Middle East, the Americas and Africa the correlation between conflicts and MPO, sanctioned or authorized by the UN Security Council, is relatively proportional. In Asia and Europe, however, a very asymmetrical relationship is apparent. Europe has witnessed 8 per cent of armed conflict worldwide over the past decade and a half. Yet a third of all peacekeeping operations have occurred in this region. In comparison, Asia has developed as the number one hot spot for armed conflict, claiming 40 per cent of the overall stake. In spite of this, only slightly over a tenth of all MPO have taken place in the region (see Graph 1 and 2).

Southeast Asia (SEA) is particularly affected by this asymmetrical phenomenon. The region has witnessed serious armed conflict and internal unrest in the majority of its ten states. In recent times Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia and The Philippines have been particularly affected. Yet, peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era have been rare and limited to Cambodia in the early 1990s (UN) and East Timor since 1999 (INTERFET and UN). What is the reason for this disproportional ratio of armed conflict to peacekeeping in the SEA region?

The immediate answer lies in the analysis of the actors undertaking peacekeeping operations. Since 1990 half of all MPO have been conducted by regional organizations, followed by the UN with 37 per cent and ad hoc coalitions with 16 per cent (Graph 3). A lack of

enforcement capabilities, amongst other things, has meant that the UN has increasingly subcontracted tasks to the above-mentioned actors. Regional organisations which are located between the UN and ad hoc coalitions in the hierarchy of legitimacy regarding peacekeeping, have been particularly active in Europe, Africa, and to a lesser degree the Americas. This is as opposed to Asia where organisations, particularly in the sub-region represented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have been noticeably reserved.


Consequently, the conduct of peacekeeping operations as the SEA region shows, is not solely dependent on the existence of regional organizations. Instead, it is their effectiveness, willingness and ability to both undertake and finance such MPO which are crucial. Why then is the SEA region not reflective of the overall trend in the post-Cold War era towards both increased peacekeeping and outsourcing of such MPO to regio-

nal organisations and ad hoc coalitions? In order to understand the lack of MPO in the SEA region one has to examine the issue from an economical, political and strategic standpoint.


## Hurdles to Peacekeeping

At first glance, it appears that the major hurdle to MPO in the region is the difficulty which SEA states may face in financing such operations. The costs for MPO in SEA over the past two decades have amounted to around \$5.5 billion. Half of all ASEAN nations (Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam) have an annual military expenditure smaller than this amount. Is the UN, with its top contributors being the US, Japan, Germany, UK and France, therefore better suited financially to conduct such operations? Not necessarily. ASEAN states could finance peacekeeping if the more prosperous states (of course, this is relative compared to Western standards) such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singa-

Graph 1: Regional Distribution of Armed Conflict 1990-2005, Share in %



Graph 2: Regional Distribution of Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations 1990-2005, Share in %



pore and The Philippines were willing to carry the main burden. In 2007 the military expenditure of the ten ASEAN countries combined, topped \$64 billion which is more than ten times the amount used for MPO in the region since 1990. Hence, the barrier to peacekeeping operations through ASEAN is not so much economic in nature, as it is political and strategic.


To begin with SEA is deeply characterized by the colonial past of its member states. Having spent significant time fighting for independence they now closely guard their sovereignty. SEA nations are furthermore all members of the so-called Non-Aligned Movement or Group of 77 at the UN (now consisting of more than 130 states) which strongly advocate a doctrine of non-intervention. The embrace of these principles is clearly reflected in the ASEAN Charter which calls for the “respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN member states” (Article 2, 2a). Peacekeeping, despite its operational principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force, cannot help but challenge the territorial integrity and political independence of the host state by the mere presence of foreign troops. This alone is sufficient for ASEAN to be uncomfortable with the practice of

peacekeeping.


As a result, the organisation’s approach to conflict management has been characterized by consensus based decision-making and has focused on four core aspects: first, regular ASEAN meetings; secondly, multilateral treaties; thirdly, the ASEAN Ad Hoc body established in 1999 to address security issues; and fourthly bilateral negotiations, including referral of disputes to the International Court of Justice if necessary (Caballero-Anthony, 2005). These steps have successfully enabled ASEAN to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict between member states. Violence within borders, however, has not been prevented through these measures. Instead there is a dominant belief that internal conflict and causes thereof need to be addressed and solved on a national basis. As long as ASEAN vehemently rejects direct involvement in the domestic affairs of member states and places a premium on political independence and territorial integrity, the quest for a region free of internal unrest and violence cannot be achieved.

From a strategic standpoint the need to preserve internal unity within ASEAN against external forces, particularly China, has tended to dominate security concerns. According to Austrian academic Alfred Gerstl, there remains a large

Graph 3:  
Actors undertaking Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations  
1990-2005, Share in %



distrust even amongst member states regarding possible external interference. Despite overarching security goals, regional collaboration in SEA has therefore focused primarily on economic, technical and cultural affairs (Gerstl, 2008). Regarding security, there is a widespread perception within ASEAN that threats emanating from internal conflicts tend to be limited to a state’s respective borders rather than being transnational. The conclusion drawn by ASEAN is that such internal conflict and violence poses a local, not a regional problem. Therefore, no external interference, including peacekeeping, is necessary. This is, of course, not always true. Refugee flows, separatist movements, Islamic fundamentalism, narcotics and pandemics are just some of the threats which have come to be transnational in nature. As a result, there is an urgent need for ASEAN to take on peacekeeping responsibilities. Today, regional organisations are the main operators of MPO and ASEAN can no longer defer the responsibility for such actions solely to the UN (Cambodia) or ad hoc coalitions led by states outside the region (East Timor). In addition, regional organisations provide a substantial platform for action in light of the fact that SEA nations, like many non-Western states, are largely excluded from the decision-



Overview ASEAN

Cartography: Henry Küper

making processes within the UN.

### Sense and Sensitivity

In the 1990s ASEAN first attempted to redefine its security role, launching the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which, in return, suggested the establishment of a regional peacekeeping training centre. Yet, with the exception of some meetings, workshops and seminars on the topic, little happened on the peacekeeping front. In 2003 the ASEAN Summit proposed an ASEAN Community by 2020, consisting of a security, economic, as well as social and cultural sphere. As part of the security community, Indonesia proposed the creation of a regional peacekeeping force. Twelve months later, however, ASEAN froze the proposal, citing differences in military capabilities and doctrines as reasons. Makarim Wibisino, Indonesian Director General for Asia, Africa and the Pacific sought to put a positive spin on the defeat suffered by arguing that “the idea (of peacekeeping) is still there [...] we only changed the wording because some countries are still sensitive to the words” (Asian Political News, 2004). As explained earlier, the predominant reasons for the rejection of the peacekeeping proposal were political and strategic in nature rather than financial or military concerns.

Despite this drawback and a lack of consensus within ASEAN, discussions and practice show that there has been a shift in member states’ attitudes towards peacekeeping. Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines, Indonesia and, to a lesser extent Singapore, have gathered extensive experience in the field through their participation in UN peacekeeping operations (Cambodia), as well as other multilateral arrangements (East Timor).

In 1999 ASEAN had the opportunity to take the initiative regarding the deployment of a peacekeeping force to East Timor. Instead, the organisation opposed collective intervention, predominantly due to its unwillingness to compromise on the doctrines of sovereignty and non-interference. This reluctance left Australia to interfere with

the support of individual ASEAN countries (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines) and the consent of Indonesia. This at least preserved the regional character of the INTERFET operation. In 2002 Indonesia furthermore invited troops from Thailand and The Philippines to support the peaceful settlement of its conflict with separatist movements in Aceh. Two years later, The Philippines invited Malaysian peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire in Mindanao. While ASEAN as a whole may not be moving towards a concrete policy on peacekeeping, individual states are increasingly embracing the concept.

In spite of the successful track record of the two core post-Cold War peacekeeping missions in the region, SEA nations currently still prefer to leave such tasks to the UN and, in exceptional circumstances such as East Timor, to an ad hoc coalition. This way the region’s ten states do not challenge each other’s sovereignty openly. Rather this is done by the two above-mentioned actors. ASEAN is used solely for less controversial diplomatic and conflict prevention measures.

### Conclusions

The future of multilateral peacekeeping operations in SEA is rather sobering. In the realm of peacekeeping the region remains a rather isolated island in a sea of change. It appears largely unaffected by the international trend towards both increased peacekeeping and the outsourcing of such operations to regional organisations and ad hoc coalitions. A lack of need is certainly not the issue with many parts of Indonesia (Aceh, West Papua, Kalimantan) and The Philippines (Mindanao), for example, being in dire need of peacekeeping operations. The core barrier towards the conduct of peacekeeping in the region therefore remains ASEAN’s strong endorsement of the norms of sovereignty and non-interference.

The changing attitudes towards these two concepts in the UN, particularly when it comes to intervention based on humanitarian grounds, may cascade

down to the regional level in due course. However, according to M.C. Abad Jr., Assistant Director of the ASEAN Secretariat the embrace and establishment of peacekeeping operations through the organisation is also highly dependent on member states’ internal political structures. Abad argues that “the more democratic (ASEAN states’ political systems), the more open they would be to offers of external assistance” (M.C. Abad, Jr., 2003). A substantial change in political and strategic attitudes toward both governance and security is therefore necessary to make the conduct of peacekeeping operations through ASEAN possible.

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### Data Sources of Graphs 1-3:

- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Database on Multilateral Peace Operations*, available at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/database-Intro/>

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# The NGO zone

## Asian non-governmental organisations' role in shaping the human rights of the region

Dorottya Atol

**"Universality. We can learn from different cultures in a pluralistic perspective and draw lessons from the humanity of these cultures to deepen respect for human rights. There is emerging a new understanding of universalism encompassing the richness and wisdom of Asia-Pacific cultures."**

**Bangkok NGO declaration  
Bangkok, Thailand, May 29, 1993.**

This paper addresses questions of regionalism and in particular, its significance in human rights protection; and explores the role non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have in this regard. It analyses these issues through examining the activities of four Asian NGOs that are similarly active in several countries of Asia. The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) is located in Hong Kong; the South Asian for Human Rights (SAFHR) in Kathmandu; the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum Asia) in Bangkok; and the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network (APHRN) in New Delhi.

Regionalism is an important aspect of international relations, and it is also a decisive factor shaping the human rights field. Although, the backbone of universal human rights protection is the international system, built mainly around the United Nations machinery, regional human rights structures in Europe (Council of Europe), the Americas (within the Organization of American States), and Africa (within the African Union) have played a significant role as well. Regional cooperation often functions as a protective counterbalance to excesses of globalisation, and also provides opportunities to step out of the rigid hold of extreme nationalism and sovereignty-guarding (Katzenstein, 2000). A regional human rights organisation can facilitate local intervention in the case of a human rights crisis, which can be beneficial especially in circumstances where the international system is slow to act and to appreciate the severity of the situation. Furthermore, it provides an additional supervisory mechanism to states.

Asia is the continent with the largest

population and has a notoriously dismal record of human rights violations, yet human rights are conspicuously absent from the agenda of regional cooperation. The Asian region covers vast areas with immense diversity of ethnicities, languages, religions and cultures, and accordingly, it is difficult to view Asia as a single region. Asia is commonly divided into Central, South, Southeast, and Northeast parts. However, with respect to human rights, a region does not have to be strictly homogenous, since pluralism can in fact enrich the regional structure. Thus it is possible to conceive of an encompassing regional human rights framework for the Asian region, similar to those in existence in Europe, Africa and the Americas. More specific sub-regional arrangements could eventually develop under the banner of an Asia-wide system. The reality thus far is that despite growing public awareness about rights and the intense discussions precipitated by the escalation of the "Asian values" debate in the 1990s (Bell, 1999), human rights have still not reached a prominent

place in the priorities of Asian inter-governmental politics. Recently there have been attempts within ASEAN to incorporate a human rights element into the organisation's work (Charter of ASEAN 2007, Art. 14.), yet the negotiations have not reached considerable results so far. Consequently, it is mostly the growing Asian civil society that has been taking on human rights problems in the absence of a coordinated and substantial governmental contribution. The operation of "native" Asian NGOs is especially significant, particularly those that go beyond local activism and extend their advocacy trans-nationally across large parts of Asia.


### Asian NGOs in the forefront of human rights protection

The activities of the AHRC, the Forum-Asia, the SAFHR, and the APHRN demonstrate well the impact that civil society can have on the Asian human rights discourse. These NGOs are "natively Asian" in the sense that they were founded and are still operated by individuals



The screenshot shows the AHRC HK NET website. The header includes the logo 'AHRC HK NET' and 'Asian Human Rights Commission'. Navigation links include 'About AHRC', 'Material in other languages' (with icons for Chinese, French, German, Italian, Korean, Nepali, and Japanese), 'Home | ALRC site | Book Store | Join! | Contact us', and a 'Quick Launch to AHRC' dropdown menu. The main content area features a news article dated 'November 13, 2008, 17:57' with the headline 'SOUTH KOREA: Presidential commission must be allowed to continue investigations into suspicious military deaths'. A small map of the Republic of Korea is visible on the right. The article text states: 'STATEMENT: Due to its maintenance of a conscription system, South Korea's military has long been plagued with ill-treatment, resulting in trauma and even suicide for the individuals concerned. After several years of civil society struggle, a law enabling the investigation of suspicious deaths in the military was finally passed, establishing a presidential commission to begin its work on January 1, 2006 for a three-year period. The commission has reportedly received 600 complaints to date, of which only 295 have been settled. Read More...'

Source: AHRC: <http://www.ahrchk.net/index.php>



from Asia, as opposed to transnational NGOs with roots primarily stemming in the “first world”. They have a clear human rights focus, which further distinguishes them from the vast array of developmental and welfare projects. Within the field of human rights, these native Asian human rights NGOs are concerned with similar issues such as the fight against torture, illegal detention, and unfair trials. They apply methods of investigation, documentation, and research, as well as publishing, advocating and lobbying. All four NGOs have a legal-orientation, implying that their primary focus concerns the deficiencies of law enforcement, flaws in legislation, and the breakdown of the legal institutions as the root-causes of the problematic human rights situation in Asian countries. They function on a regional level, distinguishing them from locally constrained grassroots groups, and also from larger international NGOs with far greater global outreach. They engage in transnational advocacy in several countries of Asia, pursuing human rights activism in cooperation with their partner organisations based on shared values, common discourse, and a dense flow of information and services exchange (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Three factors determine the outcomes of their transnational advocacy. They are: to maintain close ties to the grassroots, to additionally hold an influential presence at the international level, and to maintain a high-level of communication and data management.

Firstly, close links to the grassroots are essential for the functioning of these “native NGOs”. Victims’ accounts and a contextual approach concentrating on uncovering all aspects of human rights problems are major characteristics of their operation. The empirical data gathered in the local environment are the

core building blocks in their activism. Keeping up close ties to the grassroots however requires more than just exploiting local groups as mere information providers. The NGOs uphold a mutually beneficial partnership with their local counterparts, providing regular assistance to them including training, education and material resources. This local ‘capacity-building’ improves the opportunities of grassroots activists, yet also benefits the regional NGOs, since in this way they are able to secure the partnership of a competent and well-trained staff in the field.

Secondly, exerting their influence at the international level is also vital to the success of these NGOs. Information on human rights problems collected at the grassroots is channelled towards the international community, providing an indispensable source of knowledge to international organisations. The NGOs offer a ‘first-hand account’ of the situation in the local environment, which often depicts a situation different from that propagated by state officials. Many prominent UN officials noted that the contribution of UN NGOs became an indispensable part of the United Nations’ operation (Alston 1992: 501). The NGOs issue ‘shadow-reports’ to the Treaty Bodies of the UN, to the Special Rapporteurs or through the Universal Periodic Review (an annual country-specific reporting system in the UN) revealing an alternative and critical assessment of the realities of human rights situations.

Thirdly, the use of information technologies (ICTs) and data constitute a major component in the activism arsenal of these NGOs. Since their core activities involve documentation, researching, verifying, analysing and publicising information on human rights violations, their effectiveness is largely dependent on the

quality and integrity of the information they provide and on the fluency of the communication they conduct. Supplying accurate, timely, well-evaluated and strategically presented data increases the possibility of favourable external intervention in certain cases of human rights abuses, lends credibility even to less-powerful organisations, and yields long-term gains for their activism. Another important function of the NGOs is to uphold free flow information among them and their partners, which has significance in counterbalancing the global trend of inequality in access to authentic information (Metzl 1996: 716). The AHRC conducts a “Human Rights Correspondence School” (Francis, 2007), the SAFHR holds annual “Human Rights and Peace Studies Program” (Kumar, 2008) and the APHRN takes part in the “Human Rights and People’s Diplomacy Training” (Nair, 2008) in an effort to educate and train local activists and public servants in human rights activism. The “technologies of freedom” – as web-communications are coined (Metzl 1996: 707) – provide the organisations with the possibility to acquire and transmit data in a timely and cost-effective manner, and allow the opportunity to localised civil society actors to amplify their messages and the meaning of their activities. The AHRC takes great advantage of email-lists to convey information about human rights problems, and maintains 39 websites explaining their campaigns. It is nonetheless a constant challenge for these NGOs to continue on developing their communication technologies in order to minimise the risks, whilst seeking to take utmost advantage of ICTs to further their activism.

### The NGOs’ regional activism

The purpose of the NGOs’ distinctive advocacy, on the one hand, is to bridge the private and public spheres by encouraging victims to break the wall of silence and publicly express their private grievances. This way they gain a genuine empirical basis for their activism, and narrow the gap between the official rhetoric and the often very different reality of the human rights situation. On the other hand, through ‘vertically’ conveying information between distinct levels, the NGOs construct a link between




the domestic and international spheres as well. The AHRC for instance, internationalises human rights issues through its “Urgent Appeals Program” (UAP, <http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/>), which is a primarily email based alert-network facilitating almost instantaneous ‘chain-reactions’ to individual cases of human rights violations from all over Asia. Local partners alert the AHRC about a human rights-related incident, which is then forwarded by the NGO in the form of an ‘Urgent Appeal’ including the most accurate data available to an email network of around 200 000 recipients. The receivers of this email-alert are then urged to send a letter of concern, and thus put pressure on the defined ‘target authorities’ to redeem the violation. The NGOs ‘horizontal’ activism involves programs and thematic campaigns which are pursued simultaneously in several countries in Asia, such as the SAFHR’s campaign on refugees and internally displaced people in South Asia ([http://www.safhr.org/refugee\\_rights.htm](http://www.safhr.org/refugee_rights.htm)).

The combination of ‘vertically’ acquired information on the human rights situation with the experiences of human rights defenders brought together through ‘horizontal’ activism from all over Asia, provides an opportunity to raise ideas and create a ‘regional platform’ for consultations and dialogue, and to construct more insightful and comprehensive knowledge on human rights. The discussions then develop into a common a discourse, which has the potential of creating new normative understandings for the region. This activism gives rise to bottom-up oriented norm creation, generating standards, which are rooted genuinely in an empirically supported collage of real human rights situations across Asia.

Norm setting is an otherwise common role for NGOs around the world. There are several examples for NGO’s active involvement in standard-setting in the United Nations, for instance during the drafting of the Rome Statute (Forsythe 2000: 192). The activism of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) is particularly remarkable as regards its lengthy preparatory work towards the establishment of the African human rights system. The ICJ first organised a pan-African conference in 1961 in Lagos

**FORUM-ASIA** Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development  
*Asian Solidarity and Human Rights for All*

**CAMBODIA: Soldiers and police escape prosecution**  
Friday, 24 October 2008



For Cambodia's police and armed forces, impunity is the rule of law. In recent months Phnom Penh has been witness to a spate of shootings perpetrated by police or Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) personnel.

FORUM-ASIA's member in Cambodia, LICADHO, details in its website various cases of police abuse and violence.

These individuals at the time of the shooting incidents were either off-duty or working second jobs as security guards, during which they were illegally carrying firearms.

These perpetrators escaped prosecution because they were protected by their high-level connections, paid out-of-court compensation to the victim to ensure a criminal complaint was not made, or were allowed to go into hiding.

More information on "Impunity at Work in Cambodia" related to police violence can be found at LICADHO's website: <http://www.licadho.org/articles/20081015:82/index.html>

Source: Forum-Asia: <http://www.forum-asia.org/>

to promote the idea of regional human rights protection among African states (Parakh 1994: 85-87), which was then followed by numerous other discussions, and concluded in the founding of the regional system. This can be a promising model for these Asian NGOs embarking on a path towards constructing a regional human rights framework from the grassroots.

### The NGOs' 'imagined regional community'

The establishment of a regional judicial-institutional structure (such as Europe, the Americas or Africa have) is realistically can only be the aim of the distant future. Constructing such a system would require active cooperation from states as well. Until this long-term goal can be fulfilled, the NGOs seek to lay down certain normative bases for a regional human rights arrangement, by building up norms and standards focusing on human rights violations at the grassroots as starting points. Through exploring individual human rights abuses, the NGOs gradually reveal patterns of structural problems which spread across countries of the region. In this way a new normative agenda can be created that applies international human rights standards as the basis, but takes into account regional particularities as well. The NGOs accentuate human rights implementation by warning against the regionally specific factors that threaten the proper enforcement and the due redress

of these rights – such as dangers of illegal detention or custodial torture on the hands of police, or the lack of adequate witness protection.

One prominent example for this is the AHRC's “Asian Human Rights Charter” (Charter), which was finalised after four years of drafting conducted with the inclusion of hundreds of civil society actors. The Charter lays down a basic framework for human rights protection and promotion in Asia. It invokes the universal human rights norms as its basis, but reconstructs the international discourse through a frame created from the bottom-up by using the AHRC's and its partners' grassroots experience and knowledge about regional human rights problems (Fernando, 2007; Wilde 1998: 139). Rights are not merely listed, but formulated in a complex manner to denote what they indeed stand for, what threatens them, and most importantly how they can be effectively enforced in the Asian environment. Whereas the right to life is simply proclaimed in most international human rights documents (Art. 2. of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. 6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the Charter interprets this fundamental right in the Asian reality, understood as life “with basic human dignity”, denoting “the right to livelihood”, “to a habitat”, “to education”, and “to a clean and healthy environment”, which are often neglected necessities in Asia (Asian Human Rights Charter, Art. 3.2.). At present, the



AHRC is working on the ensuing project of the “Asian Charter on the Rule of Law” (<http://material.ahrchk.net/ruleoflawcharter/>), in the process of which they once again bring actors together in a series of consultations to address problems of broken legal systems and flawed rights enforcement held to be the major cause of human rights crises in Asia.

On the whole there is a growing potential for Asian human rights NGOs to fulfil a normatively meaningful role in shaping the region-wide human rights development. Due to their fortunate ‘intermediary positions’, they have the ability to reach out equally effectively to the grassroots and to international actors, and to mediate between them. Keys to

their successful activism lie in their abilities to explore the particularities of the local context, to similarly have influence on the international system, and to effectively manage and communicate information through utilising ICTs.

However, the delicate process of conveying messages and negotiating meanings among multiple levels and actors in the complex field of human rights carries numerous hazards for the NGOs, including being corrupted by donor dependency or co-opted by politicians – an issue that the present paper has not the space to discuss. Nevertheless, the potential that such NGOs represent promotes hopes and aspirations for progress in terms of human rights in the region.

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Kind bei Angkor Wat/Kambodscha (3. Platz bei Coverwettbewerb der aktuellen Ausgabe).  
Quelle: Bastian Zitscher



# Natural hazard monitoring in New Zealand: Implications for Tourist Safety

Caroline Orchiston

New Zealand is a young, geologically active country, which is no stranger to spectacular volcanism and frequent earthquakes. Over the period since European settlement (post 1840), seventeen significant earthquakes (magnitude > 7) have resulted in several hundred deaths. Active volcanism in the Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ, figure 1) has taken place for c. 10 million years, with the last episode on Mt Ruapehu in the mid-1990s. With visitor numbers to New Zealand growing rapidly, the potential for disruption and damage to the tourism industry from seismic or volcanic activity continues to increase.



Mt Ruapehu erupting in September 1995, with an ash cloud depositing material across ski areas and as far as 250 km from the volcano (source: D. Johnston).

International visitors to New Zealand are attracted by images of a scenic and diverse natural landscape, which has been marketed globally as “100% Pure New Zealand”. As a result, the tourism industry in New Zealand over the past two decades has shown remarkable growth, and is now the country’s largest export industry, earning \$8.1 billion annually, and responsible for one in every ten jobs (Tourism New Zealand 2007). Since 1999, total visitor arrivals to New Zealand have grown by 48%, with forecast continued growth of 4.7% annually (Tourism New Zealand 2007). Visitor flows for short stay international tourists highlight a circuit which takes in the jewels of the New Zealand tourism industry; namely Auckland, Rotorua, Queenstown and Milford Sound. These visitor destinations are inherently hazardous environments, where active volcanism has occurred within the last decade, and where large devastating earthquakes are considered by seismologists to be overdue.

This paper describes two case studies to illustrate natural hazard management in New Zealand, and the potential impact of hazard events on the tourism industry. Firstly, Mt Ruapehu in the central North Island, which erupted most recently in 1996, causing significant financial and physical disruption to the tourism (ski and aviation) economy in the area. Second, the alpine destinations of the South Island, which lie close to the Alpine fault, a 500 kilometre geological feature defining the position of the plate boundary in the South Island (figure 1). Paleoseismic evidence suggests this fault produces large (magnitude 7.8 – 8) earthquakes every 100-300 years, with the last known event occurring in 1717 AD (Sutherland et al. 2007). An earthquake of this magnitude could significantly impact regional tourism activities throughout the South Island due to physical and infrastructural damage and restricted access, as well as an unprecedented drop in visitor numbers driven by negative international media attention.

## Mt Ruapehu eruptions of 1995-96

Volcanic activity in the North Island has been taking place for millions of years due to compressional tectonic forces east of the North Island as the Pacific Plate subducts beneath the Australian Plate (figure 1). In post-European times, the volcanoes and their associated geothermal hot springs began to attract visitors, and in 1887 the Tongariro volcanoes were gifted to the Crown by Maori, and designated as the country’s first National Park in 1894 (Hall and Kearsely, 2001). Volcanic activity in the TVZ has impacted on tourism activities over the years. For example, the Mt Tarawera eruption of 1886 killed 120 people, and destroyed the famed Pink and White Terraces (Graham et al. 2008). In 1953, a lahar (mud/rock debris flow) spilled from the crater lake of Mt Ruapehu, destroying a railbridge and derailing a train at Tangiwai, killing 151 passengers.

More recently, ski areas have been developed on the volcanic cone of Mt Ruapehu (called Whakapapa, Turoa and Tukiino). The first rope tow was installed on the mountain in 1929. By 1987 the lift capacity of the ski field had grown to 20,000 skiers per hour (Williams and Banford 1987), and latterly around 400,000 winter visitors were received on Mt Ruapehu by 2004 (Milne 2005). Houghton et al. (1997) believe Mt Ruapehu poses the greatest risk to human life of any volcano in New Zealand due to its relatively frequent episodes of activity (eruptions occurred during almost every decade of the 20th century), and the presence of a crater lake with proven potential to cause lahars.

Between September 1995 and August 1996, sustained volcanic activity during the winter season on Mt Ruapehu caused extensive ash fall over 250km away (Johnston et al. 2000). Early in this eruptive phase, on September 23rd 1995, a lahar travelled down through a ski area coming within metres of ski lift base stations and queuing areas (Johnston et al. 2000). The ski field had closed an hour before the lahar struck, which undoubtedly saved lives. The ski seasons of 1995 and 1996 were severely disrupted, with damage to infrastructure caused by ash fall and acid rains, and loss of skiing days (mainly during the 1996 season) (Table 1). Financial losses for the local tourism economy were estimated at \$100 million (Johnston et al. 2000). The aviation industry was also impacted due to closure of the airspace by ash clouds, with direct losses of \$2.5 million (Johnston et al. 2000).



Map of New Zealand showing key locations. Note the position of the plate boundary is schematic, particularly the section between the North and South Island, which is in fact a complex system of faults.

Source: Johnston et al. 2000

### Improvements in Hazard Monitoring

Partly in response to damaging hazard events in the 1990s, and in recognition

of the need for improved scientific monitoring of a range of geological hazards in New Zealand, GeoNet was established in 2001. GeoNet is a government-funded initiative that provides publicly

available hazard data for earthquakes and volcanic activity, as well as landslides and tsunamis. GeoNet has proven useful on a number of occasions. With the help of modern remote sensing methods and careful geochemical analysis of the Ruapehu crater lake, scientists developed a hazard warning system with the potential to greatly enhance human safety and emergency response during volcanic episodes. Alert levels ranging from 1 to 5 are issued on the GeoNet website for each active volcano in the TVZ, and whenever an alert level changes key government and public stakeholders are informed, including tourism and aviation authorities. A test for the new alerts came in early 2007, when monitoring of Mt Ruapehu showed the crater lake volume was increasing to critical levels. A lahar alert was publicly announced, and as a result the expected lahar path was kept clear. When the lahar finally came in March 2007 it caused no injury or death.

In addition, GeoNet has been instrumental in upgrading the existing lahar hazard warning system on Mt Ruapehu (Christianson 2006). The system uses seismic and acoustic data to predict the onset of volcanic activity. When earthquakes associated with volcanic activity are detected, the warning system is trig-

gered and broadcast messages are played across the skifields warning people to move out of the valleys to high ground (as lahars will preferentially travel down into valleys) (Christianson 2006). This differs from the original more reactive warning system which was only triggered when a lahar was already on its way and offered less forewarning. In sum, one of the many positive outcomes from the introduction of GeoNet has been a significant improvement in tourist safety in ski areas on Mt Ruapehu over the past decade.

### The Alpine fault

The Alpine fault is a stunningly linear geological feature which cuts through 500 km of scenic alpine terrain west of the Southern Alps, and marks the position of the plate boundary in the South Island of New Zealand (figure 1). There have been no recent large earthquakes on the Alpine fault, but paleoseismic studies indicate that the Alpine fault produces earthquakes within the 7.8-8 magnitude range approximately every 100-300 years, with the last known event occurring in 1717 AD (Sutherland et al. 2007). This event caused surface rupture of 300-350 km along the fault, with horizontal offsets of up to 9 metres, widespread landsliding in the Southern Alps,

tree mortality, and aggradation (deposition) of several metres of outwash material onto the coastal strip of the West Coast. Geoscientists consider the Alpine fault to be overdue for another major earthquake.

Coincident with this zone of high seismic risk is a burgeoning tourism industry. Visitors are attracted by world-renowned scenery, where the active tectonic environment provides a backdrop to a wide range of nature-based and adventure tourism activities. The popularity of Milford Sound, Queenstown, Mt Cook and the West Coast has grown rapidly over the past decade, with projected growth in visitation of up to 24% by 2013 (Tourism Research Council 2008). A large number of visitors will spend time in National Parks, and public access is accommodated by the Department of Conservation, who are the custodians of large tracts of Crown conservation land. They provide a range of walking tracks and huts, and other amenities and facilities. Tourism activities occur in an alpine environment where climatic and physical hazard events occur relatively often, and have the potential to interrupt the flow of visitors. For example, road access to the West Coast and Milford can only be achieved via rugged, heavily forested alpine passes (figure 2), all of which are vulnerable to landslides and tree fall. Mt Cook and Milford are located at road ends, with the latter frequently cut-off due to avalanche risk or rock fall.

If a magnitude 8 earthquake were to occur today it would be felt throughout the country, with the most intense shaking occurring in and around the

Table 1: Total ski days and total revenue per season from 1993-1996

Year	1993	1994	1995	1996
Skier Days	430,000	449,000	340,000	140,000
Total revenue (\$NZ)	\$102 million	\$107 million	\$81 million	\$34 million

Source: Johnston et al. 2000



The Oīra Viaduct in Arthur's Pass, one of two alpine passes in and out of the West Coast of the South Island (source: D. Johnston).



Cyclists en route to Mt Cook Village, South Island, New Zealand.

Southern Alps. Tourism in the zone of the Alpine fault would be critically damaged by a sudden and prolonged drop in visitor numbers caused by serious damage to road access and tourism infrastructure, potential casualties and negative international media coverage. In addition, long-term damage to the aesthetic value of the forest and mountain landscape would further damage and impede the recovery of the tourism industry. Road reinstatement would be a critical factor in recovering tourism numbers, and current estimates for the West Coast State Highway (72) suggest it could take a minimum of six weeks to create basic access, with a timeframe of many years before it is returned to its current state (pers. comm. Daniel 2008).

Earthquakes differ from other natural disasters because they are 'no-escape' natural disasters that provide no lead-time for evacuation (Huan et al. 1999). Floods, volcanic eruptions and landslides can have a window of opportunity to inform local residents, businesses and visitors about impending disaster, and to initiate pre-planned evacuation or

mitigation methods. To date, emergency planning by Civil Defence, in conjunction with District Councils and Lifelines providers (power, sewage, water roading, telecommunications), has gone some way towards defining roles and responsibilities in the immediate aftermath of an Alpine fault event, and prioritising lifelines work in order to speed the recovery of local communities. Tourists are difficult to coordinate and manage during a crisis, not least because most are unaware of the potential seismic risk. Informing visitors to an earthquake-prone tourism destination about the potential for a large earthquake, and what to do when one happens, is largely impractical. Instead it falls upon District Councils and tourism

operators to shoulder the responsibility, by informing themselves about earthquake hazards, and ensuring they have made adequate preparations in order to perform their duty of care to look after clients/visitors in the immediate aftermath of a damaging earthquake. So how prepared is the tourism industry to cope with the aftermath of a magnitude 8 Alpine fault event? Work currently being carried out by the author on the level of preparedness of tourism operators hopes to add new insights into an industry which has been neglected in the risk perception and disaster preparedness literature in New Zealand.

### Conclusion

New Zealand's nature-based tourism product, coupled with its geological history and active tectonic environment, dictates that tourists will put themselves at some degree of risk by visiting popular destinations. This paper has described two natural hazards and the tourism activities that take place alongside them; skiing on the active volcanic cone of Mt Ruapehu, and nature-based tourism

activities in a zone of high seismic potential in the Southern Alps. Emergency planning and hazard monitoring have advanced positively over the last decade, with GeoNet providing hazard warning systems which have reduced the risks associated with lahar and volcanic activity, as well as enhancing our network of seismographs throughout the country. Complacency, however, is the enemy of emergency planning; encouraging individuals or business operators to think through the issues involved in low frequency, high impact disaster events is a major challenge, but is one that must be faced.

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# Arbeitsmigranten im Großraum Ho Chi Minh City: Prekäre Wohnbedingungen in Boarding Houses

*Ann-Kathrin Ott & Adrian Klaus*

Heerscharen von Arbeiterinnen und Arbeitern, die in den Industriezonen der städtischen Peripherie von Ho Chi Minh City ganz wesentlich zum wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung des Landes beitragen, leiden oft unter prekären Wohnbedingungen in so genannten Boarding Houses.

Bildquelle: Ann-Kathrin Ott



## PACIFIC NEWS PICTURES

Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) hat sich Folge der Öffnungspolitik und der damit einhergehenden Umsetzung der Strategie der exportorientierten Industrialisierung zum Wachstumsmotor Vietnams entwickelt. Ausländische Direktinvestitionen konzentrieren sich vor allem in den zahlreichen Industriezonen im sub- und periurbanen Umland der Metropole. Dort werden für transnationale Unternehmen steuerliche Anreize, ein exzellentes Infrastrukturangebot und vereinfachte bürokratische Verfahren bereitgestellt. Der Bedarf an Arbeitskräften wird vorwiegend durch Migranten aus den ländlichen Gebieten Vietnams gedeckt. Da der Staat in der Regel keinen Wohnraum für die Arbeitsmigranten anbietet, ist es für die ansässige Bevölkerung, die in der Nähe der Fabriken über Boden verfügt, zu einem lukrativen Geschäft geworden, Wohnraum an die zugezogenen Arbeiter zu vermieten. Als Folge hat sich eine typische Haustypologie herausgebildet, die Vietnam als Boarding House bezeichnet wird. Boarding Houses sind rund um die Industriezonen in großer Anzahl entstanden und haben sich somit zur gängigsten Unterkunft für die Masse der Arbeitsmigranten entwickelt. Im Gegensatz zu den sehr gut ausgestatteten Industriezonen leiden die Boarding-House-Agglomerationen unter erheblichen Defizi-

ten der Ausstattung mit technischer und sozialer Infrastruktur.

Die ein- bis dreistöckigen Mietwohneinheiten bestehen aus in der Regel identischen, durchschnittlich 12m<sup>2</sup> grossen Einzimmerwohnräumen mit rudimentären sanitären Anlagen die sich entweder im hinteren Teil des Zimmers oder zur gemeinsamen Nutzung außerhalb des Wohnhauses befinden<sup>1</sup>. Durch den Einbau eines ‚Zwischengeschosses‘ in der Grösse der halben Grundfläche des Raums wird zusätzliche Nutzfläche, etwa zum Schlafen, geschaffen. In der Regel teilen sich 3-6 Leute eine solche Wohneinheit, die zwischen 18 – 25 € pro Monat kostet, was gut 1/3 des monatlichen Einkommens ausmacht.

Die Größe der Boarding Houses ist ganz unterschiedlich. Kleine Einheiten verfügen über 5 bis 20 solcher Einraumwohnungen, deren Besitzer oftmals in einem sich deutlich unterscheidenden vorderen Hausteil wohnen. Bei größeren Anlagen mit bis zu 100 Wohneinheiten wohnen die Eigentümer entweder in separaten, bisweilen auffallend großen Häusern in der Nähe. Die behördlich festgelegte Maximalgröße von Boarding Houses liegt bei 200 Wohneinheiten. Im Frontteil, respektive in dem der Strasse oder bei größeren Anlagen dem Eingang zugewandten Teil der Häuser befindet

sich in der Regel ein kleines Geschäft für Güter des täglichen Bedarfs.

Im Großraum HCMC leben mehrere hunderttausend Arbeitsmigranten in derartigen Wohnverhältnissen. Obwohl die Arbeiter der Motor des wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs Vietnams darstellen, und die schnell expandierenden Industriezonen auf immer neue Arbeitskräfte angewiesen sind, verfügt die überwältigende Mehrzahl der Zugewanderten nur über einen temporären, alle drei Monate zu erneuernden, Aufenthaltsstatus oder sind gar nicht offiziell registriert. Somit können sie weder Wohnraum noch Landnutzungsrechte erwerben und haben auch keinen Zugang zu Darlehen. Auch können sie staatliche Bildungseinrichtungen oder Gesundheitszentren nur äußerst eingeschränkt nutzen. Zu den schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen bei etwa 56 bis 70 Std. Wochenarbeitszeit und niedrigen Löhnen (2/3 der Befragten verdienen weniger wie 70€ pro Monat) gesellen sich die oftmals prekären Wohnbedingungen in den Boarding House-Arealen.

### Anmerkung

<sup>1)</sup> Diese und die folgenden Angaben beziehen sich auf eine durch die Autoren Anfang 2008 durchgeführte Befragung von 187 Boarding House-Bewohnern in verschiedenen Siedlungen.

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Bildquellen: Michael Waibel





# Climate Change and Challenges for the Urban Development of Ho Chi Minh City / Vietnam

Ronald Eckert & Michael Waibel

The latest reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and different other scientific sources confirm that climate change is no longer a “distant possibility but a current reality” (World Bank 2008). Although Vietnam has only played a tiny part in creating the problems of global environmental change, it is among the countries most seriously affected by this threatening development (Waibel 2008). Already in the past decades, a significant rise in weather extremes such as tropical typhoons and flooding events as a consequence of climate change has been observed there.

Climate change and urban development are closely interlinked and often interact negatively (Wamsler 2008: 96).

In this paper, the authors analyze sector- and spatial-level-specific dangers of climate change for the most prosperous city and first mega-urban region of Viet-nam Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). Thereby, a dual-track approach to dealing with climate impacts will be proposed consisting of adaptation and mitigation.

## Impacts of climate change

Vietnam is extremely vulnerable to climate change impacts, mainly because of its topography. The overwhelming part of the Vietnamese population and most of its economic activities are concentrated in the low elevated coastal zones along the more than 3,000 km of coast-line. The two densely-populated main delta regions of the Red River and the Mekong are particularly affected. There, according to IPCC (2007: 59) a 1-meter sea level rise (SLR) would lead to a flooding of up to 20,000 km<sup>2</sup> of Mekong River delta (see map) and 5,000 km<sup>2</sup> of the Red River delta (Waibel 2008). The metropolises of Hanoi and HCMC, being situated within the delta regions, will not only be endangered by SLR itself, but may also experience a massive migration pressure of climate change refugees from the surrounding areas. Nguyen Duc Ngu, former general director of the Viet Nam Meteorology and Hydrology Centre, predicts an average SLR in

Vietnam of 35 cm by 2050, of 50 cm by 2070, and of 100 cm by 2100 (Vietnam News, 26.05.2008). With a forecast SLR of 1 m and over 11 % of urban areas, around 10 % of the population and 10 % of the gross domestic product will be affected by flooding (World Bank 2007: 18). The SLR adds to the danger of flood-tides, which in HCMC have already reached a height of 1.47 m (2006) and most recently in November 2008 even a height of 1.54 m (Thanh Nien Daily News, 15.11.2008). A SLR of just 50 cm, added to a flood-tide of about 1.50 m, makes a temporary rise of water level of +2.00 m. This would lead to a flooding of 300 km<sup>2</sup> of HCMC, with 2 mill. inhabitants. The flooding events in the recent past have already placed severe strains on the metropolis, e.g. in the case of traffic (see photos above).

Climate change, and especially SLR, threaten the general spatial urban development path of HCMC. It could result in a totally new dynamic in the progress of the settlement structures in the medium to long run, simply because large parts of the city areas will become unfit for human habitation. The current system of planning, guiding, and implementing urban development is not prepared for this tremendous challenge at all.

A further challenge related to climate change is the “Urban Heat Island (UHI) Effect”, which is clearly noticeable in the densely built inner city districts. Even today, the temperature in these areas is up

to 10 degrees above the average temperature of the surrounding districts. This increases the energy demand for cooling and also puts a lot of stress on the human health and comfort of the local population, especially the elderly and the young people.

UHIs can be largely blamed for deficiencies in urban planning that have led to insufficient ventilation, lack of green spaces, augmented use of air-conditioning, and a strongly increased traffic volume.

In general, the metropolis of HCMC has witnessed a disproportionate rise of urban energy consumption due to the successful implementation of a strategy of export-led industrialization, suburbanization processes and rising living standards as well as more resource-intensive lifestyles of the urban population.

## Current urban development

Apart from the horror scenarios of climate change, the urban planning authorities in Ho Chi Minh City are already now overburdened with the problems that are typical of mega-cities in developing countries all over the world. The metropolis is suffering from environmental degradation, air and water pollution, insufficient governmental capacities to cope with the fast growth, migration pressure (about 200,000 migrants move in every year), and increasing socio-spatial fragmentation (Waibel 2009). The latter is further promoted by the increasing inclusion of non-state actors in ur-



Pictures from Flooding Events in HCMC and in Hanoi.

Source: Vietnam News & Thanh Nien Daily News 2008

ban development projects through public-private partnership models.

One example is the development of Saigon South New Urban Area implemented by a joint venture enterprise of a Taiwanese developer and a daughter company of the People's Committee of HCMC. It is a functionally mixed urban development covering 3,300 hectares. For this showcase urban development project, which exclusively targets the nouveaux riches, vast wetland areas have been transformed into urban fabric. In this way, a large space that had previously served to buffer water in times of flooding has disappeared. Less than 10 years after the construction of the main development axis, the Saigon South Parkway already had to be massively elevated due to marshy underground and the danger of flooding. Another showcase project, the development of the new Central Business District Thu Thiem on a low-rise peninsula opposite central District 1, suffered significant delays as result of major modifications of the master plan that became necessary after it became obvious that the whole area is under enormous threat of flooding.

All in all, urban development is dominated by single-sector and single-project approaches, which reflects institutional fragmentation. To combat the consequences of climate change, however, cross-sector planning and comprehensive approaches are needed.

### Mainstreaming Climate Change

Given the institutional constraints in Vietnam, mainstreaming adequate responses to climate change into urban development seems to be a big challenge. Firstly, what is required is a well-founded examination of the consequences for urban development as well as substantial countermeasures on all levels of current urban development planning, from the level of the metropolitan region, the municipality, the urban district, the neighbourhood, and the building, down to the level of the individual household.


The foundations for climate change adaptation are laid at the levels of the region and the city. The main aim of urban development must be the protection of urban areas from flooding. Potential solutions for adapting urban areas include elevation of building sites by land filling or the construction of dikes. Due to the low elevated marshy lands and the fine-meshed network of canals in HCMC, these measures bring with them immense technical challenges and will be very cost-intensive. In the long run, the relocation of existing infrastructure and settlements away from the worst affected flood-prone areas will be inevitable.

The continuous demand for new building sites due to economic progress, suburbanization, and high migration flows should be strictly limited to flood-safe areas from now on, which is almost impossible to achieve. A first step would be a precise evaluation of the local impacts of flooding and their spatial manifestation within the urban area of HCMC (Eckert 2008). The current regional and urban development concepts (Regional Development Plan 2020, Master Plan 2025) are addressing the problem of continuous urban expansion into low-lying marshland for the first time (PC HCMC 2007: 2-20). However, no specific consequences for the proposed future development of HCMC are drawn. The master plan needs additional statements designating flood-safe areas for future settlements as well as areas with definite building prohibitions. Within these zones where construction is banned, marshlands can be used as buffer against

flooding and SLR (World Bank 2008).

To prevent or minimize the phenomena of UHIs, a city-wide system of open spaces for adequate air ventilation and for developing cold air generation areas has to be established. In this context, the urban morphology, the orientation of buildings, and the ratio of sealed surfaces also play an important role (TCPA 2007: 19). All these aspects have to be taken into account in the context of redevelopment measures of existing neighbourhoods, and particularly where new neighbourhoods are being developed.

On the level of buildings, there is only little local knowledge on the construction of energy-efficient housing typologies, alternative technical solutions like solar cooling, and energy-saving behaviour in the field of housing in general. Promising approaches to promote energy-efficient housing would be to adopt technical and constructional solutions in terms of energy-efficiency, to support local research efforts in this field, to raise awareness among the owners of real estate, and to establish a whole range of policies measures that would



Impact of 1 m SLR on Ho Chi Minh City and on the NE-Mekong River Delta. Source: ADB 2008

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Under the leadership of the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus (BTU), a trans-disciplinary team of German and Vietnamese researchers, including the Department of Economic Geography at the University of Hamburg, aims at the adaptation of the built environment of Ho Chi Minh City to climate changes, with the goal of minimizing or avoiding severe impacts of climate change in the future.

More info: [www.megacity-hcmc.org](http://www.megacity-hcmc.org)

serve to stimulate energy-efficiency on the one hand, and would penalize energy wastage, on the other hand. In terms of energy-efficient housing, the individual households are the main stakeholders. In the best case, their behaviour would be market-driven. That means that the money saved through technical and constructional solutions exceeds the extra costs incurred. These actions should be supported by state policies and financial drivers, as described above.

## "Mitaptation" as a response

Adaptation measures certainly rank at the top of the agenda due to the high vulnerability of HCMC. However, economic success and the mostly uncontrolled urban growth have also made HCMC the country's main emitter of human-induced greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, just adapting to the consequences of climate change is not sufficient. In expanding mega-urban regions such as HCMC, there are strategic potentials to reduce the consumption of resources and to lower emissions, for example by the promotion of inner-city redevelopment prior to growth in outer areas. Furthermore, the rapidly emerging urban middle classes that are only beginning to

adopt resource-intensive lifestyles could become a key target group for increased sustainability.

The implementation of a dual-track approach consisting of both adaptation and mitigation measures seems mandatory. This is especially true for a highly dynamic urban economy such as HCMC. In this context, Droege recommends a combination of adaptation and avoidance strategies for urban growth regions, which he labels as "mitigating adaptation" or "mitaptation" (Droege 2006: 70).

By contrast, pursuing either of these strategies on its own may result in conflicting aims for urban development. For example, the scientific discourse on adequate urban forms in developed countries of temperate climate zones recommends compact and dense settlement structures to meet the requirements for reduced land consumption. This approach follows the classic model of the European City (Bauriedl et al. 2008). However, in tropical hot-humid countries such as Vietnam and in the context of global warming, the impacts of the UHIs' excessive temperatures on densely built urban areas have to be taken into account. Therefore, a sensible balance between compact settlement structures and a linked network of well-irrigated open spaces to secure the infiltration of rain water is needed. This implies a coordinated application of both mitigation and adaptation measures.

## Conclusions

Dealing with climate change and increasing the adaptive capacity of the mega-urban region of HCMC does not imply a need to reinvent the wheel. Many policies can be derived simply from the ongoing sustainable-city discourse. The toolbox of sustainable city development offers various solutions to promote the concept of a compact city, for example. However, the urgency of the threats of climate change can be leveraged to develop specific sustainable city planning solutions and to promote new institutional arrangements. In this respect, innovative

forms of governance coalitions could serve as learning fields for reorganising urban development agencies in a broader context and to overcome the biggest problem of urban development in Vietnam: Institutional fragmentation.

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# “The Storms and Waves Eat Away our Islands” An interview with Basil Peso from Tulele Peisa\*, Carteret Islands

\*Tulele Peisa is an NGO which supports the climate refugees from the Carteret Islands in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. URL: <http://www.tulelepeisa.org>

Marion Struck-Garbe

The era of climate change migration is underway. The world's first evacuation of low-lying islands due to climate change is going to happen from spring 2009 onwards in the Carteret atoll. The “idyllic” Carterets are a tiny and flat Pacific atoll surrounded by nothing but the open ocean, about 200 kilometres northeast off the coast of Bougainville. The six inhabited small islands are no more than 1.2 metres above sea level. With about 2.600 people the Carteret atoll belongs to the now Autonomous Region Bougainville of Papua New Guinea. In 2005 a political decision was reached to resettle the islanders to mainland Bougainville because scientists predict that the islands could submerge as early as 2015. The process of relocation thus should be finished by 2012.

The relocation of people or even whole nations in the Pacific like Kiribati or Tuvalu is not only a political and economic issue - it is also ethical, spiritual and emotional. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of November 2008 a conference in Hamburg “Atolls of the South Sea - Holms of the North Sea: International Dialogue on Climate Change” aimed to highlight these issues. The organizers - the Northelbian Centre for World Mission, the Pacific Network and others - invited representatives from NGOs, churches and effected communities from Oceania and Germany to discuss the negative impacts of climate change for the people concerned.

Basil Peso from the NGO Tulele Peisa from Bougainville was one of the speakers. I took the chance to ask him a few questions about the recent situation of the threatened islands.

## What are the problems the people of the Carteret Islands are facing?

It started some years ago. People first thought everything was normal. But then it became much more dramatic what is happening to our islands. The sea coming deep into our gardens is uncommon and the sea is coming in very fast. Flooding of our islands is new. Huene, one of the islands, was sliced in two by the sea. More islands are going to split. The sea is washing it off quickly. Experts advised us to build walls and plant mangroves. We have tried both. But this is not going to work; the walls are broken by the rough sea. The land is getting smaller and the population is getting bigger. We have a race with the sea. And we are giving up because there are no resources to save the islands.




Basil Peso

Source: Marion Struck-Garbe 2008

The main problems the islanders are facing is food and water shortage. Nothing substantial is growing on the Carterets anymore. The soil became salty. Taro and Bananas do not grow in salty ground. We depend on coconut and fish. But the roots of the coconut trees are washing away or get rotten. The destruction is striking. There is not much food available now. There are a few shops getting supplies by banana boat. But they sell their goods for a very high price because it is very costly to go by boat to the mainland. There are no jobs on the islands and only little money. People sell seashells and seacucumber. They

Flooded coconut tree: The stump in the water shows where the shoreline has retreated from.  
Source: NGO Tulele Peisa





Cartography: Henry Küper

collect them only at certain times. They cannot sell the fish. There is no market and it wouldn't come fresh due to the four-hour boat ride and lack of transport (there is no ferry and no airlink to the atoll).

Once every few month the Bougainville administration gives relief supplies. It is only rice. And that's no solution. There is no long term strategy in place.

We are getting more and more water problems now. It is not only the waves destroying our land. Our fresh water is coming from the bottom (underground). But the ocean is washing in the salty waves. Our fresh water gets brackish, spoilt. Some years ago the Carterets had wells. But they don't function any longer. Rainfall is our second source of drinking water. Some villagers have water tanks but our dry season is long. Often water becomes scarce. Often we rely on coconuts for drinking. Coconuts and breadfruits are now our main staples. But saltwater, storms and tidal waves will ruin them too.

**How far has the relocation process proceeded?**

The first relocation plan was developed 2005. But the government is slow. In 2007 Tulele Peisa submitted a new plan to the government to speed up the

process and it is now facilitating it. Because of the similarities in language and culture the people of the Carterets will be resettled at Tinputz on northeastern Bougainville. The Catholic Mission is allocating land on two different locations for both agriculture and to build houses. They don't want money for the land. The two chiefs from Tinputz and the Carterets represented their clans in a recent meeting. They exchanged shell money. A customary payment which is valued more by the chiefs because this money represents a promise or an agreement.

In 2008 the building of the houses started. They are built from bush material and they last for 20 years only. This is because there is little money but it is also for cultural reasons. The houses must be similar to those of the others in Tinputz and cannot be permanent houses. The building process is coordinated by the church.

Tulele Peisa does not want anyone to live in a town like Buka as squatters. The islanders should move to a secure place, where they could do their gardening and fishing and make a living. The government wanted to built a different school for the Carteret pupils. But the local villagers don't want this. They say, the Carterets are part of us. It is not a good start to separate them, their kids should

grow together with ours. Japan supports the upgrading of the local school through some assistance. Sister Lorraine - a well known catholic nun - looks into our food security. Together with a youth group she started to grow new plants and she is teaching about sustainable gardening.

Five houses are being built right now. The relocation will start in spring 2009 with five families who face the most inconvenient situation and who are willing to move. All together around 100 people. They will go first. We hope they will be seen as a success and others will want to follow. By 2012 the resettlement of all Carteret Islanders should be finished. That's very little time.

**How do the people feel about the situation?**

The sea is threatening the islanders. They feel something has to be done. People worry about a big cyclone or Tsunami which will come along and kill everyone. The men don't have any idea what to do and where to go - unless some people give us land. The women say: We have to find a new place for the younger generation. We need a place to stay with our kids. Women are worried about their children.

The old people do not want to go, they rather drawn with the islands. This confuses the younger generations. They don't feel good to be separated from



Flooded coconut tree: The stump in the water shows where the shoreline has retreated from.

Source: NGO Tulele Peisa

their parents. They don't want to leave them on the islands. But relocation is our only means of building our future. We will lose our identity, but we have no choice. The islands are shrinking.

### What do people talk about the rise of the sea? What do they think about climate change?

They see it is happening, but they don't think about its causes. People don't know much about it. It is happening the last twenty years. The land is disappearing slowly. It happens. The food shortage is happening. Because of our awareness campaign the islanders know by now it is a worldwide thing. It is not only us. It is happening to other islands as well. The people know about Tuvalu. Carteret and Tuvalu are the first ones who drawn. Kiribati and the Marshall Islands will follow. But there is no exchange between the islands because we do not have the money to visit our Pacific neighbours.

### What is the role of Tulele Peisa?

Tulele Peisa ("Sailing the Waves On Our Own") is a locally registered NGO. The aims are firstly to create awareness amongst the Carteret Islanders and overseas. To influence and mobilize people,



Kids with an uncertain future

Source: NGO Tulele Peisa

governments, business and institutions to stop global warming. And secondly to assist the Carteret Islanders during the relocation process. We work on both sides, we support and educate the host communities and the migrants. We organize meetings between the two groups and they travel together around Tinupuz to meet with community leaders to talk about climate change and explain why the Carteret Islanders must relocate from the islands to the mainland.

As the world tries to hammer out a future plan to tackle climate change, tiny islands say it is too late. The rising sea level

and the increase of ferocity of storms is related to global warming caused by greenhouse emissions. Climate policy needs to act internationally to reduce greenhouse gas emissions immediately. Reports by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) have stated that a rise in sea level of one centimetre can result in beach erosion of one metre. This puts extreme pressure on beaches and densely populated coastal areas. The situation is dire. People are not only becoming refugees but the place they call home will disappear under the rising sea. During the recent conference in Hamburg Reverent Baranite Kirata from Kiribati wrote a sign of conflict and misery on the wall: "If we don't end up in the lagoon, we will end up fighting each other over land, food, water". To avoid this prediction global warming must become an important issue for all governments, industries and communities around the globe. Governments need to be proactive in dealing with the issue. The world needs to pay greater attention to these problems - both ecological and economic.

Interview by Marion Struck-Garbe, Network of Pacific Groups - [www.pazifik-netzwerk.org](http://www.pazifik-netzwerk.org)



Huene a part of Carteret Islands. Huene used to be one island but has now been bisected by rising seas.

Basil Peso [rakovaursula@gmail.com] was born on Bougainville. He attended a vocational training in agriculture in the Solomon Islands. During the civil war on Bougainville he joined the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. Only later he became educated as a social worker during the peace monitoring process. He worked for eight years at the Oxfam rehabilitation and restoration program. When Ursula Rakova - the first local director of the Oxfam program - founded Tulele Peisa to help the people of her home Carteret Islands Basil Peso followed.

Source: Pip Starr, May 2006 (www.starr.tv)



Foto: Bettina Volk

Ältester der Dia'ang mit Familie

## Lokale Interpretationen eines gewalttätigen Konfliktes auf Pantar, Ostindonesien

Bettina Volk

Anfang 2007 brachen auf der Insel Pantar im ostindonesischen Alor-Archipel Unruhen zwischen zwei ethnischen Gruppen, den Mauta und den Bara, aus, deren Folgen eine weitere ethnische Gruppe, die Dia'ang, direkt betrafen.

Der Konflikt wird von den Mauta und den Dia'ang unterschiedlich wahrgenommen und interpretiert. Im Folgenden soll den Fragen, wie genau sich diese Interpretationen unterscheiden und wie sie sich in den Kontext der Interaktionen zwischen den Gruppen einordnen lassen, nachgegangen werden<sup>1</sup>.

### Die Ausschreitungen

Anfang 2007 kam es zu gewalttätigen Unruhen zwischen den christlichen Mauta und den muslimischen Bara, die bis heute weiter schwelen. Im Laufe dieses Konfliktes kam es zu Schlägereien, dem Niederbrennen von Häusern, bewaffneten Zusammenstößen<sup>2</sup> zwischen den Mauta und Bara, aber auch zwischen den Konfliktparteien und der Polizei bzw. dem Bezirksvorsteher, sowie zur Beschwörung schwarzer Magie. Es wurden Straßenblockaden errichtet, der Bootsverkehr, der Baranusa und das Muriabang-Gebiet der Dia'ang verbindet, wurde für knapp zwei Monate eingestellt. Aufgrund dieser Blockaden der Verkehrswege kam es zu Versorgungs-

engpässen<sup>3</sup>, besonders in Muriabang. Die wöchentlichen Märkte konnten im ganzen Konfliktgebiet nur sehr eingeschränkt stattfinden, in Muriabang fielen sie völlig aus. Friedensverhandlungen unter Vorsitz des Bezirksvorstehers (camat) scheiterten über Wochen. In zwei Fällen wurde er angegriffen. Erst nach über drei Monaten konnte man sich auf einen traditionellen Friedensschluss durch ein traditionelles Tanzfest (lego-lego) einigen. Dieser hatte jedoch bei meiner Abreise im August 2007, und nach meinen Informationen bis heute, nicht stattgefunden. Der Konflikt ist bis heute nicht gelöst<sup>4</sup>, obwohl es nach etwa zwei Monaten zu keinen weiteren gewalttätigen Zusammenstößen kam.

### Der Konflikt aus Sicht der Mauta


Schon über den Auslöser der Unruhen herrscht keine Einigkeit zwischen den Dia'ang und den Mauta. Noch weniger Parallelen lassen sich finden, wenn man nach der Essenz des Konfliktes fragt.

Nach den Mauta<sup>5</sup> spielte es sich folgendermaßen ab: Ein junger Mauta war als Soldat in Lewoleba stationiert. In seinen Ferien wollte er seine Familie in Air Mama auf Pantar besuchen. Als er in Pantar am Hafen von Baranusa ankam, war eine Schlägerei im Gange. Einige Bara verprügelten einen Jungen aus Mauta, weil er eine junge Bara als Freundin hatte. Es hieß, er habe seine Freundin angegriffen. Nach den Mauta



verhielt es sich jedoch so, dass die Bara die junge Frau selbst angegriffen hätten, weil sie mit dem Mauta zusammen sei. Sie verprügelten den Mauta nun, weil er ihr Freund sei. Der Soldat forderte die Bara auf, den Jungen gehen zu lassen und ihm zu sagen, was denn das Problem sei. Dies sahen die Bara als Provokation an und griffen ihn auch an. Der Soldat wies einen jungen Mauta an, Hilfe zu holen. Also fuhr dieser mit einem Motorroller in die Dörfer Air Mama und Kakamauta und berichtet, was in Baranusa los sei. Daraufhin bewaffneten sich die Männer mit Pfeil und Bogen und fuhren mit zwei Lastern nach Baranusa. In Baranusa zerstörten sie Häuser mit Steinwürfen, das Boot der Bara, die die Schlägerei angefangen hatten und suchten diese. Aber diese hatten sich versteckt. Es kam dann zu weiteren Zerstörungen von Häusern und Schlägereien. Nach diesen wurden die Bara von ihrem König (raja) aufgefordert, weder die Mauta nach Baranusa auf den Markt zu lassen noch selbst auf die Märkte der Mauta zu gehen noch auf die der Dia'ang. Er warnte sie, dass sie von den Mauta alle umgebracht würden, wenn sie dort auftauchten. Trotz dieser Warnung gingen einige Frauen aus Baranusa zum Markt nach Maliang<sup>6</sup>, ebenso wie einige Frauen aus Kakamauta. Sie wurden am Hafen mit Macheten angegriffen und fortgejagt, ebenso erging es Schulkindern. Es kam zu erneuten Zusammenstößen zwischen Mauta und Bara in Baranusa. Daraufhin fällten die Bara einige große Bäume an der Verbindungsstraße zwischen dem Gebiet der Mauta bzw. dem der Dia'ang und Baranusa. Diese ließen sie auf die Straße fallen, so dass diese blockiert war. So wollten sie verhindern, dass die Mauta wieder mit Lastwagen nach Baranusa kamen, um sie anzugreifen.

Nachdem es hieß, die Polizei habe auch Angst einzugreifen und könne nichts tun, traten die Mauta aus Puntaro in Kontakt mit dem König der Bara. Sie erinnerten ihn an vergangene Mauta-interne Konflikte, in denen er die Portugiesen und andere zur Hilfe geholt habe, um Krieg gegen sie zu führen. So habe er indirekt dafür gesorgt, dass die Mauta sich vereinigten. Deshalb würden sie ihm nun als geschlossene Einheit gegenüberstehen, er habe also auch seinen Anteil an den Fronten in diesem Konflikt.



Kartographie: Henry Küper 2008

Übersicht der Insel Pantar im Indonesischen Archipel

Letztlich geben sie den Bara Schuld an dem Ausufern des Konfliktes und an seinen Folgen, wie etwa den geschlossenen Wochenmärkten. Die Mauta aus Puntaro sehen sich als Vermittler zwischen den restlichen Mauta und den Bara. Nach wie vor herrschen Spannungen zwischen den Mauta und Bara. Als Aggressoren wird hauptsächlich eine kleine Gruppe von jungen Männern gesehen. Der Spannungen werden auf ökonomische Gründe zurückgeführt. Diese jungen Männer kämpfen um das Hoheitsgebiet im ojek<sup>7</sup>-Territorium. So wollen die ojek-Fahrer der Mauta denen aus Baranusa verbieten, das Mauta-Gebiet anzufahren. Wer welche Orte anfahren darf, hat große ökonomische Relevanz, da das ojek-Fahren eine der Hauptverdienstquellen für junge Männer aus Mauta und Baranusa darstellt.

### Der Konflikt aus Sicht der Dia'ang

Etwas anders stellt sich der Konflikt und sein vermeintlicher Kern aus Sicht der betroffenen, wenn auch nicht beteiligten Dia'ang dar: Eine junge Muslima war auf ihrem Weg nach Hause von Flores nach Baranusa. Bei einem Zwischenstopp der Fähre mit Landgang verbrachte sie ihre Pause nicht etwa mit ihren Freundinnen, sondern entschied sich mit einem jungen

angetrunkenen Mauta auf seinem Motorroller zu einem Imbissstand zu fahren, um etwas zu essen zu kaufen. Dieser verfuhr sich jedoch auf dem Weg dorthin. Daraufhin geriet die junge Frau in Panik, da sie dachte, er nehme den falschen Weg, um sie zu vergewaltigen. Sie sprang vom fahrenden Motorroller, brach sich den Arm und zog sich schwere Verletzungen im Gesicht zu. Wieder auf der Fähre rief sie ihre Familie in Baranusa an und berichtete, was geschehen war. Als die Fähre in Baranusa anlegte, hatte sich ihre Familie schon im Hafen versammelt und verprügelte den jungen Mauta, als er die Fähre verließ. Die Schlägerei war noch in vollem Gange als ein Verwandter des jungen Mannes vorbei kam, ihn erkannte und daraufhin die Angreifer wüst beschimpfte, woraufhin auch er verprügelt wurde. Als man in den Dörfern der Mauta hiervon hörte, versammelten sich sofort die Männer, bewaffneten sich mit Macheten sowie Pfeil und Bogen. Bevor sie sich auf den Weg nach Baranusa machten, um Rache zu nehmen, beteten sie zusammen für den Sieg und führten ein altes Ritual durch, dass ihnen Glück im Kampf geben sollte. Auf ihrem Weg nach Baranusa trafen sie auf ein Ehepaar aus Baranusa, das Fisch verkaufen wollte. Sie schlugen sie zusammen, zerstörten ihren Motorroller. In Baranusa

angekommen, begannen sie Häuser nieder zu brennen, ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass sich in ihnen noch Personen befanden. Glücklicherweise konnten diese sich retten. Es kam zu Straßenschlachten, bei denen etliche Personen verletzt wurden und zu Auseinandersetzungen mit der Polizei. Jeder Versuch, die Beteiligten zu beruhigen und die Situation zu entschärfen, scheiterte. In den folgenden Tagen kam es immer wieder zu gewalttätigen Zusammenstößen zwischen den beiden Gruppen. Schließlich errichteten die Baranachts durch Fällen von Bäumen Straßensperren, durch die sie die Straße von Baranusa nach Muriabang unpassierbar machten. Der Bootsverkehr, der normalerweise Muriabang mit Baranusa verbindet, wurde eingestellt.

In Muriabang reagierte man mit Panik auf die sich über Wochen ziehenden Unruhen. Die Männer bewaffneten sich, Pfeile wurden hergestellt, nachts patrouillierten die jungen Männer durch das Dorf, Frauen und Kinder wurde verboten ohne Begleitung die Häuser zu verlassen und die Arbeit auf den Feldern, die Richtung Baranusa liegen, wurde eingestellt. Nachdem es neben immer wieder aufflammender Gewalt bei - gescheiterten - Friedensverhandlungen zu einem Angriff auf den Bezirksvorsteher (camat) und dessen Frau gekommen war, verstärkte sich die Angst der Dia'ang in diesen Konflikt hineingezogen zu werden, weiter. Die wenigen jugendlichen Dia'ang, die sich an den Unruhen beteiligt hatten, waren vorsorglich sofort nach Beginn der Unruhen auf die Nachbarinsel Alor geschickt worden.

Es gingen das Gerücht um, dass die Bara an einem bestimmten Datum das Gebiet der Dia'ang überfallen würden, um alle Dia'ang zu töten, da sie Christen seien. Einige Männer schickten daraufhin ihre Familien in die Berge, in die alten Dörfer<sup>8</sup> bis die Gefahr vorüber sei. Weiter bestärkt sahen sich die Dia'ang, und auch im Muriabang lebenden Mauta, durch die bekannten religiösen Unruhen auf den Molukken, Flores und anderen Gebieten Indonesiens. Man begann die muslimischen Nachbarn im Dorf möglichst zu meiden und forderte gerade die Kinder und jungen Erwachsenen immer wieder auf, vorsichtig im Kontakt zu sein. Auch als der festgelegte Tag des angenommenen Massakers vor-

über war und niemand das Gebiet angegriffen hatte, legte sich die Angst nicht völlig, sondern schwelte noch immer, als ich im August 2007 Pantar verließ.

Erst nachdem die Straßensperren entfernt, der Bootsverkehr wieder aufgenommen worden war, liefen die Wochenmärkte allmählich wieder an, die allerdings bei meinem Verlassen der Insel immer noch nicht ähnlich gut besucht waren, wie vor den Ausschreitungen.

Obwohl es aus der oralen Geschichte und der näheren Vergangenheit etliche Zusammenstöße zwischen den Mauta und den Bara bekannt sind, sehen die Dia'ang diesen Konflikt als religiös motiviert an. Hierbei sind für sie die muslimische Bara Hauptaggressoren. Sie sind überzeugt, dass diese sich mit allen anderen Muslimen in der Gegend verbünden werden, um die Christen auf Pantar auszulöschen.<sup>9</sup>

### **Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede in der Wahrnehmung der Ausschreitungen**

Zwar zeichnen die Mauta und die Dia'ang den Verlauf des Konfliktes sehr ähnlich nach, doch die Ursache und die Interpretation des Konfliktes unterscheiden sich. Während man bei den verschiedenen Versionen zur Ursache der Unruhen noch von Variationen der gleichen Geschichte ausgehen kann, die lediglich der mündlichen Weitergabe derselben zuschreiben sein könnte, ist dies für die Interpretationen des Kerns der Unruhen nicht möglich. Hier bestehen lediglich drei Gemeinsamkeiten: Erstens verweisen beide Gruppen darauf, das es in der Vergangenheit verschiedentlich zu teils gewalttätige, teils kriegsartige Konflikte zwischen den Bara und den Mauta gekommen ist. Zweitens sehen beide Ethnien die jungen Männer als Hauptausstragende der Gewalt an. Drittens ist der Auslöser der Eskalation die Schlägerei am Hafen von Baranusa wegen der (unterschiedlich gesehenen) Ereignisse zwischen dem jungen Mauta und der jungen Bara. Darüber hinaus finden sich jedoch keine weiteren gemeinsamen Erklärungen bzw. Annahmen. Während die Mauta von einem hauptsächlich ökonomisch motivierten, schon zuvor schwelenden Konflikt ausgehen, der aufgrund der oben genannten Ereignisse

eskalierte, gehen die Dia'ang von einem interreligiösen Konflikt aus. Diesen setzen sie in Zusammenhang mit anderen religiösen Unruhen in Indonesien, insbesondere jenen auf den Molukken und Flores. Diese Konflikte wurden schon vor dem Ausbruch der Ausschreitungen immer wieder thematisiert, ebenso wie die Furcht davor, dass so etwas auch auf Pantar oder Alor passieren können. Gleichmaßen wurden jedoch das, auch in der wenigen zur Region vorhandenen Literatur gepriesene, (vermeintlich) friedliche Zusammenleben der Christen und Muslims im Alor-Archipel betont.<sup>10</sup> Die große Furcht, in diesen Konflikts aktiv hineingezogen zu werden und einer damit verbunden Ausweitung der Unruhen, spiegelte sich nicht nur in dem Aufrüsten des Vorrats an Pfeilen durch die Männer und anderen oben beschriebenen Maßnahmen wider. Sondern sie zeigt sich besonders auch darin, dass die Jugendlichen der Dia'ang, die sich ganz am Anfang an den Schlägereien beteiligt hatten, sofort zu Verwandten auf die Nachbarinsel Alor geschickt wurden und teilweise erst nach einigen Monaten zurückkehren durften.

### **Schlussbetrachtung und Ausblick**

Warum die Dia'ang als einzige ethnische Gruppe, neben denen in ihren Dörfern lebenden Mauta, den Konflikt als religiös motiviert interpretierten, während die muslimischen Bara dies ebenso bestritten, wie Vertreter der verschiedenen muslimischen Ethnien, die in Muriabang leben und die Mauta den ökonomischen Interessenskonflikt zwischen Bara und Mauta betonen, kann an dieser Stelle nicht beantwortet werden. Eine gezielte Forschung vor Ort ist hierfür nötig.

Es kann jedoch folgende Vermutung geäußert werden, warum die Dia'ang einen Konflikt mit den Bara als besonders bedrohlich empfinden: Als die Dia'ang in den 1960ern aus ihren Bergdörfern an die Küste umsiedelten, wurden sie von den Bara angegriffen, die ihnen das Gebiet an der Küste streitig machen wollten. Hierbei wurden mehrere der politisch wichtigsten Dia'ang teils schwer verletzt. Diese Ereignisse werden bis heute immer wieder thematisiert. Wenn man weiter in die lokale Geschichte der Interaktion zwischen den Dia'ang und

den Bara eindringt, finden sich etliche weitere Beispiele von Konflikten zwischen beiden Gruppen. Aus Sicht der Dia'ang endeten diese meisten zu Gunsten der Dia'ang, waren jedoch immer verbunden mit einem Angriff auf ihre politischen Führer.

Um abschließend klären zu können, wie es zu den beschriebenen unterschiedlichen Wahrnehmungen der Unruhen kam, sollte die Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen den drei ethnischen Gruppen (Bara, Dia'ang und Mauta) gezielt untersucht werden.

### Endnoten

<sup>1)</sup> Soweit nicht anders verzeichnet, beruht dieser Artikel auf Daten, die die Autorin während eines 18monatigen Feldforschungsaufenthalts bei den Dia'ang in Muriabang, Pantar erhoben hat.

<sup>2)</sup> Als Waffen wurden Pfeil und Bogen, Macheten und Messer, Steine sowie Feuer verwendet.

<sup>3)</sup> Muriabang ist in weiten Teilen von der Versorgung über diese Verkehrswege abhängig. Schon nach einer Woche wurden Öl für die Lampen, Benzin sowie Zucker, Seife, Salz, Reis etc. knapp. Es kam schnell zu einer deutlichen Verteuerung der Artikel, die es vielen Dia'ang unmöglich machte, sie zu erwerben. Die Versorgung mit Fisch durch die Bara brach völlig zusammen. Des Weiteren waren die Dia'ang durch die Blockade nicht in möglich die Insel zu verlassen, es sei denn sie waren in der Lage oder hatten den Mut, durch das Krisengebiet zu wandern. Von einer medizinischen Versorgung waren sie fast vollständig abgeschnitten. Die Blockaden wurden erst nach zwei Monaten gelockert bzw. beseitigt.

<sup>4)</sup> Persönliche Kommunikation mit Gary Holton (23.07.2008).

<sup>5)</sup> Die folgenden Ausführungen zu den Mauta beruhen auf persönlicher Kommunikation mit Gary Holton, der mir freundlicherweise ein Interviewtranskript zum Thema zur Verfügung stellte. (Juli/August 2008).

<sup>6)</sup> Ein Dorf der Dia'ang in Muriabang.

<sup>7)</sup> Ein ojek ist ein Motorrollertaxi.

<sup>8)</sup> Erst in den 1960er Jahren waren die Dia'ang aus ihren Bergdörfern in neue Dörfer in Küstennähe umgesiedelt worden.

<sup>9)</sup> Zu weiteren Ausführungen zu diesem Aspekt der Unruhen vgl. Volk (forthcoming).

<sup>10)</sup> Vgl. hierzu Volk (forthcoming).

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Foto: Bettina Volk

Zwei mautasprachige Frauen aus Muriabang

**Bettina Volk [bettinavolk@googlemail.com] promoviert bei Prof. Dr. Susanne Schröter am Lehrstuhl für koloniale und postkoloniale Ethnologie an der Universität zu Frankfurt zum Thema: Totenrituale als Zugang zu einer indigenen Moderne im ostindonesischen Alor-Archipel.**

**Sie ist wissenschaftliche Volontärin am Museum und Zentralinstitut für Sepulkralkultur in Kassel und hier insbesondere mit der Konzeption von Ausstellungen betraut.**

**Bettina Volk ist Sprecherin des AK Volontariats des DMB sowie des Doktorandennetzwerks Indonesien.**



# Towards a New Pacific Theatre

Bert van Dijk

This article presents an overview of a current PhD research project 'Towards a New Pacific Theatre' - focusing on some of the ethical and political issues of Intercultural Performance and articulating a number of guiding principles with regards to intercultural exchange.

Othello:  
Matu Ngaropo in OTHELLO (dir. Bert van Dijk): New Zealand, 2003

But let me first situate myself. I have been a dancer, actor, and theatre director for most of my professional life. Michael Chekhov, Grotowski, Min Tanaka, Etienne Decroux, Eugenio Barba, Roy Hart and Enrique Pardo are among those that shaped my approach to theatre. In my work I value and integrate the vocabularies of Body, Space, Voice, Text, Objects and Light as equal partners in the process of image making. I use the devising (i.e. collaborative) process to explore and generate performance content. For the last 16 years I have been based in New Zealand. In the Netherlands children are told that if you drill a hole through the earth you end up in New Zealand. This tickled my imagination and I was determined that one day I would check out the world on 'the other side'.

In New Zealand the natural environment is physically and spatially incredibly dynamic, yet Body and Space appear such underdeveloped elements in our theatre practice. I asked myself: how can it be that - after more than 200 years of Māori and Pākehā (non Māori) co-existence - mainstream NZ theatre remains more or less unaffected by Māori culture? These reflections led me to my current PhD project.

## Research Overview

The aim of my PhD project is to develop - and test - an intercultural approach to theatre making, that is inspired by Māori, Contemporary European and Japanese performance principles. Based on performative enquiry into bicultural and intercultural performance praxis I want to construct a model of actor training

and devised theatre, that is strongly connected to, and reflective of, the unique geographic, cultural and spiritual qualities of New Zealand.

For theatre to be current it needs to relate to the cultural identity of its audiences and, somehow, reflect their natural and cultural environments. In New Zealand, the natural environment is breathtakingly dynamic, and the people a rich mixture of Māori, Pacific Island, European and Asian cultures. However, this is not reflected in the NZ theatre practice where it appears that:

- Actors have no feet
- Gods are missing
- Adventure and risk-taking is lacking
- Theatre appeals only to a portion of its communities.

I propose a New Pacific Theatre that is cutting-edge, experimental, embracing the latest technologies and theatre expertise, as well as being deeply rooted in the spiritual and cultural dimensions of Pacific tradition - its actors connected with their body and the earth (They Have Feet), the archetypal qualities of the gods incorporated in training and performance practice (Return of the Gods), a sense of adventure prominent, and relating to our various cultures and communities.

For pragmatic reasons, it has been necessary to narrow the field of my inquiry to a definite number of praxis within each of the fields of Māori, Japanese and Contemporary European Performance. Within the field of Māori performing arts I am concentrating on the pre-European form of Te Whare Tapere. The reasons for this are three-fold:

1. To circumnavigate the complex issue of colonialism that has influenced current Māori theatre practice in ways that makes it hard to establish what is essentially Māori, and what is Pākehā based
2. Having access to the in-depth research on Te Whare Tapere by Dr Charles Royal, undertaken in the context of his PhD research at VUW (1998)
3. A strong personal and professional attraction to the performance principles and value-base of Te Whare Tapere: Manaakitanga (reciprocal relationships), Rangatiratanga (leadership through unity), Tohungatanga (knowledge of symbols), Ūkaipo (spiritual nourishment), Whanaungatanga (inter-connectedness of all things in the world) and Kotahitanga (unity of all things).

Within the diverse field of Japanese performance the spotlight is on the two contrasting genres of Nō and Butoh. Nō Theatre is one of the oldest theatre genres in the world that has stayed alive for many centuries in more or less the same form. It is still possible to observe Nō training and performance in action. The Nō philosophy and practice are well documented in the English language, and a number of NZ theatre practitioners have incorporated elements of Nō in their work. In contrast Butoh is a con-

temporary, rebellious response to some of the formal and restrictive aspects of traditional Japanese society and theatre practice. It offers an exciting example of intercultural performance in which Western and Japanese codes and expressions coexist and collide.

In the domain of Contemporary European Performance I am focusing on Devised or Collaborative Theatre, the Michael Chekhov Technique, and Intercultural Performance. Devised Theatre is one of the most effective strategies to deal with the ethical, political, and spiritual complexities of intercultural performance. It offers a number of ways for cultural identities and environmental qualities to inform the creative process:

Firstly, the collaborative nature of Devised Theatre allows an ensemble, made up of artists from various cultural backgrounds, to incorporate ideas, values and modes of expression that are culturally formed (in New Zealand: Māori, Pacific Island, European and Asian).

Secondly, devisers aim to create performances that are current. This implies that the performance material is somehow reflective of, and connected to, the people and their environment.

Thirdly, devisers are committed to experimentation, exploring a wide range of possible locations in the natural and urban environments as a site for performance.

The Michael Chekhov Technique - recently experiencing a huge international revival - enables the actor to draw from their body and imagination in order to create intention, feeling and quality of being (character). It beautifully balances the demands of form and content in theatrical expression. When aiming to bring together a number of theatre practices from various cultural ancestries, we are entering the domain of Intercultural Performance – an arena fraught with ethical and political issues. In New Zealand the unique relationship between Māori and Pākehā has crystallised the intercultural performance debate on issues of bi-cultural theatre.

### Intercultural Performance Debate

On reviewing the ideas of Rustom Bharucha (1993), Christopher Balme (2007), Charles Royal (1998) and Janinka Green-



Agamemnon:  
Matariki Whatarau as Agamemnon in  
AGAMEMNON  
(dir. Bert van Dijk): New Zealand, 2005

wood (2002), it appears that the intercultural performance debate centres on the following issues:

- a) Globalisation and Diasporas
- b) The relationship between tangible and intangible aspects of cultural expressions (in other words: matters of form and content)
- c) The appropriation of cultural material
- d) Mutuality in relationships during the process of intercultural exchange.

#### Issues of Globalisation:

In her article Researching the Native Māori (Norman & Lincoln, 2005) Linda Tuhiwai Smith observes that the current globalisation carries in it a danger of losing the culturally specific.

**“For indigenous communities, the “something lost” has been defined as indigenous knowledge and culture. In biological terms, it is our diversity; in sociolinguistics, it is the diversity of minority languages; culturally, it is our uniqueness of stories and experiences and how they are expressed.” (p. 95)**

Across the globe our cities are starting to look more and more the same - containing similar food and drinking outlets, manifesting ‘a sameness’ in architecture, and using English as the main language. For some people it is comforting to

# Xê'no~pho'ria n. the ecstatic love of all things foreign.

know that - no matter where you are in the world - you can get your latte, your Big Mac, or your favourite Italian food. Others deeply regret and resent these homogenizing developments, and long for authentic cultural encounters when travelling.

The increased mobility of people across geographic borders also presents an opportunity for people to connect across cultural differences, and to learn from, and appreciate, these differences. I argue that Intercultural Performance can play a significant role in the survival of the culturally specific (language, cultural expressions, values) as well as enriching the palette of our artistic experiences.

Some people respond to things foreign or 'other' with a feeling of fear or terror (Xenophobia), while others are attracted and fascinated, perhaps even obsessed by the 'other'. For me, the attraction to 'otherness' (Xenophoria) is what drives me to travel, to engage with other beings, other cultures, and other practices. It is what expands my horizons, and deepens my understanding of how people and communities operate and express themselves. To give theatrical expression to this strong drive in me I created a solo performance in the mid 90's, directed by Enrique Pardo. For the title of this show I invented a new word: XENOPHORIA

This word fuses the linguistic roots of Xeno (foreigner) and Euphoria (ecstasy) into 'the ecstatic love of all things foreign'.

*Tangible and intangible aspects of cultural expressions:*

The discussions around the appreciation of tangible and intangible aspects of cultural expression - particularly concerning issues of universality versus the culturally and historically specific - are rather complex and, at times, distorted

by personal or professional bias. In her monograph *History of Bicultural Theatre* Janinka Greenwood (2002) observes that the theatre of cultural exchange, as explored by Brook, Barba and Grotowski, is more concerned with theatrical form than with the complex meanings those forms carry in their original contexts. In this context she notes that:

**"[Bharucha's writings] have problematised practices of intercultural borrowing and the understanding of both theatre and culture that underlie them. At the base of Bharucha's critique is an insistence that "bios" cannot be separated from "ethos"; that stories and forms cannot be separated from the meanings they hold for their own people, without doing violence to both the forms and the people." (p. 8)**

It appears that Bharucha (1993) is more interested in the culturally specific than in the universal when he declares:

**"There are no universal values in theatre. There are only personal needs, which get transformed into social and political actions, rooted in the individual histories of theatre." (p. 67)**

I want to counter this declaration by observing that many audiences have been able to enjoy and appreciate performances based on cultural expressions and codes foreign to their own. This demonstrates that theatre contains and reflects universal values, as well as the socially, politically and historically specific. In terms of actor training, it is crucial for an actor to develop the ability to shape physical and vocal actions beyond cultural conditioning. It would be extremely limiting if an actor were only able to ex-

press the culturally specific - unable to achieve some kind of neutrality or universality, from which to transform into any chosen quality or state of being.

*An Example of Cultural Appropriation:*

When I saw Peter Brook's *Mahabharata* in Paris (in 1986) I enjoyed the visual spectacle of this 8-hour long production with its stunning use of costumes, fire, water, fight scenes, and imagery. As I was unfamiliar with the source material, the intrinsic meanings and context of the stories went over my head.

After reading Bharucha's argument that this show was "one of the most blatant and accomplished appropriations of Indian culture in recent years" (Bharucha 1993), I came to realise that I had been rather naïve in my original response, and that Peter Brook's production was unethical in a number of ways. Bharucha compares Brook's *Mahabharata* with the process of commercial textile exploitation:

- i. Raw materials (the story) were taken from India
- ii. These materials were transformed into commodities (costumes, props, a text decontextualised from its history in order to sell)
- iii. Sold (forcibly) to India

What is the point of an international ensemble, Bharucha asks, when most of the actors' voices have been homogenised within a Western structure of action, and where they have to speak in a language foreign to them?

*Mutuality in Relationships During Intercultural Exchange:*

At the heart of Bharucha's critique on intercultural performance practice is his observation that there is often a lack of mutuality in relationship during the pro-



**The Blue Shawl:** From the left: Tia Barrett, Tema Kwan Fenton-Coyne, Ngahuaia Murphy (Noh Chorus in the background) in **THE BLUE SHAWL** (written / directed John G. Davies): Hamilton, 2008

cess of cultural exchange, particularly in the context of colonialism. Colonialism does not operate through exchange: rather it appropriates, decontextualises, and represent the ‘other’ culture, often with the complicity of its colonial subjects.

### Guiding Principles for Intercultural Exchange:

It is impossible within the scope of this article to cover all the issues of intercultural performance. To conclude I would like to articulate a number of guiding principles with regards to intercultural exchange.

1. Consider and absorb the original cultural and historical context of the material or stories that you are using as you point of departure
2. Ensure that your working relationships are mutually beneficial, and that there is equal pay amongst the collaborating artists
3. When working with an international or intercultural ensemble of actors allow the performers to use their first tongue and their native performance codes, and cultural expressions
4. Through the use devising and collaborative strategies allow each artist a voice in the exploration and generation of performance material

### The Blue Shawl:

The Blue Shawl (2008) is a recent New Zealand intercultural performance that is exemplary in the way it adhered to the fore-mentioned guidelines. The show is giving the Māori perspective on a historical event - wrapped in a poetic narrative - and presented within the structure and staging conventions of a Nō Play, incorporating Kapahaka (Māori performing arts) expressions, using both Māori and English language, with a mixed cast of Māori and Pakeha performers, and accompanied by Taonga Puoro (traditional Māori musical instruments), a small Taiko Drum and Nohkan (a Japanese flute).

The original historical incidents were considered and absorbed within their cultural context by writer / director John Davies. Permission to tell this story was obtained beforehand, and the performance material was developed in ongoing partnership and consultation with a close relative of the protagonist of the initial story. Throughout the writing and rehearsal process John consulted the appropriate Kaumatua (Māori elders) in matters of Te Reo (Māori language) and Tikanga Māori (Māori protocol). All the artists, involved in this project, participated on a voluntary basis, motivated by a deep commitment to tell this particular

story, a strong desire to work with the director, or both. The Māori performers were able to use Te Reo as well as English; they were encouraged to incorporate Māori codes and expressions, such as Māori footwork, wiriwiri (fluttering of the hands), pukana (facial animation), waiata (song), haka (dance), and Māori actions.

As the director, John is committed to creating the right atmosphere and circumstance that invite the appropriate response from the performers. He places huge value on the contribution of each individual, and allows room for experimentation and error. As such he employs devising strategies that allow each participating artist to have a voice in the ultimate performance.

### Final Quote:

**“If inter-culturalism is born through the meeting of ‘self’ and the ‘other’, the real challenge is to maintain the reciprocity of this dynamic“ (Bharucha 1993: 155)**

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